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CHAPTER I. IMTRODUCTQRY.
A. TRENDS OF THOUGHT IN VICTORIAN BRITAIN.
Estimates by contemporaries of the significance of a prominent 
national figure are apt to have only a temporary importance. But when Dean
Rashdall spoke in 1903 of Principal A. H. Fairbairn as being, on the whole,
1 
»our foremost English theologian', he gave the estimate of a first-rate
thinker on a man whose writing and speaking for some three decades had had a 
determining influence on theological thought. This influence was felt not 
only in the British Isles but also on the Continent, in France and Germany 
and especially in Holland.
In dealing with Fairbairn»s theology, which was constructed and had 
its chief influence in the latter part of the nineteenth century, it is necessary 
when tracing its roots to consider the dominant trends which moulded Victorian 
thought. The three tendencies which were most determinative in shaping the late 
Victorian theology and philosophy in Britain had been developing under cover, as 
it were, until all at once they broke into broad daylight and effected a revolutic 
in thought. The scientific advances made in the early part of the century 
naturally affected the thinking world in a direct way: but with the publication 
of Darwin*s Origin of Species (1859) British theology was turned up-side down. 
The idea of the continuity of history, so closely allied with the general notion 
of development and with the theory of evolution (which gave rise to the science 
of history), can be directly traced back at least a century: yet it was really 
not until Essays and Reviews appeared (1860) that British theologians realized
its significance for religious thought and especially its importance for the
2 
interpretation of the Bible. The idealist German philosophy which had its
1. Review of Phil, in Hibbert Jl., Vol. I, 1903, p. 172.
2. As a background to nineteenth century thought, it is necessary to have some 
understanding of the rise and rapid development of German idealism. A brief 
sketch of this movement is given in Appendix A.
inception in the Kantian revolt against natural theology and dogmatic philosophy 
effected an entrance only very slowly into the insularity of the British Isles, 
not making a marked impression on English thought until after the middle of the 
century. To be sure, Coleridge had been strongly influenced by the new transcen- 
dentalism, and J. S. Mill considered him the principal source of the reaction in 
England against eighteenth century rationalism. But Coleridge's impact on thought 
 as mediated through such men as Maurice and Carlyle (whose real master was 
Goethe), was felt rather late than early in the century, having prepared the 
way for the more general influx into England of German idealism. The roots of 
these trends must be sought, however, in the time before the Romantic movement 
broke with full force in England.
i. Pre-Romanticism.
The eighteenth century was marked by a dominant rationalism which 
arose out of the strong intellectual interest at the beginning of the century 
in the mathematical sciences. By rationalism we mean the placing of unbounded 
faith in the power of the speculative reason to attain ultimate truth by 
spinning it, so to speak, out of its own ratiocinative processes; a way of 
theorizing which in theological thought finds expression in natural theology; 
which is prone to be indifferent to tradition, especially of institutions; and 
which neglects for the most part those subliminal processes in man which are of 
such vital significance in human thought and action. The rationalist emphasis 
made itself felt in all areas of life: in the formal classicism of literature, 
in the hardening of manners, in the moralizing propensities of the middle 
classes, in a tolerance based on indifference in religion.
On the whole rationalism persisted unchecked, despite the pronounced
1 
divergent influence of Rousseau and although modified or at least coloured by
1. The central importance of Rousseau as the chief representative of this 
sentimental or subjective trend which culminated in full-blown Romanticism 
is realized when noting a few of his principles which cut radically across 
the age of rationalism. That man is good by nature (continued on next page)
the sentimentalism which occasionally broke into the classicism and proclivity 
toward speculation of the period. In literature this sentiraentalisci came to 
some significance in the nature poetry of James Thomson and the religious verse 
of Cowper or in the ' novels of sentiment 1 of Richardson and Fielding. Among the 
moralists the third Earl of Shaftesbury with his demonstrative emphasis on the 
goodness of man may be considered as a precursor of Rousseau; and the ethical 
theorists writing later in the century, both English and Scottish, however 
complete their trust in reason, clearly indicated a contrary trend of national 
thought in their concern with the concrete and with actual fact, feeling and 
the practical issues of the man in the street being made important at times 
central points of reference in their thinking.
In religion this trend toward sentimentalism showed itself most
cleariy in the rise of Pietism in Germany, and in England of Methodism and the
1 
Evangelical movement in the Church of England. 'Evangelicalism 1 , writes Tulloch
in reference to the early part of the nineteenth century, 'was. . . the only 
type of aggressive religion then, or for some time, prevailing, although its 
aggressiveness was more of a practical than an intellectual kind. 1 Nonetheless 
Evangelicalism, of whatever specific kind, exerted a marked influence on 
religious thought, if indirectly, in its stress on what Professor Brunner calls 
a 'one-sided Subjectivism'. 'The experience of the individual moves commanding-
ly into the centre of attention; pious feeling, even where theoretically this
2 
term was not used, becomes of chief importance.' Without question the stress on
the individual and on feeling were important forerunners of the Romantic 
movement.
(continued from previous page) and made vile by the institutions of civilization, 
that feeling should predominate over the patient investigation of fact, that 
the state of nature is the true state of -freedom and only by sweeping away 
the 'artificial restrictions of an artificial society' can the best be 
developed in man: these principles are all immediate and powerful harbingers 
of Romanticism. The influence of the development of these principles, 
Professor Webb notes, can be seen in the French Revolution, in Kant's moral 
philosophy, and in the work of Goethe. (A Century of Anglican Theology, p. 16)
1. Movements of Religious Thought, p. 10.
2. Wahrheit als Begegnung, p. 24,
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ii. Romanticism.
The growing opposition to rationalism by sentimentalism reached an 
apogean point in the early Romanticism of the nineteenth century. The epoch 
was one of self-conscious art, despite the exuberance, exaltation of spirit, 
and sense of freedom among its leaders: for a conscious effort was made to 
probe the mysteries of the hunan soul. There was, moreover, a conscious turning 
to the past, for this early Romanticism realized itself to be a kind of movement 
of which there had been at least one great exemplar before it the Elizabethan 
Age. The first Romanticism, dominant during the Napoleonic wars, mirrored the 
national consciousness by reacting against the revolutionary ideal which had 
given it much of its own motivating power. The mysticism basic in the poetical 
reform envisaged by Wordsworth and Coleridge and inaugurated by the publication, 
anonymously, of Lyrical Ballads (1798), had its roots in »a national idealism,
where a sympathetic interest in the poor enters as an element, but where there
1 
is no place for a foreign gospel of the rights of man 1 . With the second
generation of poets Byron, Shelley, Keats the reaction came in the form of 
moral revolt and a radical stress on progress and freedom which deliberately 
alienated itself from the mores of society. Concomitantly a group of philo- 
sophical radicals were active, and the school of Utilitarianism had its rise 
under the vigorous theorizing of Bentham and James Mill. Throughout, however, 
there was the sense of 'wonder 1 characteristic of the childhood of an era whose 
exalted spirits had experienced a rebirth. The movement received its deep 
impetus from the spiritual quality of the men who led it, especially the two 
giants, Wordsworth and Coleridge: the fresh delight in and sympathy for nature, 
the emphasis on passion and spontaneity, the freeing of the creative imagination, 
 these were but general characteristics of a tendency which received its vital 
stimulus from the liberation of a human nature which had had its depth and 
largeness starved by the artificial art and attenuated argument of the
1. Legouis and Cazamion, A History of English Literature» Vol. II, p. 1032. I 
am indebted to this work for some of the material in this paragraph.
saeculum rationalisticurn.
The f spirit astir* to which Newman referred in his Apologia was, 
of course, Romanticism in its broad sense and liberalism in specific reference 
to religious thought. The Romantic renascence in literature was but part of a 
larger impulse which quickly had its effect on religious thought. Sven 
Wordsworth, as Tulloch says, 'while leaving it (religious thought) in the old
channels. . . gave it a richer and deeper volume 1 ; as for Coleridge, 'later
1 
streams of religious thought are all more or less coloured by his influence f .
The Coleridge of Christabel and KublarKhan became the theologian of the Aids to 
Reflection or the Biblical critic of Confessions of an Enquiring Spirit; thus he 
brought to England as early as 1825 the new spirit of German idealism which he 
had absorbed while studying at Gfrbtingen. In religion he emphasized the central- 
ity of inward experience and considered the Bible as authoritative for him in so 
far as it was true, in so far as it 'found* him. Here the importance of giving 
due importance to the place of the religious consciousness, recognized if not 
named by all of the evangelical movements and given a central place by 
Schleiermacher, was making its entrance into British religious thought.
iii. Action and Reaction in the Church.
Quite independently of movements of thought in Germany and England 
a line of theological development sprang up in Scotland under the stimulation of 
Erskine and Campbell, both of whom rebelled against the narrow dogmatisms and 
rigid externality of the forensic Scottish Calvinism and made the starting points 
of a new theology personal experience and the inner witness of the heart: 
Erskine in setting forth salvation not so much as a future good but rather as a 
potential present possession to be made actual in the building of character by 
means of the correlative working of God's grace and man»s efforts, and Campbell 
in stating the significance of the Atonement as being in the example of our 
Lord and the moral influence of His death upon man. The influence of this new
1. Qp. cit.» pp. 5, 7.
theology, especially as expressed in Erakine's The Brazen Serpent (1831) and 
Campbell»s The Nature of the Atonement (1856) made itself felt in England, 
particularly through Maurice. Another »heretical 1 movement in the United 
Secession Church was headed by James Morison and resulted in the establishment 
of the Evangelical Union, in which Fairbairn was cradled during his formative 
years.
A movement in England equally liberal if somewhat different in its 
approach was that known as the early Oriel or Noetic School, in which originated 
forces which were to continue their influence through the century upon the 
so-called Broad Church group in the Anglican communion, a group characterized 
by its emphasis on scholarship and on liberalism, in both Church and State. 
Speaking generally, the Noetics attacked traditionalism and the scholastic 
theology on which early nineteenth century Anglican orthodoxy was based, being 
so positively liberal in tendency as to be anathema to conservative churchmen 
and having a sufficiently strong influence to induce a marked reaction in the 
Tractarian movement. Two men nurtured by the Oriel School were to become the 
protagonists in this reaction: Keble and Newman.
To speak of the rise of the High Church party as due merely to a 
reaction to liberalism would be to over-simplify its very complex origins. 
Especially in France there had been a strong Catholic revival as part of the 
general recoil of European thought from the rationalistic tendencies of the 
Aufklarung and the excesses during the Revolution and the Napoleonic era. This, 
together with the turning back to medievalism, a trend represented in literature 
most strikingly in the Waverley novels, and the increasing emphasis on the 
continuity of history and the importance of authority in religion as in life 
in general (as over against the contempt of the Encyclopedists for history or 
authority of any kind), had its place in the inception of the Oxford Movement. 
The ritualistic tendency among the Tractarians grew out of this medieval
nostalgia. Their intense dislike of emotionalism, as well as their desire to 
make dominant the institutional aspect of the Church and their emphasis on 
scholarship, were the signs.of a radical turning away from the Evangelicals, 
who as we have seen laid chief stress on feeling and put the individual rather 
than the institution at the centre of the religious stage, so to speak; even as 
their opposition to liberalism in both Church and State was a sharp reaction 
against the early Noetics. The close connection among the early Tractarians to 
Toryism in politics and a strong conservatism in regard to social issues 
changed, so that late in the nineteenth century and thereafter the High Church 
party began to take the lead on social issues, and even in regard to Biblical 
criticism the Anglo-Catholics became more liberal, as we shall see, in the 
publication of Lux Mundi.
The influence of the sacerdotalism and authoritarianism of the 
Oxford Movement was far-reaching. Despite the persistent opposition of the 
Broad Church party, Anglicanism became throughout the century increasingly 
'high 1 . Roman Catholicism was greatly strengthened in England throughout the 
century, in part because of the going over to Rome of Newman and some 150 of 
his followers, in part because of the gradual lifting of political restrictions 
from non-established churches, which gave increasing freedom to Roman Catholicism 
as to Nonconformity, in part, too, because of the concerted endeavour of the 
Roman Church to utilize its new opportunities in Britain firmly to establish 
itself. As Nonconformity grew in strength, it vigorously opposed the new 
sacerdotalism of the High Church movement with what at times was called a 'new 
Puritanism', which stressed preaching rather than ritual and which maintained 
that the source of religious authority was reason or individual religious 
experience rather than the church. That the High Church party itself underwent 
tremendous changes in the sixty years from 1830 to 1890, when Lux Mundi was 
published, can be realized by noting a few of the names among the two succeeding 
groups of 'younger 1 Anglo-Catholics, Samuel Wilberforce, Gladstone, and Church
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among the first group, or Gore, Illingworth and Moberly among the second, or by 
comparing and contrasting some of the Tracts (e. g., Baptism by Pusey, the 
leader of the movement, especially after Newman's capitulation to Rome, or the 
famous number ninety) with the essays in the later publication. The writers of
Lux Mundi manifest not only the influence of Green's idealism on Anglican
1 
theology, as Professor Webb indicates, but also the increasing liberalism in
Biblical criticism (as in Gore's article on The Holy Spirit) and in politics. 
During the middle of the century Maurice, Kingsley and Robert son, 
though strongly influencing the tendency toward the liberalizing of thought, may 
be grouped in the Broad Church succession only because their inclinations were 
strongly against Evangelicalism and Tractarianism, although in fact they were 
independents rather than party men. But their attitude was that of the Broad 
Church leaders, that is, 'that every new suggestion should be given a fair 
hearing, and that the hospitality of the Church to opinions and pious practice
be as wide and comprehensive as is possible consistently with the maintenance of
2 
her spiritual identity 1 . But the significance of the Broad Church movement lay
not merely in such a neutral open-mindedness in an age of spiritual conflict and 
rapid intellectual change. Its most momentous specific positive influence came 
with the publication of Essays and Reviews (1860) by a group mostly of Oxford 
scholars, although this publication but made more prominent a point of view held 
consistently by the Broad Church leaders through the century.
The rise of Nonconformists to power in Britain during the nineteenth 
century was due to multivaried causes. At the beginning of the century
'they were still under the ban of the law; they were unable to hold any 
public offices; thefc national Universities were closed to them; they 
could not be married in their own churches nor be buried save with the 
rites of the Church of England. They were compelled to pay church rates 
for the support of the Establishment, and, if their worship was tolerated, 
it was only in specially licensed conventicles* Add to these things the 
fact that reaction was in full force and Dissenters everywhere denounced
1. Webb, A Century of Anglican Theology, pp. 50-52.
2. Ibid, p. 40.
as Jacobites and revolutionaries, and that their growth and prosperity 
were viewed by the authorities with alarm and hatred, and we have a 
condition of things that might well have led them to give up their 
cause in despair.' (1)
But during the century, even while political freedom was being advanced, 
Nonconformists through strenuous efforts gradually achieved a recognized position 
which by the end of the century was mostly freed of disabilities. The efforts of 
various Nonconformist organizations and individuals, such as John Bright, who 
became prominent in politics had much to do with the increasing freedom allowed 
to Dissenters. But the growing democratic feeling in the country, a part of the 
widespread movement of democracy in the century, nurtured by the poverty and 
general unrest early in the century following the war with France and sustained 
by the deplorable conditions of the factory workers, especially in the newly 
industrialized midlands (which only slowly were granted representation in 
Parliament during the century), tended more and more for a general recognition 
of the justice of the Nonconformist cause. The Dissenters in general were much 
strengthened, too, by the coming into power of a class of prosperous factory 
owners who tended naturally to support the Free Churches. The vigorous backing 
of the Reform Bill of 1832 by Nonconformists greatly increased their prestige 
and power. Four years earlier the repeal of the Test and Corporation Acts, 
which opened public offices to Dissenters, was but the first of the many reforms 
through the century which worked for greater freedom among the Nonconformist 
groups as well as for the advance of democratic ideals in Britain. One of the 
most significant of these reforms was the opening to Nonconformists in 1871 of 
the national Universities of Oxford and Cambridge by the passage of the Bill
which 'abolished all ecclesiastical and theological tests for professors, tutors,
2 
fellows, and scholars'. It has only been in the last year or two, however, that
a member to the Theological Faculty has been appointed who is not a clergyman of
3 
the Church of England. Through the entire century Nonconformists held a
1. Selbie, Nonconformity, pp. 198-9.
2. Ibid, p. 209.
3. Professor C. H. Dodd at Cambridge.
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conspicuous place in philanthropic work. In addition to their large part in 
organizing and urging forward movements for parliamentary reform and for popular 
education, they carried a generous share in the work of prison reform, the 
abolition of the slave trade, and the various Factory Acts passed through the 
century. It would be inaccurate to suggest that only Nonconformists were 
concerned with these social democratic issues: yet the words of Lord John 
Russell give a not untruthful indication of their leadership in the work of 
social amelioration. »I know the Dissenters, They gave us the emanci/pation
of the slave. They gave us the Reform Bill. They gave us Free Trade. And
1 
they will give us the abolition of Church Rates. 1
With so much action and reaction in the thought of the century, with 
so much general unrest and changeX in political and social life, there could not 
but be a shifting religious mood which mirrored among the people the spiritual 
conflict which often occurred among the thinkers of the age. It may be said 
that before the middle of the century spiritual struggle took place more among 
thinkers such as Robertson, George Eliot, or Francis Newman, to take random 
examples. In the second half of the century, however, especially after 1860, 
there was widespread doubt of and uncertainty about religion, due in part to 
the disturbing effect of Biblical criticism; in part to the vague fear of German 
thought; in part to the advance in scientific discovery and in temporal well- 
being, which had brought about a spirit of practical materialism, and this in
turn had tended to make religion both unnecessary and unreal and to make people
2 
indifferent to the churches. The agnosticism of the speculative evolutionist
had a penetrating influence, having been wholly ineffectually countered by the 
Conservative party in the Established Church, though more successfully combatted 
by the Liberal group, which also had a radical left, and by some Nonconformists. 
An uncritical faith in the idea of progress and an 'irreligious optimism 1
1. Quoted by Selbie, Nonconformity, p. 201.
2. Ibid, p. 255.
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dominated the time.
There were some positive influences which had a steadying and
1 
clarifying effect on the vagueness and uncertainties of religious faith.
With his massive stress on basic morality, his eloquent defense of a spiritual 
interpretation of the universe against all attacks of materialism, and his 
impassioned plea for the ultimate meaning of life, Thomas Carlyle through the 
long period of his activity gave a continuous and emphatic 'everlasting Yea' 
in answer to religious doubt, and that despite his marked impatience with insti- 
tutional religion. The poetry of Tennyson and Browning in maintaining a strong 
religious optimism opposed the pessimism which gradually was taking hold of the 
country in the latter part of the century and also emphasized the validity of 
what might be termed elemental religious experience in the individual. Another 
influence came from the several Moody and Sankey revivals, following as they 
did upon smaller revivals which had sprung up after the middle of the century. 
The Moody and Sankey meetings stirred and quickened and deepened religious life 
in Britain as nothing had done since the Evangelical Revival.
The period covering roughly the last forty years of the century was 
one of many conflicting movements: revivals, the re-awakened Oxford Movement 
in its second and later phases, the continuing efforts of liberal thought to 
effect a rapprochement between religion and science, the widespread attempts at 
increased social amelioration. Each movement clamoured for its own definite 
position in the general life and thought of the time. It was not 'a self- 
complacent, unquestioning age (as it has often been called). On the contrary,
it was a time of widespread doubt and inquiry and of adventurous discovery in
2 
many fields. . . . .'
1. Matthew Arnold's hesitating faith exemplifies a spirit which became more 
prevalent toward the close of the century. His tenuous definition of 
religion as 'morality touched with emotion' and sad pessimism which coloured 
his poetry are indicative not only of his own inner uncertainty, perhaps due 
partly to his rebellion against Romanticism and return to classicism, but 
also of the general trend of the times, especially in regard to the increasing 
pessimism.
2. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850« p. 50.
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iv. The Rise of the Historical Spirit.
The various movements of which I have been speaking show in their 
distinctive work the impress upon them of the historical spirit which rose into 
prominence during the nineteenth century, a general tendency out of which grew 
the science of history, the comparative study of religion, and the new science of 
anthropology. Even as Evangelicalism with its emphasis on the individual had 
neglected the historical background in which man is placed, so the Tractarians 
with their stress on the continuity of the church, looking back in this regard 
with the literary Romantics as led by Sir Walter Scott to medieval Europe, were 
concerned with the historical roots of Christianity and of its institutions. In 
this respect, as in their emphasis on the place of authority in religion, they 
reacted against the tendencies associated with the French Revolution, with its 
ignoring of the historical and its blatant contempt for traditional authorities. 
The Broad Church group's similar emphasis on history (in a more constructive way 
because of its freer spirit of dispassionate inquiry) arose, too, out of its
continuous stress on scholarship and its strong leaning to Platonism, which as
1 
Professor Webb points out, has been a leading characteristic of all Anglican
theology. The persistent investigation by the scientists of the natural world 
also contributed to the bringing into prominence of the principles of historical 
method.
The historical method, which may briefly be characterized as the 
genetic approach to any fact or situation, which is studied as something which 
has grown or is growing and which can be understood only by investigating all its 
antecedents, the effort always being to trace processes to their beginnings,  
had become increasingly significant after the unhistorical character of the early 
part of the eighteenth century and the revolutionary reaction against history 
toward its close. As early as 1748 Conyers Middleton had pointed to the need of 
the belief in the continuity of history, and the search for external evidences of
1. A Century of Anglican Theology, p. 8.
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revelation in Christianity for the next five or six decades acted as a stimulus 
to the development of the historical method, as did, too, the inquiry among moral 
philosophers into the origin of the moral faculty. The idea of development, so 
closely connected with the whole concept of history, had been suggested in 
various ways with increasing clarity, by Goethe in his principle of metamorphosis, 
by Hegel in his stress on the progressively self -revealing spirit, by Newman in 
his notable essay on the growth of the church. It was Hegel who had made history 
 philosophically respectable 1 by establishing the history of philosophy as an 
independent science and by the dominant place which history held in his whole 
system.
In general the method of historical criticism was recognized as 
valid by the middle of the nineteenth century in Britain as it had been recog- 
nized even earlier on the Continent,  as valid in all spheres except in that of 
the interpretation of the Scriptures. The assumption in the first half of the 
century was that in the Bible is to be found f a revelation from God of such 
authority that even on matters belonging to the sphere of the natural sciences 
or of history its statements cannot be allowed to be incorrect without thereby
impairing the f?T*\im of the whole to be, in the phrase hallowed by tradition,
1 
"the Word of God" ' : and this general assumption continued powerfully to affect
religious thought and especially popular notions about religion through the 
latter part of the Victorian era.
The publication in 1860 of Colenso's Introduction to the Pentateuch 
and the Book of Joshua and of Essays and Reviews (to which reference has already 
been made) was revolutionary in its effect, possibly mostly because principles 
of historical criticism had here been applied to the Scriptures by clergymen. 
These books, together with Darwin's epoch-making Origin of Species, which had 
appeared the year before, not only caused a furore among all church groups, but
1. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850, p. 60.
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definitely Marked the end of an era in regard to Biblical criticism in Britain, 
effectually opening the way for the higher criticism of the Bible which, despite 
Coleridge's cautious protest against a 'dictated* Bible and the radical German 
criticism, had made very slow progress in England. The Bible was to be inter- 
preted thereafter, as Jowett in Essays and Reviews suggested it should be, 'like 
any other book'. In this connection it must be remembered, however, that Robertson 
Smith was yet to stand a heresy trial in Scotland in 1875 for his critical work 
on the Old Testament. A movement among religious thinkers of considerable moment 
which grew up during the last quarter of the century because of the new stress 
on history was what came to be called the 'return to the historical Jesus'.
In addition to changing profoundly the whole approach to Biblical 
criticism, the historical method as its application spread to new fields of 
inquiry stimulated the rise of the Historical Science of Religion with its
interest in 'the diversity of human religion and particularly in the vast field
1
of it which lies outwith the pale of the Hebrew-Christian development». On the 
Continent Max Mttller was one of the pioneers in this field, and it may be noted 
that Fairbairo was one of the first British theologians to recognize the 
importance of this new 'science' and to introduce its findings and its methods 
into the British Isles. Anthropology, which centred attention on the study of 
primitive culture, became a significant science during the later Victorian years, 
its chief British leaders having been the eminent scholars Tylor and Sir James 
Frazer.
v. The Scientific Advance.
The growth of the science of history was but part of a general 
advance of science through the nineteenth century. The work of Herschel in 
astronomy, of Dalton and Young in physics, of lyell in geology, of Schwann and 
Schleiden in biology, to mention but a very few of the vast number of natural 
scientists doing research during this period, indicates to some small degree
1. John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion, p. 110.
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the remarkable fecundity of scientific thought during the Victorian epoch. As 
the scientific point of view became established, science itself rose to a 
dominating position over all of life such as it had never before held. The 
scientific method invaded every sphere of thought, not only transforming 
scholarship but turning many individual thinkers from a spiritual to a completely
materialistic view of the universe. Every new discovery in astronomy and geology
1 
seemed further to reduce the dignity and significance of man.
The propounding by geologists of the uniformitarian theory had 
already caused some disquietude among religionists during the first half of the 
century by showing that the Old Testament cosmogony could not be taken literally, 
and had led them to make a last desperate effort to keep science under the 
control of theology. Even while this struggle was going on, science meanwhile 
becoming ever more independent, Darwin1 s Origin of Species burst with revolution- 
ary force upon the religious thought of the day. The idea of evolution certainly 
was not new: in a general way it had been in the air for some time, and both 
Goethe and Larmarck had already applied it in the sphere of biology, whereas 
Comte had elaborated it in some detail in his GOUTS de Philosophic Positive. 
Darwin 1 s work, however, especially because of the method of evolution by natural 
selection which he set up as a hypothesis and because of the wealth of detailed 
evidence he gave to substantiate his theory, startled the mid-Victorian English 
world by destroying (so it seemed) any possibility of belief in the creation of 
man.
The effects on religious thought of the increasing conflict between 
science and religion may be briefly summarized. The notion of a rigid system of 
natural laws which determined all action and interaction in the world of nature 
and of man gave further impetus to the prevailing tendency toward materialism 
which worked against a spiritual interpretation of the universe. Since all 
activity in the world can be explained in natural terms, any idea of a super-
1. Cp. Elliott-Binns, Religion in the Victorian Era, pp. 160, 162.
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natural being acting on nature from »without' (as it were) is an exploded
1 
superstition, according to the late nineteenth century science. In this
'closed system 1 there is no room for the concept of miracle and little room for 
the practice of prayer, except in a very restricted form. God if God there be
 does not so much work on nature as through nature, or rather, in nature. The
2 
doctrine of the immanence of God was so elaborated and trenchantly defended
that it often carried its supporters very near to or completely into pantheism. 
The tendency to identify nature and God raised a real problem for Christian 
believers, for it was difficult to conceive of the all-good and all-loving God 
of the Christian faith as responsible for all the waste and brutalities of 
natural selection. The traditional doctrines of man being made in the image of 
God and of original sin, moreover, were challenged by the emphasis placed upon 
man having  descended 1 from the ape.
The various scientific findings made even more prominent the monism which had 
an important place in philosophical thought since Schleiermacher and Eegel. 
Professor Webb in Religious Thought in England from 1850 shows in a closely 
knit exposition the development of 'immanentism 1 in the world of thought. He 
traces it as a logical outcome of the whole drift of thought from the end of 
the Middle Ages onwards, to find within 'this world 1 that which to medieval 
man f had been presented as belonging to "another world" and manifested in 
"this world" only through a supernatural intervention from that other.' 
(p. 21) Spinoza's immanentism, 'whatever is, is of God', was carried on by 
Schleiermacher, who broke down the natural-supernatural dualism. Kant in 
making only phenomena knowable and things-in-themselves unknowable by the 
human mind, threw doubt on the genuine reality of 'another world'. Goethe 
emphasized the 'organic unity of all reality' and Hegel made the Absolute 
already present in human experience. In England Wordsworth's poetry was 
strongly immanentist; and Coleridge and Carlyle under the influence of German 
idealism represented the same trend, though neither brought out 'into full 
relief the theological immanentism which was implicit 1 in their point of view. 
Similarly the attitude of such leaders as Maurice, Westcott, and Hort, though 
tending in the same direction, always implied the existence of a transcendent 
object for religious worship. In Comte's attempt to replace Christian theism 
with a religion of society or science, and in J, S. Mill's ethics, which 
'dispensed with all supernatural sanctions as unnecessary' (p. 64} for the 
moral life, the immanentism became specifically non-religious. The tendency 
continued in the evolutionary philosophy which followed, realistic and 
agnostic in Spencer, idealist in the neo-Hegelians, the trend becoming a 
conscious immanentism with the idealists. Professor Webb suggests four 
principal direct sources of the increasing immanentism throughout the century: 
the idealist philosophy which lay behind the Romantic movement, the idea of 
evolution as it became a plausible hypothesis, the new historical sense, 
the less individualistic type of thought and piety.
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Much of the conflict between science and religion was due to 
arrogance and prejudice on both sides: religionists arrogant because of the 
traditional dominance of theology over science and because of their fear that 
the foundations of faith actually were being undermined; scientists arrogant 
because of their new sense of power at being able to 'explain 1 the universe and 
all in it. A number of religious leaders,  among them such men as Kingsley, 
Church and Hort,  recognized the Darwinian theory for what it was, that is, an 
unusually comprehensive hypothesis which gave new insight into the workings of 
the universe: and these men could work intelligently to defend the claims of 
religion at the real point of issue, namely, whether the universe should be 
conceived and interpreted in spiritual or naturalistic terms. This real issue 
between science and religion came into the open when scientists like Tyndall 
and Huxley or philosophical evolutionists like Spencer or Stephen carried 
science into the sphere of metaphysics and made pronouncements on the ultimate 
meaning of life and the universe: to controvert such speculations was the task 
of religious thinkers during the last quarter of the century.
Philosophy developed primarily along two lines in England during 
the Victorian era: the one, positivist and agnostic, tried on an empirical 
basis to establish its system on science; the other, idealist and spiritual, 
repudiated empiricism and carried forward the Hegelian idealism. The former 
originated in France early in the century, where Comte had developed with 
remarkable detail the system based entirely, he insisted, on science. Positi- 
vism, the religion of Humanity, never had much influence in France, but in 
England J. S. Mill, George Eliot and Matthew Arnold were among its adherents. 
Cerate's chief tenets were that man can know only phenomena, such terms as cause
et*
will or force being based on illusions; that the study of contemporary 
society cannot be divorced from all its past history; that theology and metaphy- 
sics, in this order, are characteristic of the first two stages of civilization, 
but that science as it advances shall inevitably replace them, all that science
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cannot explain being denied reality; that Humanity takes the place of God and 
altruism, of worship.
John Stuart Mill, who was considerably influenced by Comte, 'is, 
on the whole, the most interesting and characteristic figure in English philoso- 
phy in the nineteenth century. . . For more than a generation Mill's influence
was dominant in nil departments of philosophy and political thought; he had the
1 
initiative, and set the problems for his opponents as well as for his adherents.'
Although he maintained that knowledge can be only of sensations and not of 
either subject or object, he deviated from complete empiricism, at least 
implicitly, in two respects: in his definition of matter as 'permanent 
possibility of sensation' he admits an objective order which has permanence; 
in his conception of mind as a succession of feelings or states of consciousness, 
he implies the identity of a self with memory which can be conscious of such a 
succession. His utilitarian ethic is closely based on that of Bent ham, although 
he makes a significant modification of the 'happiness principle' that the 
quality as well as the quantity of the happiness must be taken into account. 
This modification, however, does not affect the validity of Pfleiderer's 
criticism of the Millite ethic, that it fails to explicate 'why we feel moral
obligation at all', a question which is quite distinct from the inquiry into
2 
'the content, the what, of right moral conduct'. Mill's agnosticism was
tempered in the posthumously published essay on Theism (1874), in which he 
tentatively develops the idea of a God whose power over nature is limited. 
In the construction of his synthetic system Spencer became the 
leader in the development of an evolutionary philosophy. As the final mystery 
of both science and religion, he predicated 'the Unknowable', to which could not 
be ascribed, he asserted, any moral or personal attributes, but which he nonethe- 
less called infinite and absolute without, however, making any attempt to explain
1. Sorley, History of English Philosophy, pp. 249, 261.
2. Development of Theology, p. 321.
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how the absolute could enter into relations with the world. From the Unknowable 
all phenomena were derivable. His philosophy is based on the physical and 
biological sciences, the law of universal evolution under which he tried to 
organize all phenomena in a scheme which developed from simple to complex having 
as its modus operand! what he called the 'persistence of force 1 . Through his 
doctrine of inheritance of acquired characteristics, Spencer tried unsuccessfully 
to effect a reconciliation between empiricism and transcendentalism: according 
to this theory, which science never substantiated, he maintained that knowledge
can be inherited so that it could be a priori in the mind of the individual
1 
though in the race always of necessity a posteriori. His evolutionary ethic is
hedonistic, much like the early utilitarian ethicj and he gave a marked laissez- 
faire emphasis in both his economic and political theory, due to his persistent 
bias to individualism.
German idealism had been seeping slowly into Britain through the 
nineteenth century, particularly as we have seen through the writings of 
Coleridge and Carlyle. Sir William Hamilton with his criticism of Kant and his 
cosmopolitan learning also helped to make Continental philosophy known in 
Britain. It was only after the mid-point of the century, however, after the 
influence of Hegel had already waned in Germany, that a British idealist or 
neo-Hegelian movement really became established, the chief protagonist of the 
new philosophy having been T. H. Green, although E. Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet 
were hardly less influential.
Green's work was chiefly constructive and designed to show that 
empiricism cannot account for man's having any knowledge whatever: knowledge 
is possible only (1) in so far as man has a continuing self, conscious of itself, 
which can relate sensations and (2) in so far as the world to be known is an 
organized unity, which in turn implies the action of all-embracing mind. With 
his defense, ex animo. of the spiritual nature of the world, which he
1. Cp. Moore, Christian Thought Since Eant,
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maintained is the expression of the »one spiritual self-conscious being 1 , and 
of man, whose mind is a ' reproduction 1 of the eternal mind, Green sought to 
refute the prevailing materialism and scepticism. 'He appealed to nEnglishmen 
under five-and-twenty" to close their Mill and Spencer and open their Kant and
Hegel; and this appeal marks an epoch in English thought in the nineteenth
1 
century.'
vi. The Mew Social Feeling.
Behind the vast social movement of the Victorian century lay at 
least three cardinal causes: (1) the general democratic trend, both revealed in 
and stimulated by the American and French Revolutions and in the strong rise of 
nationalism over all of Europe in 1848, which later in the century was further 
to work itself out in the imperialism of England, France, and Germany, a 
democratic trend which in England was in evidence in the parliamentary reforms 
of the century and the large increase of representation in government; (2) the 
Industrial Revolution, which resulted on the one hand in a rapid increase of 
material prosperity and a general re-distribution of wealth, on the other in the 
rise of a factory system which quickly changed an agrarian into an urban 
population and caused countless social evils to spring up in the new mushroom- 
growth cities; (3) the change in political economic policy after the middle of 
the century from laisse z-faire to government paternalism, from individualism to 
collectivism (generally speaking), a change readily observed Ty contrasting the 
political theory of Mill and Spencer with that of Green.
Of the multivaried social changes which occurred during the century, 
only a very few can be noted as indicative of some general tendencies: the 
extension of education, and the large increase of newspapers printed and read, 
resulting in a time of remarkable mental activity; the passing of considerable 
factory legislation which helped to better the plight of the working people in 
such matters as housing conditions, wage scales, and number of working hours;
1. Sorley, op. cit.. p. 288
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the rapid spread of Trade Unions and the beginning of the Co-operative Movement, 
both of which continued alongside the steady growth of socialistic ideas; the 
founding of Settlement Houses and of such ameliorative organizations as the 
Salvation Amor, which showed that social work was being undertaken more by 
organized groups and less by isolated individuals, as had been the situation 
earlier in the century. Developing together with all these concrete social 
changes, social theory was slowly evolving, so that through this epoch we see 
the rise of political economy in England; and progress is made in the allied 
sciences of sociology and social psychology, and more attention given to the 
study of jurisprudence.
Although many of the leading social reformers were anti-Christian, 
many others received their chief impetus from the Church. Only gradually through 
the century, however, did the idea develop that the Church should not only 
palliate social evils with 'charity 1 , but also be responsible, as an institution. 
for finding and striking at the roots of these evils. Fairbairn pointed out 
that one reason for the widespread unbelief, both critical and uncritical, was
that religion T has not prevented, or remedied in the measure man has a right
1 
to expect of it, the evils from which he suffers 1 .
The leading features of the Victorian social changes have been
characterized as 'the approximation of man to man, class to class, peer to
2 
peasant, Churchman to Nonconformist 1 and the position of woman to that of man.
B. THE ROOTS OF FAIRBAIRN»S THEOLOGY.
Fairbairn (1838-1912) was peculiarly alive to the significance for 
the Christian faith of the multifarious trends of thought in his time, and he 
had particular aptitude for constructive interpretation. The wide and deep 
range of his own background, the encyclopaedic nature of his knowledge, made it
1. Catholicism, p. 6.
2. Elliott-Binns, op. cit., p. 410.
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possible for him to stress what was meaningful, vigorously to controvert what he 
considered subversive, and in general to be a defender of the faith whose 
especial delight was to take elements from modern thought which many supposed 
destructive to the Christian religion and show how in actuality these had an
integral connection with a reasonable interpretation of it.
1
That there is, as Principal Garvie suggests, »no revival of Fair- 
bairn f s theology* in our own time may be due in part to the contemporary nature 
of much of his writing, in which he purposely made it relevant for specific 
issues of his day; due in part, too, to his invincible faith in human reason, 
in a somewhat restricted sense, which would be considered subversive by many 
modern theologians who have been attempting to disenfranchise reason. Withal
>
Fairbairn made a lasting contribution to religious thought which is not entirely 
irrelevant for our day. The emphasis he placed on history, for example, and the
way in which he rooted his theology in history, would be a salutary corrective
2 
to what has been termed the f historical scepticism' of the dialectic theologians.
Later I shall try to indicate what is of permanent value in Fairbairn f s religious 
thought. In this introductory chapter I shall consider only the general back- 
ground (Part A) and the roots (Part B) of his constructive work. In view of the 
excellent definitive biography of Fairbairn written by Principal W. B. Selbie, 
it will not be necessary to burden this thesis with biographical data, except in 
so far as they have specific bearing upon the development of his theology.
i. Early Formative Experiences.
The vibrant Christian faith of his mother was a highly significant 
.intellectual and spiritual influence on Fairbairn. While discussing the doctrine
of the Incarnation of our Lord in one of his books, he breaks into the exposition
3 
with a personal experience in which he acknowledges his obligation to his
1. "Dr. Fairbairn and Dr. Forsyth", Christian World, Nov. 17, 1938, p. 9.
2. D. H. Baillie in an address, "The Jesus of History and the Word of God".
3. Place of Christ, p. 475.
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maternal parentage.
'One of the things time has made most obvious to me is this: 
 that of all the human persons that have contributed to the shaping 
of the character which is as destiny, the mightiest was that of an 
obscure man who died years before I was born. But his daughter was 
ray mother; and the daughter so loved and revered the father, so 
remembered his sayings, so understood his mind, so believed the faith 
that ruled and guided him, that she had no higher thought for her 
son than to make him such a man as her father had been. And so, 
invisible as he was, he became the real parent of the spirit and 
character of the man who now writes this book. 1
In another connection he relates that when he was born his mother said, 'This
is to be a man for God 1 , and holding this hope ever before him she reared him
1 
as one who had already been consecrated.
2 
The effect on Fairbairn of being a member in a Scottish family
which had produced twelve ministers in two generations cannot be over-stressed.
The Scotsman's love for the intricacies of philosophical and theological
3 
speculation', together with the deep fervour springing out of his personal,
evangelical religious experience, are in evidence throughout all of his work. 
Going to work at ten years of age, he read and studied by night for himself 
until nearly twenty, when he entered Edinburgh University and the Evangelical 
Union Academy. The erudition he later attained was dependent largely on his 
own efforts. When twenty-two years of age he was still very backward in his
education, 'and in some respects was still doing the work of a fourth-form boy
4 
at a public school 1 . During his three years at these two institutions but
especially during his twelve-year pastorate at Bathgate, broken by one year's 
study in Germany, he laid the broad, deep foundation of the learning which
1. In writing about Barrie's Margaret Ogilvy, Fairbairn said that »he could 
hardly read it because of another and to him grander and sweeter figure'. 
Quoted in Life, pp. 2-3.
2. Fairbairn's father is described as a »miller and a typical Scotchman of his 
class, a man of grit and conscience, with a mind to work and a deeply 
religious nature *. (Life, p. 2.) But his mother had the most determinative 
influence on his character.
3. Selbie, Andrew Martin Fairbairn, 1858-1958, Cong»l Quat., Vol. XVI, No. 4, 
Oct., 1938, p. 395.
4. Life, p. 24.
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undergirded and made significant all his later theological work.
The influence of three men in the formative years of Fairbairn's 
life was of particular importance. The first was the minister of an Evangelical 
Union Church in Leith, the Rev. Joseph Boyle, whose church Fairbairn joined 
while living in Edinburgh because he was attracted by its broader and more 
gracious type of religion than that taught in the more rigid Calvinist Secession 
Church of which his parents were members. It was under Mr. Boyle's tutelage 
and 'quickening influence 1 that Fairbairn began the study of Greek and other 
subjects ancillary to the work of the ministry when he decided to enter the 
Evangelical Union ministry.
The second man was John Stuart Blackie, professor of Greek in 
Edinburgh University, who inspired in Fairbairn a high ideal of scholarship but 
whose more determinative influence lay in inculcating a deep interest in 
Hellenism. Out of this association came the stimulus to study Greek literature 
and culture which later was to blossom into Fairbairn's rich background in 
Greek thought. Here too may have been born the initial interest in the compara- 
tive study of religions, the continued study of which throughout his life was to 
prove of such significant value in the formulation of Fairbairn's theology.
 
Leaving Presbyterianism and joining a tiny, unpopular and much
1 
misunderstood denomination 'which was outside the pale of brotherhood 1 brought
2 
Fairbairn into contact with the man he called 'master and friend' and who had
much to do with the shaping of his character. This was James Morison, the 
leader and founder of the Evangelical Union. From Morison*s indefatigable 
industry and high standard of scholarship Fairbairn received much direct stimu- 
lation while at the Union Academy in Glasgow. But the general background of 
Morison as heresiarch and his courageous stand in the controversy in which he 
was finally ousted from the United Secession ministry must have left even a 
deeper impression on young Fairbairn, who saw the marks of the years in the older
1. Life, p. 52.
2. Fairbairn in his I&roduction to 0. Smeaton's Principal James Morison. p. xv.
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man and realized that the sustained doctrinal conflict had placed them there. 
Fairbairn's own later vigour in tenaciously sustaining controversy over theolog- 
ical and ecclesiastical issues must have received its initial impetus from the 
example of Moriaon and also from his own position in the Evangelical Union
Church. Even in these early days 'he could not rest till he had convinced others,
1 
or, at least, had vindicated his position in his own eyes'. Morison's reaction
2 
against the strict Calvinist theology, his emphasis on the need of always
considering the practical outworking of doctrine, and the necessity of the 
Evangelical Union to be ruggedly independent in the face of strong opposition 
from more powerful ecclesiastical bodies, these all had a part in forming a 
mental disposition in Fairbairn which throughout his life was to make him 
vigorously Nonconformist and one of the strong protagonists of Independent 
Protestantism in modern Britain, was to lead him always to ground his exposition 
of religious truth in experience, and was to encourage his own strong protest
against Calvinist orthodoxy which had still a considerable influence near the
3 
close of the century. Yet Nonconformity for him was never merely negative in
the sense of being a protest against an existing system which in its total
effect he thought subversive. 'It was a living and distinctive thing, and big
4 
with promise for the future. 1 Its principles, he felt, must ultimately prevail.
That he considered himself to be in the vanguard of theological progress gave 
much of the confidence and buoyancy to his work in his first pastorate as well 
as later when his position became more established.
In 1876, when he was a candidate for the Chair of Moral Philosophy
1. Life, p. 54.
2. Principal Garvie summarizes Morison's position with 'the three universalities, 
that God loves all, that Christ died for all, and that the Holy Spirit strives 
in all'.3 The Theology of Dr. Andrew Martin Fairbairn, London Quarterly, 
Jan., 19J9, p. 28.
3. A vitriolic criticism of the Place of Christ, for example, together with 
Drummond's Ascent of Man, written in 1894 by Professor Watts of Assembly's 
College, Belfast, is largely based on the orthodox Calvinist apologetic.
4. Life, p. 55.
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in the University of Aberdeen and for the same chair in the University of St. 
Andrews, both Crown appointments, the fact that he was a member of the strongly 
distrusted Evangelical Union no doubt had much to do with his defeat for both 
chairs, although it was generally recognized that he was unusually well qualified 
for either of the posts. During these days before the issue had been decided
he wrote to the Secretary of State for Scotland and explained the theological
1 
position of the Evangelical Union.
1 Allow me then to say that we agree in every essential point with 
the theology of the Scotch churches. Our points of difference may be 
reduced to two. We hold (1) a universal Atonement, or the sacrificial 
death of Christ as a death for all; (2) a conditional election, or 
election to eternal life through faith. ....
 I may say as to ecclesiastical questions, we are not as a body 
voluntaries. For myself I have taken no part in any movement against 
the Church of Scotland, but have often spoken in its defence, believing 
that a national church is the ideal church, consecrating the state and 
connecting religion with all the forms and phases of its life.'
Such a statement is of especial interest because of the pronounced anti-
«
Erastian views for which Fairbairn later contended with much vigour.
ii. Study in Germany.
Before this date, however, while he was still in his first pastorate 
at Bathgate (1860-1872), he experienced a period of spiritual crisis in which he 
completely lost his faith and went to Germany for a year's study in the hope of 
recapturing or finding a new religious conviction which could sustain him. 
Before the time of the crisis it was his daily habit at Bathgate to study three 
hours before and some five hours after breakfast, and by means of this strict 
regimen he had covered systematically with a remarkable degree of thoroughness 
the whole field of theology. His preaching, however, had continued to be 
evangelistic rather than theological and, as Principal Selbie suggests, 'there
can be little doubt that his theological views so far had been adopted rather
2 
than assimilated'. The spiritual upheaval could not but come; and when it did,
he at once left his parish and went to Berlin. Years later in a Chapter of
1. Quoted in Life, p. 75.
2. Ibid, p. 36.
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1 
Autobiography he described how poignantly the experience affected him.
'And so, in a mood compounded partly of hope but largely of 
despair, I determined to seek abroad the light I could not find at 
home. Well do I remember the day when, feeling cheerless, forsaken of 
God, unpitied and unblest of men, I left the manse to take my way to 
Germany, never expecting to return. Life seemed a ruin; all its plans 
had been thrown down; and in the desolation one's best and only hope 
was to find in journalism a new pulpit, and in literature a mode of 
speech more suitable to living men. It is now forty years since I 
set out on that memorable quest, thinking in the bitterness of my soul 
that all the old loves were dead beyond any chance or hope of resur- 
rection and return. Yet God's purpose did not fail, though the dreams 
of man might perish.'
At Berlin Fairbairn found the fellowship with students especially 
stimulating, and in the article just quoted he called them 'the truest and
most efficient teachers'. From their spirit of free inquiry and outspoken
2 
frankness he learned 'that one could doubt and not sin', a lesson which when
learned at once lifted from him the burden of guilt he had been carrying 
because of the collapse of his faith. In ijie academically free but religiously 
arid atmosphere of the German university, on the basis of his omnivorous reading 
and the lectures he attended, especially those of Dorner and Hengstenberg, 
Fairbairn's theological position became fixed in a system which was 'so complete 
as to be almost premature. His thought moved so easily and freely along the 
lines thus laid down, and opened up to him a field so vast, that he was content
to confine himself to it and only reluctantly and with difficulty entered into
3 
other and less familiar spheres.'
Theological thought in Germany at this time was under the dual 
influence of Schleiermacher and Hegel, although this influence was no longer in 
its heyday. The emphasis in theology was Christological and historical, the 
stress on Christology naturally working itself out in criticism which sought to 
find the historic Person as He had been. In criticism the Tubingen School was 
breaking up, Strauss had just published the new edition of the Leben Jesu. and
1. Cont. Rev., vol. 91, Apr., 1907, p. 558.
2. Ibid, pp. 559, 560.
5. Life, p. 41.
£8 
Ritschl f s book indicating his break with the Tttbingen School had just appeared.
'Underneath all these questions, and unifying all, 1  Fairbairn 
wrote of this period, »was the notion that Christianity was a system of 
ideas; or, to speak with Hegel, it was a form of thought, though it lived 
in a realm where conceptions were figurate and language symbolical. 1 (1)
Dorner himself belonged to the Vermittlung School, that is mediating 
between Schleiermacher's and the orthodox theology, and at the same time seeking 
a rapprochement between philosophy and theology. The anthropocentric trend, a 
general characteristic of the nineteenth century, appeared in the application 
of the same terms to 'generic man' which orthodoxy had applied only to Christ: 
the distinction between God and man thus became confused. In Dorner this con- 
fusion appeared particularly in making the satisfaction for man's sin
'consist above all in Christ's vicarious suffering, or His entrance into 
humanity's consciousness of guilt and condemnation'. Thus 'he conceives 
it possible for Christ so to identify Himself with humanity as to share 
its consciousness of guilt.' (2)
Fairbairn considered of particular importance Dorner's interpretation of Deity 
in ethical and personal terms, God being conceived as concrete goodness, 'the
parent ethical personality whose goodness determined both His own ends and those
3 
of the universe.' Dorner's influence on Fairbairn was determinative, and
Hengstenberg, strongly orthodox, also made a deep impression on him. That 
Fairbairn's Biblical criticism always remained pre-Wellhausen (even as in his 
theological thinking he never came to terms with Ritschl) was due to the hold 
Hengstenberg had on him.
The total effect of his stay in Germany Fairbairn summarized in
4 
part as follows:
 The questions that really mattered to us had been altogether 
ignored (i. e., in Scotland); whether God was and what; whether He 
was one as a simple atom or as a complex and complicated organism; 
what person signified, whether it meant the same thing when applied 
to God, to Jesus Christ, to His natures and to man; whether God had 
spoken or could speak to man and what He had said; whether revealed 
truth could be verified and known as God's, and whether the process
1. Chapter of Autobiography, op. pit., p. 566.
2. Franks, A History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ. Vol. II, p. 296.
3. Chapter of Autobiography, op. cit.» p. 562.
4. Ibid, pp. 568-9.
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of verification involved an appeal to an infallible authority, outer or 
inner, and whether these two authorities did not cancel each other and 
so disprove revelation. What was Jesus Christ and what His work? How 
were we to conceive the incarnation? And why was it necessary? What 
security had we that the Gospels narrate the history and report the 
words of Jesus? or that the Epistles are the work of the men whose 
names they bear? What has Christianity done for man, and what can it 
still do for him, whether considered as an individual, a society, a 
state, or a race? These were some of the questions we wanted to have 
answered, and we doubted because no answer had been given; but the 
answer came in the new life created by the new light so suddenly poured 
into the soul. And so ... theology was re-born and with it a new and 
higher faith. God seemed a nobler and more majestic Being when inter- 
preted through the Son; the Eternal Sonship involved Eternal Fatherhood, 
and the old controversy as to their consubstantiality took a new meaning 
when the Son was conceived to be as necessary to the Deity as the Father, 
with an equal claim to necessary existence. Man, too, was so interpreted 
as to be invested with fresh majesty as an individual, and as a race he 
had a unity which made his fall and his redemption at once more possible 
and more reasonable.'
iii. Theologian, Educator, and Churchman.
After his return from Germany, Fairbairn continued his work in the 
Bathgate Church until 1872, when he accepted a call to the St. Paul's Street 
Evangelical Union Church, Aberdeen, where he stayed until, five years later, he 
was called to the Principalship of Airedale College, Bradford. Fairbairn had 
not been at Aberdeen long before he began to draw professors and students to 
hear his preaching, and during the years of his ministry there he exerted no 
small constructive influence on University life, which at the time was prevail- 
ingly agnostic in character, much as several years later he was to have a 
similar influence upon an agnostic Oxford by means of his Sunday evening lectures. 
To meet the needs of his new congregation in Aberdeen he began a series of Sunday 
evening meetings in which he dealt with many of the mooted questions of the time, 
such as 'The Conflict of Faith and Doubt', 'The Scientific and Religious Concep- 
tions of the World-^ieed they exclude each other?' 'The Influence of Christianity 
on Civilization', and many other similar subjects. In these lectures he 
developed a trenchant Christian apologetic, all the time drawing on his own 
experience with doubt for pertinent and vivid illustration. One sentence in a
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letter from Professor Geddes gives some indication of the value of his work:
'Among the fine points of it (i. e., the lecture the previous evening) 
was the demonstration, which, I think, was complete, that Theism is no 
product of teleology, and that Tyndall's view is wrong and historically 1 
false in affirming that the notion of Design produced the idea of Theism.'
HUhile at Aberdeen Fairbairn read widely, studied intensively, 
especially in the field of comparative religions, and did considerable writing 
on theological and ecclesiastical subjects for the Contemporary Review and 
Expositor, as well as for the Scotsman and Aberdeen Free Press, in which his 
contributions were often used as lead articles. The promise he had shown at 
Bathgate of being a preacher with power and an able and stimulating writer came 
to brilliant fruition during the Aberdeen years. His ability for doing 
distinctively original and scholarly work was indicated in several of his 
magazine articles, but most markedly in his first published book, Studies in the 
Philosophy of Religion and History (1876), which together with his other writing 
and his growing fame as a leader in theological thinking, brought him the 
deserved reputation which resulted in his call to Airedale College. He accepted 
the call without hesitation, for he considered that he had been preparing 
himself through the years for theological"teaching. During his nine years at 
Bradford, (1877-86), in addition to his teaching and administrative work, he 
delivered a series of lectures to working men which is among his very best work 
and threw himself vigorously into the activities of English Nonconformity, where 
his powers were recognized and used largely. Three years after going to Bradford 
he was elected chairman of the County Congregational Union, and three years 
later as Chairman of the Congregational Union of England and Wales. During 
these years his competence as an educator and churchman came to its full power. 
At the same time he was being prepared for the larger work he was to assume in 
1886 as the founder and First principal of Mansfield College, Oxford, a position 
he held until his retirement in 1909, only three years before his death.
1. Quoted in Life, p. 65.
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With an of his theological activity speaking, writing, controversy 
 it is most probable that Fairbairn's chief attention after leaving Aberdeen 
was devoted to the cause of theological education. That he was never able to 
complete the theological system he hoped to construct was due to the inordinate 
amount of time and energy given not only to the schools with which he was 
immediately connected, but also to his efforts in raising the general standard 
of theological education among Independent schools over all of Britain. Despite 
his multivaried activities, he always retained keen zest for teaching, and his 
most lasting contribution to theological thought probably is in the men he
trained for the Christian preaching and teaching ministry. One of his former
1 
students gave a fine expression to this idea at Bradford last November, at a
gathering in celebration of the centenary of Fairbairn's birth.
1 ... There is the fact to be faced that in spite of the great 
impression Fairbairn made on his own generation, his books seem to be 
no longer a living force in ours. There are a number of reasons for 
this change, into which I now propose to go.
'The first reason, entirely creditable to him and to his work 
is that he did it so well that many of us who were either actually his 
personal pupils, or else learned of him from his books as they appeared, 
became entirely established in the main principles for which he stood; 
so well established in fact that we have never gone back upon them or 
even needed to revive their mastery over us by fresh contact with his 
writings. The agreement of faith and reason, the rationality of the 
Christian revelation, the founding of theology upon the consciousness 
of Christ, the dominance of all Christian doctrine by the central 
doctrine of the Fatherhood of God these are principles which have 
become to us more than mere intellectual principles they have come to 
be part of our very selves, to be in fact, as Wordsworth expresses it,
"felt in the blood, and felt along the heart",
Yes, Fairbairn did his work well. It is impossible to describe to a 
new generation the personal impression that he made on those whom he 
taught or who may have listened to his speaking and preaching; but 
the ancient adage still comes true,
"si monumentum quaeris, circumspice".
The influence of Fairbairn is still to be seen in the Liberal 
Evangelicalism that he fostered in his pupils, and that still in 
spite of so many changes continues as a powerful religious and 
theological current among us today. f
1. Franks, The Theology of Andrew Martin Fairbairn.
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APPENDIX A. THE RISE OF GERMAN IDEALISM.
Immanuel Kant established the critical method to determine the 
limits of the mind's power to know the real nature of things, this to oppose 
the prevailing dogmatism which assumed the ability of the mind to know things 
as they really are. Knowledge does not consist, as the British empiricists 
had maintained, in a series of sense impressions being received by an 'empty 1 
mind; on the contrary, knowledge consists in perceptions being made intelligible 
through the operation of the categories of the understanding, which are 
logically though not chronologically prior to having any knowledge of the space 
and time world at all. In experience the external world, to be perceived, must 
be empirically real: the perceptions as made understandable by the categories, 
however, are only phenomena, that is, appearances of the things as they are 
in themselves (noumena), which cannot be known by the mind since the external 
world of space and time, outside experience, is transcendentally ideal.
In addition to the categories of the understanding which are 
constitutive in gaining knowledge through perception, Kant recognized three 
regulative ideas: a first cause, the soul and God. These ideas, formed by the 
reason as it speculates about a system which, it seems, must undergird all 
phenomena, cannot become knowledge. Hence these regulative ideas are not real 
as is the external world apprehended in phenomena, but they nonetheless are 
necessary guides to the understanding in its endeavour to apprehend the external 
world of space and time. The assertion that the mind cannot have real knowledge 
of these ideas destroyed at a blow the three traditional proofs for the 
existence of God.
Faith, to establish which (as he said) he had destroyed knowledge,. 
Kant explicated in his second Critique» in which he gave the practical reason 
primacy over the theoretical and placed religion on what he considered a solid 
foundation of morality. The categorical imperative of the moral life which 
demands unconditional obedience carries within itself the necessity for man to 
postulate freedom, immortality and God: freedom, because the ought of the moral 
imperative necessarily implies a can on the part of man; immortality, because 
the goal set by the moral imperative moral perfection could be reached only 
if man's efforts were not bounded by the earth years; God, because a basic 
unitary reality must be postulated if moral activity is to be carried on at all.
Kant's successors took one part of his philosophy, that man can 
know only phenomena, and modified it in devious ways: Fichte into 'subjective' 
idealism, Schelling into 'objective' idealism, and Hegel into 'logical' or 
'absolute' idealism. Fichte in seeking to eradicate the dualism in Kant's 
system between phenomena and noumena sacrificed the latter, all that 'is' being 
centred in the Ego (absolute self). The Ego in experience divides itself into 
self and not-self, the not-self being the world of nature which the self 
requires as a field of endeavour in which to obey duty and achieve moral per- 
fection, which with Fichte as with Kant was considered the chief end of human 
life. Schelling in turn reacted against Fichte's notion of a nature derived 
from mind, and claimed that the Absolute was manifested in both nature (or 
matter) and mind (or spirit), preference being given to neither. But he not 
only failed to distinguish between mind and nature, but tended to remove all 
characteristics from the Absolute, which because of its being isolated from the 
world could be apprehended by man, according to Schelling, only in an immediate 
intuition.
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For Hegel the idea of apprehending the Absolute by intuition was 
absurd. The Absolute can be sought only in the careful scrutiny of mind and 
nature, by which means it will be found that both mind and nature are but 
manifestations, in their historical unfolding, of the Absolute. The Absolute, 
in fact, has its very being in this self-manifestation. Kant's two worlds of 
phenomenal and noumenal Hegel brought together into a strict monism. 'For him 
it was necessary to show that the kingdoms of nature and spirit are one, in 
spite of all their antagonisms; nay, it was necessary for him to show that this 
antagonism itself is the manifestation of their unity.' (1) This unity was to 
be achieved by the dialectic method, whereby pairs of opposites, whether simple 
or complex, were to be locked together in an all-embracing synthesis. Through 
the use of the dialectic method the mind, by following its own laws, can 
discover all of reality since, in his well-known dictum, the real is the rational 
and the rational is the real.
Schleiermacher, commonly known as the father of modern theology 
because of his great systematic work, The Christian Faith, gave a marked 
Romantic impetus to theology by his emphasis on feeling and on the inwardness 
of religious experience. Although he is not in the direct line of German 
idealists, he is considered here because of his profound influence on all 
nineteenth century theology. In philosophy he mediated between the realistic 
and idealistic elements in Kant's system. For Schleiermacher knowledge is 
phenomenal, and 'his epistemology distinguishes between the form and material 
of knowledge, the former (concepts and judgments) being given in the "intel- 
lectual function" and the latter through sensuous perception'. (2) In his 
early writing he made much of the religious consciousness in man, which, he 
claimed, formed the basis for the different religions in the world as it 
manifested itself in various ways. 'If man is not one with the Eternal in the 
unity of intuition and feeling which is immediate, he remains, in the unity of 
consciousness which is derived, for ever apart. 1 (3) This single sentence shows 
the pantheistic tendency which always touched his theology, as well as its 
predominant subjectivism. His philosophical idea of God as the principle of 
unity between real and ideal is carried over into his theology in his doctrine 
of the Christian God, who is without distinct attributes, though One who can be 
worshipped as a personal Being. He inclined to think of Christ as the 
archetypal personality in history, His perfect God-consciousness making Him 
unique among men; but he also lays strong stress on Christ as Redeemer, and 
makes redemption the end-all of the Christian religion. Although he continues 
to make the religious consciousness, which of necessity is the concern of the 
individual, the centre of faith, he emphasizes at the same time the vital 
importance of the Church as a fellowship of believers and so in part 'escapes 
from the perils of his own subjectivism'.(4) Possibly most characteristic 
of his whole system is his definition of religion as the pious feeling of 
dependence on God which develops within a particular Church at a specific time.
1. E. Caird, Hegel, p. 128.
2. Selbie, art. in E. R. E. on Schleiermacher, Vol. 11, p. 237.
3. Quoted by Selbie, Ibid, p. 238, from Reden, tr. Oman, p. 40.
4. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 74.
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CHAPTER II. FAIRBAIRN'S ATTITUDE TO RELIGION IN GENERAL.
i. What is Religion?
All of Fairbairn's thinking about man in relation to the universe 
in which he lives started from the fundamental conviction that man is by nature 
religious. Atheism, he asserted, is never of nature, always of art. It is 
never found among primitive tribes, but only among sophisticated peoples who 
must persuade themselves into it.
This conviction that man is inescapably religious was supported 
by two others. The first he stated as historical fact: that no tribes, however 
primitive, have been discovered without some expression of religious faith as 
part of their life T s routine. The other stemmed from his repudiation of 
Cartesian subjectivism: for he held that man cannot become self-conscious 
without at the same moment being conscious of not-self. In religion the Thou 
of Heaven stood over against the I of earth.
Since Fairbairn could speak of religion in general, it is obvious 
that he thought of Christianity as set among other historical religions, all 
expressing in different ways the same inherent impulse, all of which could be 
investigated and appreciated within their own native setting. Religion so 
understood, as present among all peoples and as expressed in multifarious ways,
he defined as f the relation of man as spirit to the creative and universal and
1 
regnant Spirit, under whatever form he may conceive Him 1 .
But religion must always be considered as an activity of the whole 
man: for Fairbairn held that all those views of religion which departmentalized 
man, so to say, were partial. Those men who endeavoured to read religion in 
excyPsive terms of intellect, feeling or conduct were simply on the wrong track,
since man cannot be divided up in this way. He quoted with disapproval the words
2 
of Jacobi, 'I believe; by my faith I am a Christian; by my reason I am a heathen.'
1. Catholicism, pp. 16-7.
2. Religion in History, p. 80.
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Fairbairn maintained that so to outlaw reason would make religion fugitive: 
indeed religion could not be at all without reason, since thought is active in
every human experience. 'Where there is no knowledge the highest, if not the
1 
sole, reality is absent. 1 Some ideas of, some knowledge about the object of
religious faith must be a necessary part of the experience, but not the whole 
of it, as Hegel had believed.
Similarly Fairbairn showed how the attempt has been made to inter- 
pret religion wholly in terms of feeling, Schleiermaeher's feeling of dependence 
and (in his own day) Spencer's feeling of wonder before the Unknown being notable 
examples. Of course he granted that feeling makes up part of the religious 
consciousness, since man as religious feels himself in relation to a supernatural 
power or powers. But feeling is not all, for man cannot conceive himself as so 
related without being conscious of constraint to act in accordance with the will 
of that Other. Fairbairn contended that both Kant and Matthew Arnold were wrong 
in holding morality to be the whole of religion: but he himself insisted that
it is an essential part. Actually he steadily maintained that all three reason,
2
feeling, conduct 'are fused in one vital moment', even if many times (especial- 
ly in polemical writing) he tended to make reason the most determinative. In
3 
his own words:
'Religion, indeed, is too large and rich a thing to be defined by 
any single term or reduced to any single element, whether intellectual, 
emotional, or moral; it too completely covers and comprehends the whole 
nature of man to be denoted ty a name borrowed from a section of his 
experience, or from one department of his rational activity.'
Since religion is ubiquitous, present wherever man is found because 
it is native to him, Fairbairn argued that the various attempts made in the 
nineteenth century to 'explain away' religion were of necessity futile. The 
religious idea creeps back into thinking because it is always 'there', as it 
were, however carefully the attempt be made to exclude it. Even when religion
1. Philosophy, p. 57.
2. Mackintosh, Christian Apprehension of God, p. 29.
3. Catholicism, p. 15.
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is denied, there develop what Fairbairn called artificial or fictitious religions 
which spring out of the imagination of some individual and which purport to be 
ideal substitutes for religion, and yet which always set up an object of worship 
to replace the one excluded. As examples of the fictitious religions he cited 
particularly the apotheosis of nature (Universum) by Strauss when he tried to 
establish a new faith in an impersonal universe which had no place in it for
personal Deity, and the apotheosis of Man in Camte's religion of humanity, where
1 
le_ grand Etre was made the object of worship. The Unbewusstes of von Hartmann
and the Unknown of Spencer, Fairbairn placed in this same general category. In
2 
regard to all such apparent negations of religion Fairbairn roundly asked:
'For what is the Agnostic but a man who confesses that there 
are ideas which he will not name but cannot escape from ideas that he 
must disguise in order that he may reason concerning them? 1
Since Fairbairn maintained, then, that man bears the image of God 
and hence lives always f in relation1 , he opposed with vigour those naturalistic 
accounts of religion which would explain it either in subjectivist or sociologi- 
cal terms. Because of the vast amount of anthropological research being done 
in his day, much of the discussion on this general subject centred about the 
origin of religion.
1. Fairbairn held Positivism to be unsound in its apotheosis of man because it 
negated spirit or reason, without which no constructive interpretation of the 
universe is possible at allj because it maintained that the sensuously 
perceived alone is real, but no adequate theory of knowledge can be constructed 
on empiricism^ because its system failed to do justice to the facts of history, 
especially in regard to the origin of religion; finally, because its 
personification of race can in no way be considered an actual substitute for 
religion, since such a personification cannot claim man's reverence and hence 
cannot command his conscience. Yet Fairbairn named the Cours de Philosophie 
Positive one of the 'greatest books' of the century.
2. Philosophy, p. 197. Fairbairn also pointed out that 'agnosticism is as fatal 
to science as to religion, for to attempt to explain the becoming of the 
world on the basis of absolute nescience as to the primary and efficient 
cause is to attempt to make science stand upon a principle that declares 
knowledge vain, and therefore science impossible'. (City of God, p. 265.)
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ii. The Origin of Religion.
The first published article which brought Fairbairn fame was 
concerned with the birth of religion in man. Although research in anthropology 
and the comparative study of religions in the past half century has superseded 
many of the specific facts from which he developed his theories, yet on the basis 
of the facts at his command he drew some strikingly original generalizations, 
some of which are still valid. Several of these conclusions are especially 
notable in view of recent anthropological study. He traced, for example, the 
roots of religion in man to a 'primitive theism' in which an important factor 
was the sense of moral obligation. He insisted, moreover, that religion 
originated not in fear, but in the consciousness on the part of man of relation- 
ship with an 'Other 1 who was worshipped as a Being who welcomed familiar
intercourse with man. An emphasis which has been given persistently by religion-
2 
ists in the face of ethnological and psychological studies was also made by
Fairbairn, namely, that the real nature of religion can be determined more 
clearly from studying its later developments than its primitive beginnings.
'For it (religion) can be explained only as it is traced to 
causes which are as common and as constant as itself, which operate 
even more powerfully in the civilized than in the savage state, and do 
so because the civilized man is a truer type of humanity, because he is 
more of a man, than the savage.' (3)
At least by implication he suggested, too, that religion to be understood at 
all must be studied (as we say today) from 'within' faith.
In tracing the birth of religion in the soul of man, he naturally 
maintained that religion did not originate in a 'primitive revelation 1 , in the 
sense of a written record or oral tradition. Yet he stressed that religion 
can never at any time be a 'one-sided' matter, but always involves relation
1. "The Idea of God: Its Genesis and Development", first published in Cont. 
Rev., 1871; in 1876 the article appeared in Studies in Religion and History. 
pp. 3-57.
2. 'Our best clue to the understanding of the rise of religious faith in the 
racial soul is our knowledge of how it arises in our own souls.' (John 
Baillie, Interpretation of Religion, p. 171.)
3. Philosophy, p. 215.
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with some Other. He criticised sharply the natural histories of religion which
sought to account for the origin of religion by an evolutionary principle
1 
1 enacted and administered without any conscious moral law-giver 1 . Against
this notion Fairbairn argued that if man were atheistic by nature there would be 
no conceivable way in which religion could be 'planted 1 in him. Actually he 
held that religion is native to man, that man cannot be man at the least cannot 
be rational man without being religious. In short, he stressed that God has 
manifested Himself to all men: He has written His Name on their hearts and 'from
the Name and the necessity of finding Him whose Name it is, man has never been
2 
able, nor indeed wanted to escape 1 . Within the local factors which have made
for variegation among different peoples in the expression of this inherent reli- 
gion, the 'universal Spirit 1 lives and moves.
In Fairbairn1 s view, then, man is so constituted that he cannot be 
self-conscious without at the same time being conscious of relationship with a 
not-Self. In the article mentioned above he developed the idea that self- 
consciousness and consciousness of obligation arise together. Since conscious- 
ness of obligation presupposes consciousness of relation with a not-Self, the
genesis of the idea of God is traceable to the same moment as the genesis of the
3 
idea of self. God is One whose 'Thou stood over against his (man's) I 1 and to
Him obedience was due. Later in his most matured book Fairbairn further 
developed this idea, although he no longer emphasized the moral factor involved; 
but he pointed out that religion originates among man in his being conscious of 
relation to suprasensible Being and in this consciousness finding expression in 
beliefs, customs, and rites. However rude the forms or crude the ideas in which 
religion originates, it is the supernatural that man conceives.
»The living heart of his belief is the thelstic idea; the form in 
which he expresses it is the accident of time and place, marking the stage 
and quality of his culture, and connoting the conditions climatic, 
geographical, ethical and political under which he has lived. The form 
is, as it were, the double of the world he lives in therefore the creation
1. Studies in Religion and History, p. 6.
2. Philosophy, p. 225. 3. Studies in Religion and History, p. 38.
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of experience: but the matter is the double of the spirit he is  
therefore the product of his own transcendency. His religion is made 
up, then, of two constituents (i) the substantive or ideal, i. e., the 
conception of the transcendental, the supernatural, or the divine, which 
is a product of thought working on the phenomena it perceives; and (ii) 
the formal or real, i. e., the terns or vehicles which embody his ideas, 
the stories, rites, and customs that come out of his own experience, both 
outer and inner.' (1)
Between this early and late writing, his emphasis has shifted from 
the moral to the intellectual factor primarily involved in the birth of religion 
in man. Nonetheless Fairbairn continued to object to any interpretation of this 
consciousness of suprasensible Being (the 'subjective' part of religion) in 
terms of a faculty psychology: to say that it has its inception in the intellect, 
or the emotions, or conscience is but to impoverish it and try to analyze what 
is in essence unanalyzable, the whole man as 'reasonable Spirit', as 'exercised 
reason'. Furthermore he maintained that the 'objective 1 part of religion 
beliefs, customs and rites could not have developed out of primitive speculation,
2
in a 'subjective process worked by an unconscious dialectic', as the evolution- 
ists (notably Spencer) were contending. There must be an Other in this dialectic 
which becomes religion, since religion is in essence a mutual relation. This
Other Fairbairn explained in idealist terms as being 'universal Reason', with
3 
which man is one, or at least which 'illuminates' the human intellect. That is
to say, religion originates in this dialectic between God immanent in man and 
man's consciousness of the presence of God within himself.
In all his writing in regard to the origin of religion, even the 
earliest, Fairbairn stressed that many of the processes out of which naturalistic 
thinkers claimed that religion developed were actually set in motion by 
speculation about primitive belief, and in many instances deteriorations of it. 
Thus the theogonic process which resulted in the rise of sacerdotalism and such
processes as hero-worship (resulting in apotheoses) or ancestor-worship (Spencer's
4 
favorite notion about the birth of religion) were not primitive. Nor is the
1. Philosophy, p. 212. 2. Ibid, p. 202.
3. At times Fairbairn identified divine and human reason: at times not.
4. This criticism is sustained by recent palaeanthropological evidence.
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development of mythologies, whether solar, floral, animal, cosmogonic, historical 
or ancestral the terms are Fairbairn's primitive, but the result of speculation 
about faith already present in man.
The natural historians of religion, moreover, maintained that the 
causes of man»s earliest faith were delusions due to. ignorance, fears or dreams, 
 and this idea, together with the 'ghost 1 theory of the rise of religion, is 
linked closely to the ancestor-worship theory, Fairbairn held such theories to 
be wholly fallacious, since resolving religious ideas into impressions of sense 
and hence failing to account for man's faculty or tendency to believe in 
invisible beings, which clearly enough shows that the constitutive element (as 
he kept reiterating in his writing) is what mind brings to nature, not what 
nature gives to mind.
Fairbairn further inveighed against the tendency of the evolutionists 
to be radically unhistorical and to become metaphysical when they were purport- 
ing to be making a scientific investigation of the origin of religion. Thus 
Spencer could never have conceived the 'ghost 1 theory which forms the basis of 
his sociology, Fairbairn pointed out, if he had thoroughly studied even one 
historical religion. Spencer, again, when he spoke of primitive man's beliefs 
as 'mistaken inferences' about familiar phenomena which were outgrown as man
advanced, was but propounding what Fairbairn called 'an evolution from
1
consciousness' and had moved out of the sphere of science into that of meta- 
physics. More generally, Fairbairn*s criticism of natural historians of religion 
was that they tended to derogate religion because of the mean and barbarous ways 
in which it had often been expressed among primitive peoples: the significant 
fact, however, is that religion has persisted even while all the time giving up 
beliefs and customs as it refined itself and found fitter forms of expression. 
While the form changed, the matter and substance of religion remained through all 
ages, Fairbairn argued; and this essence of religion, its substantive or ideal
constituent, originated in the primitive theism native to man. In the relation 
1, Philosophy, p. 208. " "—————————      
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which is religion, however, he held that God and not man takes the initiative.
1 
'His action precedes and underlies ours.' Thus revelation is essential to
the being of religion.
iii. Revelation.
The recent attempt to draw natural knowledge into the concept of 
revelation would have been repudiated ty Fairbaira. His position rather was 
that there is natural knowledge and both general and special revelation (of 
course he did not use these terms). That is to say, he maintained that man 
with his unaided reason can discover some knowledge of God: but he applies 
the concept of revelation only to religious knowledge, specific knowledge about
the character of God as disclosed partially in all the positive religions, but
2 
most fully in Christianity.
In modern theological thought it is becoming more generally held 
that knowledge of God can come only as He reveals Himself; in fact, man is 
considered to be dependent on God «n the time not only for knowledge of Him 
and of the universe, but for his own very being as man. But Fairbairn inclined
strongly toward the Arminian notion that man is rather more than relatively
3
independent of God. In his view, then, man by the exercise of his own facul- 
ties can discover truth about nature and God, and nothing he can discover by 
his own unaided faculties can rightly be termed revelation. Strictly speaking, 
revelation in Fairbairn»s use of the term is testimony from God concerning His 
own nature, 'truths' about God, testimony which completes the knowledge of 
God which man has already derived through speculating about the natural world, 
the course of history, and his own place in the realms of nature and history.
1. Catholicism, p. 18.
2. Cp. the symposium, Revelation, ed. by John Baillie and Hugh Martin. Fair- 
bairn's point of view is most closely related to that stated in Chapter vi, 
written by W. M. Horton.
5. In speaking of the work of Christ, Fairbairn says that 'He made man stand 
upright before God, conscious of his dignity. It does not become a being 
of infinite promise to lie prone in the dust, even before the Infinite 
Majesty 1 . (Philosophy, p. 544.)
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That is to say, Fairbairn considered that man can deduce the idea of God from
discovering design in nature, purpose in history, and conscience within himself.
1 
To quote his own words:
'Revelation, then, can only concern what is so above nature as to 
be beyond the power of man to discover or of nature to disclose; in 
other words, it must relate to God, proceed from Him, and be concerned 
with Him.'
Thus Fairbairn stood solidly on the Medieval Synthesis: that God 
is, the unaided reason can discover; what He is, can be learned only through 
revelation. Of course he maintained, as did the medieval theologians, that 
reason is the gift of God: but it works (as we say) on its own, whereas 
revelation takes place through the direct action of God's grace, man apprehend- 
ing it ly means of faith, which is also God's gift. He further asserted that
2 
man 'can never without reason either know or accept' revelation. Fairbairn's
view might be expressed thus: it is to reason, by grace through faith, that 
revelation comes.
The distinction between knowledge discoverable by reason and 
knowledge received through revelation delimited for Fairbairn (of course) the 
difference between natural and revealed theology. By means of the former man 
gains natural knowledge of God through the interaction between man's 'regressive 
and analytical' thought and God's works; thus man learns of God immanent, the 
Cause, Law and End of the universe. By means of supernatural revelation man 
is shown the Godhead, God transcendent, as He is in Himself.
In Fairbairn's view, then, 'revelation does not create the belief 
3 
in God', since philosophy can reach such belief as the end result of a
speculative process. But the philosophical idea of God is abstract and hence 
incomplete, can form at best but the 'first chapter' of a constructive theology. 
For constructive theology must derive its subject-matter from religion, where 
God has been worshipped before He has become the object of thought, where God is
1. Place of Christ, p. 387. 2. Ibid, p. 511. 3. Ibid, p. 403.
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not an abstract conception but a living, personal Being. Thus theology draws 
its subject-matter from religion, to the very being of which revelation is 
essential. Fairbairn pointed out that this is true not only of religions which 
have written revelations, for the idea of revelation (or divination) is as old 
as religion itself: that God can and does communicate with man is involved in 
the birth of religion in the human soul.
 Religion may be described as man's consciousness of supernatural 
relations, or his belief in the reciprocal activities of his own spirit 
and the Divine. The activity of the Divine is creative and communicative, 
of the human is receptive and responsive- 1 (1)
Fairbairn thought of revelation, then, as the testimony of God about 
Himself given to man, its medium being history and human experience. Christ 
thus takes His place as the supreme revelation, since so related to God as to be 
able to show Him forth as He really is and so a part of the human race as to be 
able to enter into experience and to hold a consummate place in its history.
But 'men had known God and believed in Him before Christ came, as they still do
2 
where they have never heard of Him 1 . This approach shows that Fairbairn did
not follow the trend of thought which led in the Ritschlian school, for example,
to a 'Christocentricism 1 which 'would scarcely allow that the religion mediated^ 3 
through Christ and the religion not so mediated were species of the same genus'.
But he constantly asserted the conviction that since all truth is of God, the 
truth in any religion must be there by His action and express will. It follows 
that he did not conceive Christianity as a 'sport' (so to say) among religions, 
but rather the apogean expression of a line of development common to all 
peoples. This tendency had found its inception in the very nature of man, 
inasmuch as man could become self-conscious only as he became conscious at the 
same time of an Other who is God. But the line of development had branched as
1. Place of Christ, p. 493.
2. Philosophy, p. 540.
3. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850. p. 166-7.
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it found expression in the life of different peoples; and the chief tributary 
was that in which the Christian religion had its rise and which eventually came 
to carry within itself all that was good and true in all the religions.
Fairbairn conceived his whole purpose to be that of discovering
»in man's religions the story of his quest after God, but no less of God's quest
1 
after him 1 . Out of the former investigation his theism developed; out of the
latter, his concept of revelation and his placing of Christianity as a centre 
about which other religions naturally grouped themselves. Clearly enough this 
whole trend of study sprang out of the development of the historical method in 
the nineteenth century.
But if God reveals Himself to man through history and his experience, 
Fairbairn held that the record of such revelation is authoritative in religion. 
It is authoritative, since the revelation of God is no less direct to the person 
who reads, though mediated through the written word, than to him who wrote that
word. Thus he maintained that revelation in the word comes to the person of
2 
faith with 'mediated immediacy 1 . In this sense the record of revelation can
itself be the medium of revelation. Fairbairn expressed this idea in telling
3 
phrases.
'The man who has most clearly and certainly heard God has done 
more than hear Him for himself; he has heard Him for the world, and the 
world ought to be able to hear God in the man. And may not the word 
which God has spoken to another become a word which God speaks directly 
to me, yet which I never should have heard but for the older man of 
finer ear and clearer soul?. . . It is true that they (i. e., the 'words') 
must come to every later as they came to the first conscience, directly 
from God; but old words, when He speaks, become new, often with a spirit 
and life proportioned to their age. 1
The Christian revelation in the Bible, viewed in this light, cannot 
be considered as anything rigidly or formally fixed in static form; for Fair- 
bairn maintained that though the writers of the record may have been inspired 
in some special way, yet the inspiration of the men who read is as 'intrinsic
1. Philosophy, p. x.
2. This illuminating phrase comes to me from Professor John Baillie. 
5. Place of Christ, pp. 495-6.
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and integral an element in the idea of revelation as the inspiration of the
men who wrote' since 'in revelation the living God speaks, not simply has
1 
spoken, to living man'. Thus he considered the Bible as authoritative because
through its portrayal of the consciousness of Christ, God speaks creatively 
to the Church and to all Christians.
Fairbairn's idea of revelation carried with it certain implications. 
He thought of the Bible as a book 'open 1 to the higher criticism, in so far as 
critics were seeking the truth which is of God; and it mattered not where that 
truth be discovered, in whatever criticism or philosophy or religion. Further- 
more he did not hold that the Biblical revelation was in any sense exclusive, 
since it did not contradict the revelation of God to every man, but special 
only because the most universal, the consummation (in Christ) of all revelation. 
Although he placed emphasis on thinking of the Bible as an authority in 
religion, it was the Bible considered not as a boo*, but as revelation: hence 
its authority is direct (as it were) and not dependent on tradition. Revelation 
moreover is essentially a 'spiritual experience', not a canonized book, and 
must rely on the Holy Spirit for its continuance. Although he granted that the 
medium for the Spirit and the Word is the Church, he insisted, in accordance 
with his basic principle of ecclesiology, that the Church must depend for its 
being on the Spirit and the Word, not they on the Church.
iv. Christianity among the Historical Religions. 
Because of his deep grounding in the historical method, Fairbairn 
became in England a marked influence away from the unhistorical approach to 
Christianity and the 'evidential* theology, and toward theological inquiry 
based on the historical and hence in the critical method. The attention he 
gave to the historical setting of religion, moreover, centred his interest in 
the comparative study of religions and anthropology, out of which, as they
1. Place of Christ, p. 498.
46
developed in concomitance with the more general historical method, evolved the 
so-called «science of religion 1 toward the latter part of the Victorian era. 
Out of his comprehensive study in this field grew the conviction 'that
Christianity stood among the religions which must be historically investigated
1 
and philosophically construed 1 .
This basic emphasis on the significance of all the historical 
religions as a necessary background to the proper understanding of any of them 
was more closely akin to Mailer's dictum (»Wer eine Religion kennt, kennt 
keine') than to Harnack's ('Wer diese Religion kennt, kennt alle»); for
Fairbairn held that only after all the religions were investigated was the
2 
validity of Christianity's claim to be the ideal universal religion discovered.
As he thought of natural religion as the necessary precursor to revealed, so for
the most part he held the notion characteristic of his generation that all
3 
'lower religions' lead up to the supreme consummation in Christianity. It was
furthermore generally recognized by his contemporaries that Fairbairn had made 
a signal contribution in the comparative field by his sympathetic interpretation 
of Buddhism. He was one of the first theologians to stress that branding 
Buddhism as atheistic was being truer to the letter than the spirit of that
1. Philosophy, p. ix.
2. Selbie in speaking of the great influence of Fairbairn»s first published 
book (Studies in Religion and History) writes that Fairbairn was among the 
first in Britain to use the work of men like Muir, Tiele, Max Mttller, and 
Chantepie de la Saussaye, 'and to show its intimate bearing on theological 
and religious conceptions'. 'One result of the publication of the book 
was an entirely new appreciation by orthodox theologians in this country 
of the importance of the history and philosophy of religion and of the 
comparative study of religions. For the effect of this in widening our 
conception of religion itself and of its place and function in human develop- 
ment we are largely indebted to Fairbairn's work.' (Life, pp. 76, 79.)
The quotations from Mllller and Harnack I have taken from John Baillie, 
Interpretation of Religion, pp, 120, 121.
3. Cp. Storr, Development of English Theology, p. 14. '. . . dominated as we 
are to-day by the thought of development, we study the evolution of religion 
and interpret earlier and lower faiths as leading up to the Christus 
Consummator, as prophetic of the more perfect expression of the religious 
principles found in Christianity. The specific theology of Christianity 
loses much of its meaning and value if it is not treated in genetic 
relationship with other religions.'
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religion, since the Buddha by the moral depth of his system showed himself to 
be theistic even while in his teaching he repudiated belief in God.
Fairbairn, then, gave considerable attention to the historical 
religions, since fir him Christianity must be historically investigated in its 
setting among the religions, even though he held it equally true that 'the Son 
of God holds in His pierced hands the keys of all the religions, explains all
the factors of their being and all the persons through whom they have been
1 
realized 1 .
In dealing with the religion of Israel, he never does full justice 
to it as the cradle of the religion of Christ. He maintained, for instance, 
that monotheism did not come into being in Judaism, which he considered to be 
most aptly characterized by the term Henotheisrnj and he referred several times 
to the religion of the Old Testament as f the old Judaic Deism 1 , where r God and
the world were so divided that it in a sense perished in His presence and lived
2 
only by His will'. In the religion of Israel he stressed especially that here
an universal idea of God was nurtured and received its apogean expression in a 
particularism bound by the institutions and customs of a local, tribal people. 
Withal the idea of God developed: and even though the Hebrew people could 
conceive of Jahweh only as their God, yet their obedience to Him was personal 
and moral as well as ceremonial, as was most often the case with particularistic 
religion where cultus dominated faith. Although Jahweh came to be worshipped 
as the God of every individual, wherever he might live, the universal idea 
which Israel cherished never became a reality for her. Even when our Lord came 
and placed this jewel of Hebraic faith into its proper universal setting, 
Fairbairn recounted how Israel repudiated what seemed the obvious implications 
of the pregnant faith she had jealously guarded through the centuries. These 
implications she repudiated because she could not de-nationalize that faith.
1. Philosophy, p. x.
2. Place of Christ, p. 80. Cf. also pp. 379, 583.
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The important division in the historical religions for Fairbairn's 
thesis is that between spontaneous and founded religions. Since Fairbairn 
maintained (as we have seen) that man is religious by nature, he grouped those 
religions as spontaneous which spring up, apparently without a special stimulus, 
as a necessary part of man's life. Over against these he set the founded or 
personal religions whose beginnings can be traced directly to a creative
religious genius and to beliefs about his person and work, 'religion whose
1 
ultimate truth is an historical person speculatively construed 1 . The former
Fairbairn termed apotheoses of nature, the latter, of personality. But without 
spontaneous religion as substructure, he held that the founded religion cannot 
come into being.
 Buddhism, Christianity and Islam are the three faiths which Fairbairn 
classified as founded or personal religions. The sect established by Gautama 
became the religion.of Buddhism, Fairbairn explained, through the two-fold pro- 
cess of mythologizing and speculating. After the Buddha's death he came to be
2 
interpreted by his followers as the f personified beneficence of the universe',
the standard and ideal for human conduct. Of Islam Fairbairn spoke as an 
absolute book religion, having been established on an apotheosis of the Word. 
But Mohammed as God's prophet was considered by his followers to be unique among 
men in the sense that he was without an equal: to doubt him was thought tanta- 
mount to doubting God. Thus each of these religions rests on the substructure 
of a spontaneous religion which has been re-vitalized and materially re-formed 
by a creative personality whose person and work, in turn, have been interpreted 
and speculatively construed by his followers. Fairbairn noted especially that 
the reformer is changed into the founder of a religion by the action of his 
people: thus the historical value of the founder, as it were, is transmuted 
into the ideal value.
Is the relation of Christ to Christianity substantially parallel
1. Philosophy, p. 265.
2. Ibid, pp. 275-6.
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to that of the Buddha and Mohammed to the religions they founded? Fairbairn
1
implied that it is, and drew up canons of criticism on the basis of his inter- 
pretation of Buddhism and Islam which he said we should not hesitate to apply 
to Christianity. He did not apply them himself, however, except in the most
general way; and after stating them he sketched the historical figure of Jesus
2 
by means of the customary exegetical approach to the Synoptic Gospels. The
partial answer which he gave to the question suggested is two-fold. (1) The 
relation of our Lord to Christianity is different from that of Gautama to 
Buddhism or Mohammed to Islam because these are positive religions, established 
on laws set forth by the founders; but Christianity is a personal religion, and 
its adherents live by faith in a person and His teaching must always be secon- 
dary. (2) The interpretation of Gautama by his people was essentially different 
from the conception he had of his own work and mission; but the Christian 
Apostles' interpretation of our Lord but fulfilled the idea He had of His own 
Person.
Fairbairn's general approach to Christianity is thus seen to be 
the characteristic view of romanticism as it developed through the century. 
Schleiermacher made this approach when he attempted to find the 'religion among 
the religions*. Lessing, too, had contributed to this trend, with his notion 
of the education of the human race through progressive revelation: hence he 
had stressed tolerance toward all religions, expressing the idea dramatically 
in Nathan, dfir__Weise, since all had had a share in this education. Fairbairn 
did not, however, follow the tendency, led especially by Max Mttller, of seeking 
to extract (so to speak) the 'highest common denominator' from all the 
religions, this highest common factor being then considered the distilled
1. These canons of criticism were five in number: (1) The Founder and the 
religion are closely interrelated. (2) The Founder has a historical and 
ideal significance for both the religion and for thought in general. 
(3) The historical person of the Founder determines the form of the religion, 
whereas (4) the ideal significance of his person determines his essential 
value for religion. (5) The Founder's mind must be immortalized.
2. See Additional Note A, p. 55.
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essence of religion, although his thought is coloured by this notion. For the 
most part he maintained that each of the historical religions was unique in its 
own way, Christianity, however, being the only religion which could substantiate 
its claim to be the sole universal religion.
v. Reason and Authority.
Fairbairn*s efforts were directed to establishing the entire 
rationality of faith. In part this was due to the dominant position which 
Spencer's system held in England, with its interpretation of the Ultimate in 
the sceptical terms of the 'Unknown 1 and its basic tenet that science alone 
can deal with the known, religion having to content itself with making 
conjectures about the unknown. Fairbairn held that a pessimistic philosophy 
such as that of Von Hartmann and the marked empirical bias of English thought 
in general (which of course he linked with medieval Nominalism) tended in the 
same sceptical direction. Moreover, the Ritschlian school in German theology 
exaggerated the antagonism between reason and revelation, and Fairbairn
considered the influence of this school subversive when it attempted rigidly
1 
to separate the spheres of philosophy and theology. All these factors,
together with the Hegelian mould of his mind, led Fairbairn to conceive reason 
as the architectonic power in man. At times he seemed to believe that reason 
could built an all-inclusive system which could embrace all of reality, and 
then it is often reason conceived as Dean Inge f s * logic-chopping faculty'. But 
basically he maintained that theism can be firmly established by reason: he 
sought to make a reasoned defense of the faith, especially against the onslaughts 
of the agnosticism which had so strong a hold£>n the late nineteenth century 
world.
To doubt the power of reason was for him tantamount to doubting God,
1. Selbie quotes Fairbairn as having said of the Ritschlian philosophy: »This 
philosophy is as marked a retrogression from the standpoint and spirit of 
the older German schools as the Ritschlian historical method is an advance 
nn that alike of Berlin and Tubingen.* (Cong»l Quat., op. cit.. p. 396.)
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'The man who despises or distrusts the reason despises the God 
who gave it, and the most efficient of all the servants He has bidden 
work within and upon man in behalf of truth. Here, at least, it may be 
honestly said there is no desire to build Faith upon the negation of 
Reason; where both are sons of God it were sin to seek to make the one 
legitimate at the expense of the other's legitimacy. 1 Any notion which 
'loses the Immanence of God from the reason, loses the active presence 
of God from the collective history and society of man.' (1)
It was this strong conviction that faith cannot be built on a negation of 
reason which carried him during his polemics against Catholicism into his sharp 
criticism of Cardinal Newman, whom he accused of 'philosophical scepticism'.
Fairbairn's intellectualism was in accord with the Greek tradition
2 
in which he had so firmly grounded himself and of course was akin to medieval
scholasticism, to which in many ways he was more closely related than to the 
Reformation faith (except in his impassioned criticism of Catholicism). More 
than this, however, was the fact that he set himself solidly against the 
voluntarism which developed during scholasticism and reached an extreme 
expression in William of Ockham. A corollary if not, indeed, the starting 
point of Fairbairn's argument against the idea of a Divine Sovereignty not 
qualified by God's fatherly nature was his repudiation of the Ockhamist 
substructure in Calvinism, Here was one reason, too, for the mordancy of his
criticism of Spencer, for Spencer represented the voluntaristic tendency in
3 
British nineteenth century thought, as indicated in his notion of Ultimate
Reality in terms of force.
That God is Sovereign Fairbairn himself wished to emphasize: but 
he further insisted that the Sovereignty is not arbitrary. It is always 
conditioned ty God's nature: God cannot be false, so to say, to his essential 
being. The Divine nature, moreover, can at least to some degree be known: 
hence Fairbairn's impatience with Spencer in conceiving the Ultimate as the
1. Philosophy, p. 19; Catholicism, p. 221.
2. His rich background in Greek thought can be noted in a brilliant and compre- 
hensive essay he wrote on the idea of immortality, a comparative study of 
the idea as held in India and in Greece. "
3. See Additional Note B, p. 55.
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Unknown. God can be known, he argued, because He is immanent in reason. Thus 
he maintained that to pit reason against faith or against conscience (as he
»
said Newman did) was tantamount to setting faith against truth, which in turn 
would be tantamount to disproving the claim of religion on man. For Fairbairn 
always held that man neither should nor does believe because of Divine fiat 
nor because of any ! external1 authority placed upon him. Rather is the 
authority inherent in faith itself: faith (so to say) grips man and convinces 
him to believe, man does not seek to grip faith by trying to persuade himself 
to believe. For this reason Fairbairn vigorously opposed the vesting of 
authority in tradition, tradition itself must be criticised by reason. Nor 
would he admit that a Church could be made the organ of authority: that is to 
say, he held that the Church is authoritative only as its judgments are true,
its judgments are not true because they issue from the Church. In Fairbairn's
1 
words:
'Belief is not grounded on authority, but authority is realized 
through belief. Christ's words become authoritative through faith; 
faith does not come because His words are authoritative. His sovereignty 
is felt to be legitimate and absolute, because His absolute truth is 
recognized; and to this recognition, authority, in the Roman sense, not 
only does not contribute, but is through and through opposed. To believe 
in Christ because of the church's decrees and determinations, is to 
believe in the church, not in Christ, and to accept its infallibility 
instead of His sovereignty.'
Similarly he pointed out (as indicated above) that the Bible is authoritative
not because it is the Bible nor because its various parts were incorporated into\
one book through the canonizing process. No, the Bible is authoritative only 
because through its pages the living and sovereign God reveals Himself to 
finite man.
As would be expected from this position, Fairbairn held that
I
theology and philosophy should work together to their mutual advantage.
Philosophy in England, he pointed out, had issued in agnosticism because
1. Catholicism, p. 234.
2. 'Theology is the universe construed through the idea of God; philosophy is 
the universe construed through the idea of man, but man as mind.' 
(Place of Christ, p. 62.)
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antagonistic to theology; in Germany, on the other hand, philosophy had always 
tried to give a speculative interpretation to religious ideas, to the great 
benefit of theology. Hence he believed that religion must be able to justify 
itself metaphysically, and he construed the traditional theistic proofs as a 
buttress in fact as a necessary substructure to revelation.
In his whole point of view it can readily be seen that coming under 
the influence of Hegel during his stay in Germany helped to groove the particu- 
lar channels in which Fairbairn »s religious thought moved. This same influence
was responsible for another bent given to his mind. Hegel's emphasis on inter-
1 
preting the world in which we live as f the work of a larger Reason 1 which we
frv 
must endeavour to understand gave Fairbairn that rootingAthe historical method
which (as we have seen) determined his whole approach thereafter to the study 
of religion. At the same time he was given the bias toward idealism which 
characterised his thought, although he cannot rightly be considered as a neo-
Hegelian along with the school of British idealists which emanated from T. H.
2 
Green, chiefly because he was too sharply aware of the reality of evil in the
realm of nature and of man to become an absolutist. Yet he worked, together 
with the members of this school, to break down 'the insularity of British 
thought and to open before it a new vista, the broader and more cosmopolitan 
outlook of German theology and philosophy.
1. Webb, Century of Anglican Theology. pp. 29-50. 'Moreover, by seeing in the 
real world around us natural, social, intellectual, the work of a larger 
Reason than yours or mine, in which your reason and mine are rooted, and 
a work which we must endeavour therefore to understand before we set about 
trying to improve it, he (i. e., Hegel) helped to reverse the old rational- 
istic prejudice in favour of considering as rational only that which could 
be devised by the individual starting afresh, as it were, for himself, as 
though his mind had no roots in a larger Reason manifested already in the 
actual structure of Reality.'
2. Forsyth points out, however, that it is not correct to say that Fairbairn 
was the indirect source of what was called the New Theology because he 
introduced Hegelianism into Congregationalism. 'As a matter of fact, 
Fairbairn had nothing but contempt for the movement as a sort of half- 
penny journalism in belief; none of his students were associated with it, 
while some of the best of them were among its (concluded on next page)
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Fairbairn's attitude to religion in general may be summarized in
1 
his own words about faith.
'It is an intellectual act, for it is a form of knowledge; it 
is an emotional attitude and activity, for it trusts persons and works 
by love; it is a moral intuition, for it sees obligation in truth and 
right in duty. It is not a single or occasional act, though it may be 
compared to a vision which for a moment looks into eternity and never 
forgets what it has seen; but it is continuous communion with the 
things the vision saw. ... In both aspects, as knowledge and as vision, 
faith is a receptivity; it is man standing open to the touch and action 
of the eternal, yet as also sensitive and active, holding fast to what 
has been received.'
2 
Thus Fairbairri had implicit trust in reason, and considered that its work
consisted in construing the theistic proofs as a metaphysical justification 
for religion. This natural religion formed the basis for revealed. He 
further maintained that all religions contained truth, and that Christianity 
stood as the consummation to all expressions of religion, it alone being able 
to vindicate its claim to be the sole universal religion.
(continued from previous page)
severest critics; and the real source of the excursion was the University 
 the Oxford Hegelians; and more particularly neither Green nor Wallace, 
with the labour demanded by the "Logic", but Caird, with his easy style, 
ideal chana, and attractive generalizations.' ("Dr. Fairbairn as a 
Theologian", Westminster Gazette, Feb. 12, 1912, p. 2.)
Principal H. TRIheeler Robinson in conversation suggested that 
Fairbairn's whole point of view was strongly antagonistic to the 
flamboyant emotionalism of the New Theology.
1. Philosophy, p. 548.




The general impression left by Fairbairn's exegetical work is, as 
Principal Garvie suggests, that he is 'often more dogmatic than historical. . . 
when he is marshalling the New Testament evidence 1 . (Lend. Rev., op. cit., p.35.)
Fairbairn himself differentiated four kinds of criticism: literary, 
historical, religious and doctrinal. The first two fire inseparably connected. 
1Without the criticism of literature there could be neither order nor accuracy 
in our knowledge of history; without historical criticism there would be nothing 
to keep thought face to face with reality. 1 Yet the two must never be identified, 
and Fairbairn criticised Robertson Smith for identifying them. Each must act, 
Fairbairn held, as a check upon the other. Ideas and persons embodying religion 
are investigated by what Fairbairn called religious criticism. Doctrine, too, 
can be criticised, but not dogma, since dogma as stated is essential to the 
being of the Church. (Studies, pp. 246-252.)
Several of his former students told me in conversation that Fair- 
bairn never quite managed to escape in his Biblical approach from the naive 
conservatism of the early, evangelical days of his ministry, before he went to 
Germany. One of these students remarked that when Fairbairn preached f and 
powerful preaching it was I' he spoke of Abraham and Job (for instance) as 
though they lived in the house next door.
'In his last volume, 1 writes Principal Garvie in the article quoted 
above, f he gives us Studies of Paul and John which seem to me to ignore the 
legitimate demands of criticism. The "beloved disciple" is identified with 
John, the son of Zebedee, and both the Gospel and the Apocalypse are ascribed 
to his authorship. In earlier volumes the same defect of critical discernment 
is present. One does not blame Dr. Fairbairn for not anticipating later results 
of scholarship; what one regrets is that he does not take adequate account of 
the critical scholarship of his own time, even if only to challenge its 
conclusions. In "bringing out the religious signification of the books" he 
seems to me to draw conclusions which literary and historical criticism would 
not sustain.' (pp. 33-4.)
NOTE B.
The tendency toward voluntarism in the nineteenth century can be 
traced to Kant's giving primacy to the practical reason. (The trend goes back, 
through Luther, to Ockham.) The tendency became more marked as the century 
advanced, and had some influence on religious life in Britain, possibly especi- 
ally in stimulating a pessimistic attitude.
Schopenhauer, who opposed the direction which German idealism had 
taken after Kant, propounded a pessimistic philosophy based on the will as the 
only reality, since knowledge, as Schopenhauer declared that Kant had clearly 
shown, is based on appearances and not on things-in-themselves. What Kant had 
recognized as radical evil in the human will, Schopenhauer made more explicit 
by showing that the evil lay in the 'will to live' and that man's only salvation 
lies in negating in Buddhist fashion this craving for life and entering upon
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a new way 'which may end in the return of the will into that state of nothing- 
ness from which it has only emerged to seek a happiness in living which living 
can never yield'. (Webb, History sf Philosophy, p. 228.) Because of the 
recognized dominance of pain over pleasure in life, Schopenhauer held that 
morality consists not in fulfilling duties to one's fellows, but in having 
sympathy for their suffering.
Schopenhauer's chief disciple, von Hartmann, in his Philosophy of 
the Unconscious, brought together his master's pessimism with an evolutionary 
optimism, pointing out that what is rational in the life-process denies the 
unreason of the will to live. Nietzsche, in basing his philosophy not on self- 
negation but on vigorous self-assertion, developed the converse of Schopenhauer's 
fundamental tenet, his central idea having been concerned with the expression 
of the 'will to power'. Toward the close of the century this general voluntar- 
istic current of thought found further expression in the pragmatism of James 
and the vitalism of Bergson.
NOTE C.
Eucken points out (Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 84) that a 
'remarkable cult of the abstract concept 1 sprang up in the nineteenth century 
along with an intellectualistic over-valuation, and at least at times (especially 
when he vigorously took up the cudgel for reason) Fairbairn became guilty of 
such abstractness. Possibly this tendency influenced him when he condemned 
Newman's 'Illative sense': he may have been antagonized by the Cardinal's stress 
on the concrete. At any rate he criticised Newman for his lack of ability for 
abstract speculation. Certainly much of recent thought would consider the 'power 
of judging about truth and error in concrete matters' (Grammar of Assent, p.346) 
 as Newman defined the Illative sense a most comprehensive idea of reason 
since inclusive of the intuitive as well as discursive reason. (Cp. also 
another statement from the Grammar; 'Our most natural mode of reasoning is, 
not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete 
to concrete, from wholes to wholes.' p. 323)
This is not to say that Fairbairn's basic notion of reason was no 
larger than merely covering the discursive power. For him reason was not 
merely a ratiocinative faculty. The most vital work of reason (in his view) 
is to gain insight, to 'get' principles valid to itself: making deductions 
must always be secondary. He thought of reason as being essentially architec- 
tonic, partially constituting even while construing nature and the world in 
which it livesj the more it is truly itself, the more does it work toward a 
perfect systhesis of all experience. Knowledge of religious truth would not be 
possible at all, were reason not constitutive, and did it not have 'religious 
truth so in it, that it is bound to seek and to conceive religious truth 
without it.' (Catholicism, p. 209.)
But if at times Fairbairn seemed, through strongly emphasizing its 
importance, to hypostafcize reason, actually he was opposed in a marked degree 
to a faculty psychology. He criticised Newman for a 'division of nature', 
arguing that conscience cannot be set in antagonism to reason, as he declared 
Newman did in making reason critical, sceptical and even atheistic and placing 
it under the authority of conscience. Fairbairn contended that religion on 
such a foundation cannot include the whole man: the wider base for religion 
must be a 'nobler Catholicism' than that of Rome, one 'of man, based, not on
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the excommunication of the reason, but on the reconciliation of the whole 
nature, intellect, conscience, heart, will, to God and His truth 1 . (Catholicism, 
p. 131) To set up a dualism in human nature between conscience and reason, 
Fairbairn insisted, is to make impossible real knowledge of religious truth. 
He further argued that the man deaf to the voice of conscience may not be able 
to reason rightly in religious matters; but when the reason is doubted or 
misused, the voice of conscience is not heard or cannot guide. But reason, 
like conscience, because part of the 'whole man', cannot be 'without religious 
character, unable to construe religious truths for what they really are, 1 else 
'there can be no legitimate reasoning concerning religion; truth is inaccessible 
to it, and it is incompetent to the discovery and determination of truth'. 
(Catholicism, p. 213)
Although he admitted, with Newman, that human reason is active in 
'fallen man', Fairbairn mentions it only in an incidental way. His unbounded
 almost exuberant confidence in reason forms a sharp contrast with the emphasis 
in recent theology on the 'twist' in human reason. At one place, for instance, 
when urging that Protestantism signifies the 'supremacy of reason', he wrote: 
'The reason, indeed, is not particular, individual, arbitrary, but universal, 
law-^abiding, reasonable the thought which cannot think without following the 
laws of its own being, and cannot follow them without finding the truth. The 
whole truth may not be found, but what is found is reality, divine and sovereign 
to the man who finds it.' (Catholicism, p. 137.)
As a matter of fact, Newman and Fairbairn spoke a different language: 
they quite misunderstood each other, and their controversy must be viewed in 
this light. Principal Selbie says in this connection: 'There was a streak of 
Puritan intolerance in his (Fairbairn»s) nature. It comes out in his treatment 
of Newman and his friends, and sometimes clouds his judgment in spite of his 
efforts to be scrupulously fair.' (Cong'l Quat., op. cit., p. 403.)
Forsyth's comment (op. cit., p. 2.) about the controversy is 
illuminating. 'The great minds fall into two classes extensive and intensive
 those with a wide and evolutionary survey, and those with an intense and 
penetrative divination. In the New Testament they are represented by the 
author of Hebrews on the one hand and St. Paul on the other. On another level 
Fairbairn would represent the one, his antagonist Newman the other the one an 
easy master of the historic field, the other ill-informed, but with the flair 
of genius for the^ragic and holy heart of things. The one class is more at home 
in a University, where all things are integrated into a grand historic procession; 
the other in a Church, where under all things is a moral convulsion, and under 
that God bearing it. For the one revelation is evolutionary, for the other 
it is redemptive; for the one the action of an organising idea, for the other the 
effect of a saving act and a moral teleology. For the one it is philosophic, 
for the other it is theological. For the one the ruling interest is a spiritual 
process, ruled by an "architectonic idea"; for the other it is a crisis, with 
the note not of growth from imperfection but of judgment, and moral salvation 
from guilt. The one stands on the idea, the other on the conscience. 1
An anecdote told me by Professor David Scott is also of interest. 
He recalled a walk with Fairbairn in Oxford when they happened to pass Bishop 
Gore. Fairbairn remarked about Gore: 'A good man, but no theologian.'
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CHAPTER III. FAIRBAIRN'S THEISM AND THE SCIENCE-RELIGION CONFLICT.
i. Fairbairn's Attitude to the Conflict between Religion and Science.
As science under the spell of Darwinism attained a dominant position 
in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the general point of view and 
speculations of scientists ruled the world of thought. Religionists for the 
most part were on the defensive. The inner meaning of the conflict between
religion and science is brought to a sharp focus by M. Maritain in True
1 
Humanism.
 We can mark a first significant moment in this process p.. e., 
the dissolution of 'this proud anthropocentric personality 1 through 
 the dispersion of its material element s'3 in the world of biology, with 
the triumph of the Darwinian idea of man's simian origin. Man, in this 
view, is seen not only as emerging from a long-drawn evolution of animal 
species (that is a purely historical and, after all, secondary question), 
but as issuing from this biological evolution without any metaphysical 
discontinuity, without at a given moment, with the coming of human being, 
anything absolutely new appearing in the series: spiritual subsistence 
implying that in each generation of a human being an individual soul is 
created by the Author of all things and cast into existence with an 
eternal destiny.'
Fairbairn knew where the core of the conflict between religion and 
science lay, and aimed to construct a theistic apologetic to resolve it. In
opposition to the clearly defined tendency of the epoch, which Eucken described
2 
as the 'desire of realism to eliminate the soul' and which Fairbairn himself
3 
more probably would have called the determination of naturalism to eliminate
the transcendental ideal from human life, he continually held before himself the
1. pp. 20-1. The next two 'moments' to which Maritain refers were (1) the 
development of the Freudian psychology and (2) the 'revolutionary moment 1 , 
the 'reversal of *Q1 values 1 . Both of these moments, of course, emerged 
into the open after Fairbairn's time.
2. Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 107.
3. Although he did not consider it entirely apt, Fairbairn used the word
'naturalism' to characterize the tendency to interpret the universe in terms 
of nature, not of spirit. The more common word used in the nineteenth cen- 
tury to express this idea was 'materialism', naturalism coming to be generally 
used only in the present century. In this thesis, 'naturalism' will be used 
throughout.
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task of reconstructing a theological system which would conserve the values of
traditional Christianity and yet would not fail to come to terms with the
1 
developing thought. Against the current secularism, empiricism, agnosticism,
and materialism, all of which we may sura up, in a general way, with the single 
term 'naturalism 1 , he brilliantly defended his liberal'idealism as a rival 
interpretation of the universe which, he declared, went further than any other
to explain all the facts as well as all the meanings of human life. The
E 
contemporary situation which he faced he described as follows:
'The conflict of Faith in our day is most arduous and fell. It 
livesjsurrounded by real or potential enemies. Science cannot publish 
her discoveries without letting us hear the shock of their collision 
with the ancient Faith. The political philosopher seeks to show how 
the State can live and prosper without religion; the ethical thinker how 
right can exist and law govern without God. A philosophy that denies 
the surest and most necessary religious truths works in harmony with a 
criticism that resolves into mythologies the holiest religious histories. 
A large section of our literature, including some of the finest creations 
of living imagination, interpret Nature and man, exhibit life and 
destiny from the standpoint of those who have consciously renounced 
belief in God and can find on earth nothing divine but humanity. Our 
working men listen to theories of life that leave around them only blank 
material walls, within them no spiritual reality, before them no higher 
and larger hope. With so many forces inimical to faith at work in our 
midst, men find it easiest to assume an attitude of absolute antagonism 
either, on the one hand, to Faith, or, on the other to Knowledge. 1
To keep faith and knowledge on friendly terms, so to speak, was 
one of the chief aims lying behind Fairbairn»s apologetic work; for he held 
that religion and science are not opposed if both are rightly conceived. 
Certainly Fairbairn persistently maintained that faith can have nothing to fear 
from any new knowledge, whatever it might be, since it as much as science 
wishes to know the truth. Religion, therefore, has no quarrel with science, 
only with what Fairbairn called 'scientific metaphysics', which was trying to 
eliminate the concept of 'spirit 1 from its interpretation of the universe. He 
aimed to refute the attacks of scientific speculation on religion with the 
theistic proofs.
1. A word invented by Thomas Huxley to 'denote his own position'. Cp. Webb 
Religious Thought in England from 1850, p. 85 and note. * '
2. City of God, pp. 7-8.
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ii. Nature, Man and God.
Since Fairbairn understood that science can be legitimately con- 
cerned only with processes and that whenever it begins to speak of origins it 
is transgressing beyond its proper sphere of investigation, he attacked with 
vigour systems of thought or speculative tendencies which had their beginnings 
in science and wer-e antagonistic to theism. He was convinced that no amount of 
scientific research could affect the foundations of theism in any way, either 
to validate or invalidate, but that the scientific speculation which eventuated 
in naturalism was quite outside its legitimate sphere in attacking theism, and 
in contradicting theism was radically unsound in its metaphysical speculating.
Fairbairn sought to prove that without a theistic approach to 
nature, it is not possible to formulate any intelligible concept of nature at 
all; and in his view the only sound basis for theism is the idea of a superna- 
tural which transcends and is prior to the natural. But whenever the 
supernatural is postulated, naturalism, which makes the reason for nature lie 
within itself without any reference to an f outside 1 power, considers nature's 
'realm of law' broken into and interfered with. To this contention that nature 
is a closed system Fairbairn replied in terms of the Berkeleian epistemology, 
since he considered knowing and being in essence an unity.
'In the strictest sense matter has no independent being, but 
spirit has, for independence is made by two things the ability to know 
and the capacity of being known. . . fthat does not know does not really 
exist. . . God and man both are, since both are capable of knowing and 
of being known, i. e., each is real both to himself and to the other.' (1)
Man, then, being mind which alone is real, is the interpretation as well as 
the interpreter of nature. Naturalism can explain neither man nor nature, the 
'man' of the naturalistic speculations being a mere abstraction, and nature in 
naturalistic terms being wholly unintelligible and hence non-interpretable. 
The only key Fairbairn allowed to be of any use in solving the enigma of both 
man and nature is mind, the divine element in man which mirrors transcendent
1. Philosophy, p. 57.
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Mind.
Although he referred to the world as the 'organism 1 of God,
1 
Comparing it to the body as expressing the mind of man 1 , Fairbairn also used
the analogy of interpreting a language to elucidate his position. If the 
signs making up a language unknown to us did not represent thought, if they 
were not symbols of reason, the language must remain wholly unintelligible to 
us. Thus he wrote:
1 . . .it was the reason immanent in the language that made it 
rational to us, that unless thought had made it, thought could never have 
understood, interpreted, and translated it. So the universe is rational 
to our reason by virtue of the immanent and absolute Reason it articulates; 
and these two, the outer and the inner Reason, co-existing, alike active, 
alike related, the universal acting on the particular reason through 
nature, through nature the particular reaching, reading and hearing the 
universal, cannot but create, as it were, by act and articulation, 
recognition of the fact, a confession and monument of the relation. And 
this recognition is faith in God, man's discovery of the Reason without 
and above him through the action of that Reason within and upon him, and, 
as a consequence, his consciousness of his dependence upon God and his 
obligations to Him.' (2)
Intelligibility in nature cannot be conceived, then, unless both creative and 
receptive intelligence are lying behind and in it. But thought alone can 
construct the intelligible, Fairbairn argued; and since thought or mind is 
the most distinctive characteristic of personality, personality cannot be 
eininated from nature in the naturalistic manner without making it entirely 
unintelligible. It follows that personality is the condition of nature's 
being, as well as the factor through which alone nature can be interpreted. 
The personality which interprets, which co-ordinates, the multifarious phenomena 
of nature cannot be considered as one of the 'co-ordinated atoms'. The conclu- 
sion which Fairbairn reaches is that 'the Personality which makes Nature was
3 
not made by the Nature it makes'.
But this conclusion needed further explication, and Fairbairn
1. Quick, The Christian Sacraments, p. 17. Canon Quick further suggests that 
not a few thinkers have 'regarded the world rather as an "artificial" symbol 
of the divine, using, perhaps unconsciously, the analogy of language which 
signifies a reality infinitely remote from what in itself it is. .' (Ibid.) 
Fairbairn, although using the analogy of language (concluded on next page)
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maintained that man not only construes nature, but also in part constitutes it, 
giving to nature, for example, such secondary qualities as colour and sound. 
Likewise with the concept of energy, set up as an ultimate cause by the 
speculative scientists: Fairbairn explained that this notion of causation used
in interpreting nature can be derived only through a deduction from will, that
1 
is to say, from the human experience of conscious freedom. Thus Fairbairn
held with other philosophic idealists that the idea of causation is the 
necessary correlate of freedom in man; and this idea also partially constitutes 
nature, from what is given within man, in terms of personality. Man supplies 
to the interpretation of nature, then, secondary qualities and such concepts as 
energy or cause, as well as the categories through which the phenomena of
nature become intelligible. Fairbairn summarized his position in a series of
2 
inferences.
1 (1) Since the intellect can interpret Nature, Nature is 
intelligiblej (2) since Nature is intelligible, there must be some 
correspondence or correlation between its laws or methods and the 
rational processes in us; (3) since there is this correlation between 
the intelligible world and the interpretative intellect, they must 
embody one and the same intelligence. f
At a time when many theologians considered that the theory of
(continued from previous page)
seemed to hover between these two positions, partly no doubt because he 
wished to hold fast to the traditional Christian view of affirming both 
the transcendence and immanence of God.
2. City of God, p. 68. "Faith and Modern Thought", a lecture delivered in 
1878 at Airedale College. The general line of thought is the same as that 
developed in the Philosophy in 1902.
3. Philosophy, p. 50.
1. Fairbairn followed essentially the same line of reasoning in this respect 
as his contemporary, James Martineau, whom Principal Dickie has called the 
'greatest-of English Theological Rationalists'. (Fifty Years of British 
Theology, p. 30.)
2. Philosophy, p. 35. Cp. Streeter, Reality, p. 21. 'The Idealists. . . 
maintain that the relation of cause and effect, though contributed by our 
minds in the act of knowing, is a relation which must also hold good of 
Reality Itself. Largely on this ground, they argue that Reality must be 
conceived as rational in the sense that Its structure must be thought of 
as similar to what we know as Reason. The Universe, then, must be viewed as 
the expression of Mind; and our minds partake of the nature of the Universal 
Mind, and see things of course, "through a glass darkly" as It or He sees 
them.'
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evolution as propounded by Darwin jeopardized theism, Fairbairn accepted it as 
a highly significant, comprehensive hypothesis which would be of value in 
gaining a better understanding of the universe. But he turned the flank of the 
evolutionists 1 attack on religion which was based on the idea, set forth by 
such men as Spencer, Tyndall, and Huxley in England or Haeckel in Germany, that 
the hypothesis of evolution could give a causal account of creation. Fairbairn 
stressed time and again that the Darwinian hypothesis might give a modal 
account.of creation, but it could never give to thought either the f why f or the 
f what' of the beginnings of nature and man. To attempt to make matter the 
primary cause, 'the promise and potency of all terrestrial life 1 (in Tyndall's 
phrase), is but a theory of nescience and had in Fairbairn f s judgment no 
significance in explaining the origin of life and certainly not of mind. The 
only interpretation of the universe which is constructive must be built on a 
transcendent or theistic basis. Fairbairn 1 s contention was that science no more
than philosophy or religion can interpret the universe without postulating a
1 
beginning, 'and a beginning that contains the end'.
What Fairbairn called Darwin's petitio principii is that he
'smuggled in' not only forms of life which could evolve but also an environment 
in which they could evolve. Likewise Fairbairn showed that the speculative 
evolutionists took for granted that a natural process like evolution could 
account for the emergence of mind without in any way recognizing that mind 
could not 'emerge' from nature unless Mind lay behind nature. Evolution has 
terminated in man, to be sure: but the method of development in no way explains 
the end result, which is mind. That from which life and mind evolved must be 
invested with the qualities which enabled it to produce man, who is living 
spirit. Fairbairn held that there could be only one sound explanation of the 
evolution of man: that a world in which reason develops by means of a natural
1. City of God, p. 62.
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process must be rooted in reason: and recognition of the »outer 1 reason 
(i. e., as initiating the process) and the 'inner' reason in man at once implies 
relation between self and not-self, which means no less than faith in God and 
leads to the consciousness of man's dependence on and obligation to Him.
One of Fairbairn's general criticisms of naturalism was that it 
was quite unhistorical in its approach. So he pointed out that the natural 
histories of creation rested on unsound suppositions. One such presupposition 
was that belief in God originated in the idea of creation. Actually such belief, 
he maintained, in all the ancient mythologies (e. g., in the Judaic) can be 
shown to have been much older than the idea of creation. Another charge brought 
against theism was that creation by God must be construed, in Paley's phrase>
as the work of a 'manlike Artificer' who constructed and designed the universe
1 
in detail, a notion manifestly absurd if the Darwinian hypothesis was valid.
Fairbairn's answer to this charge was that the deepest theistic thought has 
never had this notion, an idea really scientific or philosophic in origin, 
having arisen in the early speculations about nature in Greece. In the Hebraic 
conception of creation God is represented as speaking, and speech, Fairbairn
always argued, is the symbol of thought and volition, implying that both mind
2 
and will were expressed in creation.
To speak in terms of a manlike Artificer, moreover, is to suggest 
that the world was created and then left to fend for itself. Fairbairn pointed 
out that this was but the old Deism again. Over against such a Deist conception, 
 and Fairbairn held that it was against such an antiquated notion that the
1. 'Theism is represented as an anthropomorphic theory of creation, a "process 
of manufacture" by "a manlike Artificer".' (Studies in Religion and History. 
p. 75.) Fairbairn in this connection quotes Spencer's First Principles 
(p. 33): 'Alike in the rudest creeds and the cosmogony long current among 
ourselves, it is assumed that the genesis of the heavens and the earth is 
effected somewhat after the manner in which a workman shapes a piece of 
furniture.'
2. In his emphasis on the doctrine of creation, Fairbairn reacted against the 
Hegelian idea of God; for a God who is Creator, since of necessity related 
to the world, cannot be conceived as an abstract Absolute.
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scientific evolutionists were contending when they inveighed against theism,  
he insisted that nature cannot be construed as being independent of God, but 
all the time dependent on His activity for its immanent energies. 'The growth,
the multiplication, and the differentiation of organisms are but the forms under
1 
which the original creative energy continues to operate. 1 In short, Fairbairn
conceived nature in Darwinian terms, as an organism which had evolved and in 
which the power of development is the immanence of God: hence God's action in 
nature can never be considered as 'interference' or even 'special'.
But if Fairbairn moved with other religious thinkers of his day in 
stressing the immanence of God in order to save the Christian faith, a movement 
which in part at least was a reaction against the over-emphasis on the Divine 
transcendence during the preceding century as in part it was coming to terms 
with the prevailing monism, he did not carry his immanent ism so far as to 
become involved in pantheism or, with the neo-Hegelian idealists, to deny 
personality in God. It was, in fact, his holding fast to the idea of personal- 
ity in the Divine Nature as well as his refusal to equate the eternal, infinite 
God with nature and man, both of which are finite and temporal, that enabled 
him to retain in his thinking the dual conception of orthodox Christianity: 
that God is no less transcendent even though immanent in nature and man, in 
nature as energy, in man as reason and will. 'Immanence denotes the mode in
which the Divine activities are exercised,' he argued, 'not the mode of the
2 
Divine existence', which can be embodied or incarnate in nature but can never
be identified with nature.
The doctrine of Divine immanence affected many religious beliefs 
which had been considered self-evident. As the belief in mechanical causation 
and the uniformity of law in nature and in all life became regnant, it was 
inevitable that God, as we have seen, should be pushed to the beginning of
1. Philosophy, p. 54.
2. City of God, p. 56.
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things and that nature should be considered self-sustaining without His continued 
activity in it. This new world-view had been developing since Galileo enunciated 
his first law of motion in 1658, although 'Newton still thought divine interfer- 
ence occasionally necessary to correct observed irregularities' in nature; but
 later it was shown that such irregularities corrected themselves and that
1 
Newton's assumption was therefore gratuitous'. Religionists in the nineteenth
century built an apologetic to controvert the notion of a self-sustaining 
universe, as in the instance of Fairbairn, by stressing the immanence of God, 
even as they were emphatic in propounding the doctrine of creation to oppose 
the further sophistication of the monistic idea, namely, that a self-sustaining 
universe could also be self-originating. As the new world-view and new apologetic 
developed side by side, the interpretation of miracles could not but undergo 
considerable change.
Fairbairn himself was too much of an immanentist to give either a 
naive or very positive apologetic for miracles. But even as he clung to the 
idea of God's transcendence, so he considered the concept of miracle important 
if not essential for faith. He did not, that is to say, allow the distinction 
between natural and supernatural to be entirely eliminated, as happened with 
thorough-going immanentiam. Of course he vituperated those scientific meta- 
physicians who argued against miracle as if religious apologetic late in the 
nineteenth century still interpreted miracle in the artificial way of Archbishop 
Tillotson and Paley in the late eighteenth century, when the whole truth of the
Christian religion had been made to rest on prophecy and miracle. Against such
2 
widely different thinkers as Hume, Matthew Arnold, and Huxley, all of whom
dogmatically denied miracle at least its credibility if not its possibility 
1. McGiffert, The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas, p. 37. McGiffert quotes 
Galileo's law as follows: 'Every body continues in its state of motion or 
of rest, unless acted upon by some opposing force.'
2. Fairbairn pointed out that Hume's argument against miracles was inconsistent 
with his philosophic principles and hence could not be sustained even on the 
basis of the Scottish philosopher's own reasoning.
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Fairbairn argued more or less along the same line, tersely indicated when he 
wrote: 'The late Matthew Arnold used to say in his very oracular, which was 
also a very foolish, manner, "The unfortunate thing about miracles is, they
do not happen," to which I simply reply, "The remarkable thing is that they
1 
have happened". 1 Specifically Fairbairn pointed to the original creation out
of which evolved the present universe and especially to the emergence of mind 
as definite evidences of miracle. Even if one does not believe in God, Fair- 
bairn maintained that the supernatural must be postulated if the universe is 
not to remain an insoluble enigma. But in essence he made the belief in
miracle a question of principle, intimately linked with the Being of God, as
2 
can be seen to some extent in the following passage:
'If God is not, miracles will of necessity be in the strict 
sense of the word impossible. . . If you exclude from your view of the 
universe a personal God, miracles or the supernatural will vanish with 
Him. . . If there is a God, then nature as it appears to the senses 
is not the whole of being; it incorporates a perfect reason, it assumes 
there is an almighty will by whose action and through whose action 
and through whose consent and concurrence it was and is. . .If there 
be a moral Deity and I am a moral man, we must be able to get at each 
other. And the only way by which we can get at each other is through 
the supernatural; and what is the supernatural when it becomes actual 
save the miraculous? The reality of the supernatural involves the 
possibility of miracles.1 '
As science was whittling down the area in which miracle could take 
place and as the tendency to minimize the activity of God in the world grew 
more prominent, it came to be recognized that even if many events termed 
miracle by naive peoples could be explained naturally, yet one must allow for 
the direct intervention of the supernatural in a miraculous way in the founding
of Christianity. Fairbairn shared this view. 'Can you take the miraculous
3 
narratives out of the gospel and leave anything behind?' he asked: and the
answer seemed to him so obvious as to make the question rhetorical. Man is a
1. "The Miracles of Christ", p. 190, in the symposium, What is Christianity?
2. Ibid, p. 189-90, 195. Note also the following statement: 'But the problems 
they (i. e., miracles) raise are religious and ethical as well as philosophi- 
cal and historical, and, we may add, the former are profounder and more 
determinative than the latter. 1 (Philosophy, p. 331.)
3. Ibid, p. 206.
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child of nature and hence bound by its ineluctable laws, Fairbairn agreed; but 
our Lord who transcended nature by His very being suspended these natural laws. 
However carefully the background of our Lord is studied race, place or time of 
birth, family, education it is not possible to account for His life and 
influence as that of an ordinary man, as a r natural being'. No, Fairbairn 
argued, our Lord Himself was the miracle. And the proper action of such a 
person is the 'extraordinary act 1 . In this general contention Fairbairn
followed the trend which made Christ and Christianity 'support the miracles
1 
instead of being sustained by them'. Fairbairn's app:pa6ch to the whole concept
of miracle, like that of his contemporaries, was really that the miracles are 
a difficulty to be explained rather than a buttress to sustain faith.
In the nineteenth century world-view another difficulty which had
2 
to be met was in regard to prayer. Professor Taylor writes in this connection:
'We know, too, h&w widely even anti-materialistic philosophers 
in the second half of the nineteenth century were infected by the coarse 
deterministic prejudice that prayer if it means anything more than 
meditation is an absurdity, because to pray implies the belief that the 
"laws of the physical world" can be modified or suspended by the will 
of God.'
Fairbairn did not succumb to this prejudice, however much he believed in the 
rigid 'laws of nature' and however much he was against the notion of 'interfer- 
ence' by the supernatural in the realm of the natural. If man himself through 
volition and the putting forth of energy (ran his arguej£r$r?) can effect changes 
in the world without as well as within himself, why should not God, the Spirit 
immanent in the universe, be able to act in and through nature, answering
prayer through the 'normal action of the universe tempered, perhaps, in special
5 
cases to our weakness, or our weakness tempered to it'? Nor is there any
1. McGiffert, op. cit., p. 39.
2. The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. II, pp. 82-3.
3. Sermons, "Providence and Prayer", p. 220. This 'pulpit discussion', as he 
called it, is the only published writing in which Fairbairn dealt specifically 
with the subject of prayer. Although it was written in 1873, it was not 
published until 1893 j hence it can probably be considered as representative 
of his mature thought.
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reason for not including the 'physical 1 as well as the 'spiritual' in the 
legitimate sphere of prayer, for the Divine Will can so administer His laws
 as to meet special ends. So understood, prayer in the physical sphere becomes
1 
both normal and right 1 .
It is interesting to note that Fairbairn referred to the suggestion 
made to Tyndall and promulgated by him that an experiment to test the efficacy 
of prayer should be arranged by setting aside two wards in a hospital, the 
patients in the one to be made the objects of prayer, those in the other not 
to be prayed for at all. If the former patients showed more marked or more 
rapid improvement, the efficacy of prayer, according to this 'experiment', 
would be vindicated. Fairbairn pointed out that such a 'scientific 1 experiment 
was quite out of place, not only because religious matters cannot be tested in 
this way, but especially because it would be impossible to isolate patients in 
a hospital who would not be prayed for by someone; that only a non-religious 
man could even suggest that certain suffering people should not be prayed for. 
To be sure, Fairbairn admitted, the ultimate test of prayer is experimental; 
'but the region of the experiment is the living soul, which, so long as it
lives and believes that over and above it broods the living God, will cry out
2 
to Him in all its trouble'.
Fairbairn's thought in regard to nature and Supernature may be
summarized as follows. The supernatural or transcendental denoted for him
3 
'a cause which is as native to Nature as reason or thought is to man 1 . Only
by postulating the priority of the supernatural can the natural be explained, 
can any account be given of the origin of the world or of man, since clearly 
the notion of a self-originating universe is but a theory of nescience. 
Religion with its doctrine of creation seeks to explain the 'why' of nature
1. Sermons, p. 221.
2. Ibid, p. 223.
3. Philosophy, p. 56.
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even as science with its theory of evolution tries to describe the 'how'. But 
if creation by God, if the activity of the supernatural, be denied, then no 
account of beginnings can be given. Creation is no finished product, however, 
but a continuing process; and since the universe can no more be considered 
self-sustaining than self-originating, Fairbairn held that the Will of God 
as its immanent energy 'moves' the universe. But the Will of God, since super- 
natural, is also transcendent, even as the mind of man is transcendent over 
nature.
iii. God and the Moral Consciousness,
As Fairbairn could brook no antipathy between reason and faith, so 
he considered morality an integral part of religion. Already in the origin 
of religion he traced the moral factor to the personal obligation laid upon
man by his not-Self, and he steadily maintained that morality and faith can
1 
never be severed. Religion and morality are so indissolubly bound together
by God into a 'great whole 1 that the 'man who puts them asunder commits an act
2 3 
unholy'. He summed up the matter in a sermon with these words:
'The religious man must be moral, the man who is really moral in 
being and action must be religious. Religion is the manifestation of 
morality; morality the incarnation, the manifestation in the flesh of 
religion.'
In developing his moral theory and here as elsewhere in his work 
he is rather critical than constructive Fairbairn expounded the theistic 
proof from the moral consciousness even while criticising the empirist and 
evolutionary ethic. Throughout the history of moral progress, he maintained, 
in which the significant factor has always been where the new differed from the 
old, man has applied to himself a standard of judgment, been drawn by a moral 
ideal, felt a moral obligation, a law he knew he should obey even while he
1. A. A. Bowman's sentence (Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Vol. II, 
p. 57) aptly expresses Fairbairn's position: 'When religion and morality 
fail to synthesize, morality may hold its own against religion, but religion 
will have the utmost difficulty in maintaining itself against morality.'
2. Sermons, p. 49.
3. Ibid, p. 186.
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disobeyed it. Neither the empirist nor evolutionary ethic, in claiming that 
this moral obligation could arise out of nature per se or out of society or be 
the product of human experience, can adequately explain its origin: the only 
explanation, Fairbairn held, is that the sense of/Dbligation is transcendent 
in origin.
Even as Fairbairn considered the epistemology of empiricism 
inadequate as a metaphysic of knowledge, so he argued that its ethic is 
inadequate as a metaphysic of morality. For Fairbairn contended that inasmuch 
as man needed a. priori categories of the understanding to make knowledge of the 
external world possible, so he needed transcendental moral elements to make 
the genesis of his moral ideal understandable, If, however, knowledge is 
conceived as the product of sense impressions, then the moral standard too will 
be considered as the product of experience. The ethical systems of Hobbes, 
Hume and Bentham, Fairbairn criticised together. For all three based their 
ethic on the satisfaction of man's appetite for pleasure, although Hume sought 
to make his ethic not wholly one of self-interest by making conscience the 
judgment of society 'expressed in a self-judgment'. Whereas all three made 
the underlying principle of their systems the natural man and the satisfaction 
of his basic appetition, Fairbairn pointed out that in trying to construct 
ethical systems they were to that extent seeking to moralize nature.
'The very attempt, therefore, to interpret man ethically implied 
that he was more than a natural being, that he transcended nature, that 
his transcendence ought to be progressive in its quality, and that a 
completely moral state was one where laws proper to man governed men: 
creatures merely natural could not be governed by such laws. 1 (1)
Moreover, even while apparently trying to establish a social sanction for their 
ethic, Fairbairn argued that these empirical thinkers had to remain strictly 
individualistic, the only standard of moral judgment possible for them having 
been based solely on the experience of the individual.
1. Philosophy, p. 68.
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Fairbairn considered that the evolutionary ethic was no less 
inadequate to explain the genesis of the moral ideal which constrains man than 
was the utilitarian ethic of the early empiricists. This evolutionary ethic 
developed out of the theories of Darwin and Spencer. According to Darwin's 
theory, the moral faculty developed, by the process of natural selection, out 
of the social instinct which desired the approbation of the tribe; he thought 
of differences, however, as based on variations which are chance or accidental 
occurrences the springing up of 'sports 1  and so the growth of moral ideas was
conceived as a series of 'incidents that happened in the course of things
1 
rather than products of any reason, personal or collective.'
Spencer in building his synthetic system could not leave anything 
to happenstance, and Fairbairn explained that even as this thinker who sought 
to build an evolutionary philosophy made life consist in the adaptation of 
organism to environment, so he made moral progress consist in the self-moved 
movement, as it were, toward 'ideal congruity 1 . This ideal congruity, as
Fairbairn noted in Spencer's words, is the life of 'the completely adapted man
2 
in the completely evolved society 1 . The moral sense develops, on the basis
of Spencer's theory of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, in the 
struggle of man toward this goal: the motivation in this process, Fairbairn 
pointed out, is the same as with the utilitarians, namely the amount of pleasure 
derived by the individual from his action.
The evolutionary ethic must be criticised in the first place, 
according to Fairbairn, from the point of view of science, which made the 
transmission of acquired characteristics a doubtful theory. Even if acquired 
characteristics could be inherited, he stressed that the significant fact to 
note is that what would be of most value to the individual, the experience of 
the parent, cannot be inherited. Furthermore whatever affinities there may be
1. Philosophy, p. 70.
2. Quoted in Ibid, p. 71.
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between the ethical ideas of man and the instincts of his ancestors whether 
primitive man or the animal again the significant factor is the difference 
between them, which is qualitative. The core of Fairbairn's criticism of the 
evolutionary ethic, however, lay in the fact that the moral obligation placed
on man has not consisted in adjustment to environment, but in adjusting his
1 
environment to the »higher ideal* which he brings to it. 'We judge both the
environment and the organism, because we apply to both an ideal standard which
£ 
expresses our notion of what ought to be.'
In a more general way Fairbairn criticised the ethic based on 
experience, whether utilitarian or evolutionary, on the basis of man f s 
conception of human freedom. Fairbairn, following Kant, would make man's moral 
autonomy a presupposition of the obligation .laid on him, i. e., that the 'ought' 
implies the 'can': only what lies within man's power to achieve can be con- 
sidered a part of his duty. But both the utilitarian and evolutionary ethic
3 
denied moral freedom to man by making him completely subject to the desire for
pleasure and the avoidance of pain, the fundamental motive, especially in the 
evolutionary ethic, being self-preservation in the struggle for existence. But 
if the obligation laid on man is real, Fairbairn argued, man must have freedom 
of choice, since otherwise he could make no moral judgments. Furthermore, the 
Edwardian distinction drawn between freedom of will and freedom of action is
1. Huxley in a modified way developed this same thought in his Romanes lecture 
delivered a decade earlier (in 1893). 'The practice of that which is 
ethically beet what we call goodness or virtue involves a course of 
conduct which, in all respects, is opposed to that which leads to success in 
the cosmic struggle for existence. . . The ethical progress of society 
depends, not on imitating the cosmic process, still less in running away from 
it, but in combating it. 1 Evolution and Ethics> pp. 33f.
2. Philosophy, p. 74.
5. Cp. Webb in Religious Thought in England from 1850. p. 65. 'The gradual but 
rapid extension of the "reign of law", as it was called, over one region of 
human experience after another appeared to promise or to threaten (according 
to the prejudices of the observer) its further extension to the sphere of 
human volition, so that no room would eventually be left either for the 
individual freedom which seemed to be required to give meaning to responsi- 
bility for one's actions before a divine Judge, or for the operation of 
the grace which men had been taught to expect from a divine Saviour.'
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artificial and unsound, since the latter without the former would be but a form 
of necessity inasmuch as any response made by man would be wholly pre-determined. 
That the will is not free because motives determine choices, as had been argued, 
Fairbairn held to be invalid, since the will selects the motives which determine 
action. Granted that nature is the realm of necessity, its dominant characteris- 
tic being uniformity based on the causative sequence: but personality, Fairbairn 
concluded, with its powexjof initiative and of breaking into the sequences nature 
follows, is the seat of freedom, reasoned will here being dominant. Since man 
can initiate action he must be more than a mere link in the causal series. That
f the free will acts in view of reasons, and would not be rational if it could
1 
choose without them 1 indicates how little of the arbitrary is involved when
man makes choices. Fairbairn argued further that if the human world were a 
mechanical order of necessitated beings, man could in no way conceive the notion 
of 'energy 1 , which was considered the power motivating nature by nineteenth 
century science: but if freedom in man were not the correlate of energy in 
nature, man would be quite unconscious of any power that could be exercised 
within himself or resisted from without. In considering the emphasis Spencer 
placed on the inheritance of acquired characteristics and its relation to 
moral freedom, Fairbairn pointed out that man bears witness to his freedom of 
will in the sense of responsibility he has for his actions; that even inheritance, 
while indubitably conditioning freedom, in no way cancels it, since man feels 
responsible even for the acts which seem to arise directly out of tendencies he 
has inherited.
Toward the hedonistic principle of the Millite ethic Fairbairn was 
caustic.
'For Happiness, unqualified, is the most absolutely insignificant 
term in the whole vocabulary of philosophy or of literature; and it is 
therefore signally unsuitable when made to play the part of ultimate 
arbiter as regards the qualities which make actions right or wrong, 1 (2)
1. Philosophy, p. 77.
2. Ibid, p. 79. It is doubtful that Fairbairn did justice to the ethical 
seriousness of J. S. Mill.
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But if happiness is to be qualified, Fairbairn maintained that some standard 
external to and higher than itself must be introduced; and then at once 
happiness per se ceases to be the principle whereby the character of the 
particular action is judged. Moreover if a person tried to apply the principle
of the happiness of the greatest number, according to Fairbairn's reasoning, he
1 
would become hopelessly entangled in a web of conflicting loyalties.
But the strongest criticism which Fairbairn levelled against the 
entire naturalistic approach to ethics was that it failed to account in any 
way for the 'imperious 1 nature of the moral obligation laid on man. Even 
granting that the happiness of the greatest number is the standard of right, 
he argued, why should man seek to promote it? TJherein lies the moral constraint 
which man feels? Suppose one holds with the evolutionists that the constraint 
rises from a social sanction which has become so a part of the individual's 
being that he feels it as a personal judgment. But conscience makes its most 
imperious demand on the individual when it commands him to go against the 
dictates of society: then how can it be validly held, Fairbairn asked, that 
society can place an absolute moral obligation upon man? The naturalistic 
ethic, in short, can give no explanation for the absolute authority of conscience, 
since society cannot place on man an unconditioned 'ought 1 .
Whence, then, does conscience receive its unconditioned authority? 
In developing his answer Fairbairn closely followed Butler and Kant, although, 
characteristically for nineteenth century moral idealism, at no point did he 
mention Kant's doctrine of the 'radical evil' in man. According to Fairbairn 
the authority is within the nature of man, in an absolute moral law which 
directs man without mediation and which gives to him his essential humanity.
'Subjectively, the ultimate, the thing of which we are supremely
1. Fairbairn did not take into account, however, that the problem of conflicting 
loyalties is the be*te noire of all ethics.
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conscious if we are conscious of ourselves at all, is the sovereignty 
of conscience; but objectively, the reality which is the correlate of 
our ultimate consciousness, is a universe in which God is Sovereign. 1 (1)
For even as mind in man implies an intelligible medium in which it lives, so 
the f ethical man 1 implies an 'ethical universe'. Man as moral stands above 
nature, Fairbairn concluded; and moral will, with its power to initiate action 
and create moral good, is more than the resultant of natural forces. The 
moral obligation is an unconditional authority because it is transcendent and 
ideal. It cannot be produced by nature. It can be laid on man only by the 
supreme ethical Will of God.
But grant that the moral consciousness of man has its roots in 
the ethical sovereignty of Deity and that man as moral is transcendent over 
nature: what of the problem of evil which appears as an immense 'surd' to 
the conception of the ethical man in an ethical universe? Fairbairn avowedly 
suggested answers (to lead toward a solution of this problem) which stemmed in 
his natural theological approach, although he was not entirely successful in 
holding out of his discussions the Christian presuppositions. Evil becomes a
problem, in his view, only for him who believes in a God who is at once good
2 
and omnipotent, since if either of these attributes is denied to Deity, the
existence of evil, while still a difficulty to be met in fashioning a world- 
view, is not an acute 'problem for anyone seeking to understand the ways of the 
universe.
Evil is of two kinds, and here Fairbairn followed the usual
classification: physical and moral. The former includes all suffering arising 
from man's relation to nature, from his own human nature, and from the actions 
upon him of other human beings, both ancestors and contemporaries. Moral evil
1. Philosophy, p. 89.
2. Unlike his contemporary, Dean Rashdall, with whose thought in other respects 
his own thinking is closely akin, Fairbairn did not limit the power of God.
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is sin, because it is rebellion of the human will against the sovereignty of
its Maker.
1 
Since Fairbaira believed that nature is 'holy and just',  although
he did quote in this connection J. S. Mill's terrible indictment of the savagery 
of nature, he conceived all suffering as being educative or disciplinary when 
considered by itself; but when it is considered in relation to sin, the punitive 
and even retributive factor must be taken into account. Suffering which does 
not seem to be a direct resultant of sin, then, Fairbairn traced to a nature 
which in the long view is beneficent or to man's ignorance of nature's 'laws'. 
The catastrophes for which nature seems to be solely responsible are few, since 
he maintained that ordinarily man in some way or another is a contributory 
agent. Moreover, the suffering man endures at the hand of nature whether 
catastrophes, his own mortality, or evils springing from his own constitution 
 has disciplined and educated him, taught him the laws by which nature acts, 
made him compassionate and beneficent as he has seen and tried to alleviate 
the suffering of his fellows, ^ature, in short, is conceived by Fairbairn as
'good in herself, evil only when she falls into evil hands, and is made a
2 
minister by sin', since the action and interaction of nature upon and in man
has contributed so immeasurably to his progress, both moral and intellectual. 
It is of especial note that Fairbairn took so little into account what is 
usually thought of as innocent suffering.
The problem raised by moral evil is more acute, and Fairbairn for 
the most part met it in the way characteristic of nineteenth century, Protestant
thought moving in the liberal, activist channel. Since God is moral, he argued,
3 
He would only create beings 'capable of the highest form of good', that is to
say, beings who could realize character. Character itself could not be created, 
since it is not possible for God, conditioned by His own nature, to create what
1. Philosophy, p. 149. 2. Ibid, p. 156. 3. Ibid.
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is in essence uncreatable. It could be achieved only by man himself as a being 
granted at least a limited freedom. But when man was given freedom, the way at 
once was open for him to sin. Man, in fact, could not become moral unless it 
were possible for him to sin, and Fairbairn laboured this point.
'Could there be obedience where disobedience was impossible? 
or could there be righteousness if wickedness could not be done. . . 
Hence if a universe is to be created where moral good shall be, it 
must also be a universe where moral evil may exist. 1 (1)
He examined and repudiated Augustine's thought as an example of the orthodox 
view, that through the occasion of sin something is gained, God is brought 
nearer to man and man is lifted to greater significance; and this gain could 
not have been achieved without the sin. As against this view he defended the 
conception more typical of his generation, that good could be achieved only 
from the possibility of sin. 'Moral character can be formed only through
conflict (with temptation), and the higher the character the fiercer must the
2 
conflict be.'
Such a view as that of J. S. Mill, who contended that God's power 
must be limited or He would never have allowed evil to despoil His creation, 
Fairbairn set aside by maintaining that God could have kept evil out of the 
universe, but He chose not to. God did not create evil, nor did He even 
 consent 1 to its entrance into the created world; yet He did not prevent its 
entrance, since to have done so would have negatived His creation of man. For 
had man been created a necessitated being, and only so could God have both 
created man and held evil out of the world, Fairbairn argued that man could 
be neither good nor evil, but only a neutral automaton. God, then, by limiting 
Himself granted to man a relative freedom, even though knowing, since omniscient, 
that man would sin. Fairbairn developed the interesting point that had God, 
with his foreknowledge that evil almost surely would enter His created world,
!  Philosophy, p. 160. Cp. Martineau's oft-quoted statement: »A universe 
which no sin could invade, neither could any character inhabit.' The Seat 
of Authority in Religion.      
2. Sermons, pp. 201-2.
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not created man for this reason, then the 'possible evil 1 and not the omnipotent 
God would have been 'victor*. Even as He chose not to prevent the entrance of 
evil into the created world, and Fairbairn held the idea that evil 'entered 1 
the world through man after his creation rather than that there was a pre-mun- 
dane fall, so He allows evil to continue in the universe not because He 
condones it, but because He could eradicate it only by destroying free will in 
man: and that (as we have seen) would mean on the one hand eliminating all 
that is essentially human in man, and on the other make impossible the achieve- 
ment of character for which alone man was created.
Physical evil (suffering) when considered by itself must be 
regarded as wholly disciplinary, even though man himself is responsible for 
bringing on himself much of this suffering. But when viewed in relation to 
moral evil, Fairbairn emphasized the juridical factor, namely, that suffering 
at least in part is punishment for transgressing the universal law of an 
ethical universe, although even as punishment the educative element must still 
be thought of as primary, the punitive as secondary. But he is no less empha- 
tic that suffering must follow sin in an ethical universe. 'Were there no
suffering in a world where evil is, it would mean that its Sovereign cared as
1 
little for the evil as for the good, was indifferent to both.' It is
possible, to be sure, that suffering as well as sin may be a sign that man is 
fallen. But the very fact that suffering is disciplinary in its action shows 
that it is redemptive and works toward the recovery of man from his fallen 
state. Hence evil is a factor for good, although Fairbairn urged that even 
while allowing this, the evil-ness of evil can in no way be toned down. In 
his historical survey on the problem of evil he showed that he turned definite- 
ly away from the absolutist position, (and this despite his immanentisia), which 
would make of evil merely something primitive, or negative, or unharmonious, 
 in short, all views which tended to lessen the unrelieved badness of evil.
1. "The Cross and Passion" in the symposium, Life and Work of Redeemer, p. 296.
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But as a factor for good, Fairbairn conceived evil as a potent agent making 
for man's highest beatitude,
'a divine energy for moralizing man and nature. ... It continues to 
exist not as a rightful or permanent inhabitant of the universe, but 
as one whose very right to be is denied, and for whose expulsion all 
the energies of nature have been marshalled and trained to fight.' (1)
One other point finds a place in Fairbairn's argument, that evil 
is a greater problem for man conceived as mortal being than as immortal soul, 
since evil in the long view of eternity must appear much differently from 
what it does in the short view of the earth years. To God who sees the 
'whole as whole', who knows the end as the beginning, and here Fairbairn 
inclines either toward the absolutist view or toward the notion of divine 
over-ruling (it is difficult to say which), evil may appear less 'darkly 
real 1 than it does to man.
The problem of evil, then, as problem, did not appear as grim to 
Fairbairn as it is sometimes painted. Suffering he conceived as disciplinary 
in action, whether it be resultant on man's ignorance of nature's 'laws 1 or 
on guilt due to man's sin. The innocent suffer with the guilty because they 
are part of the race and because innocent suffering has such a marked redemp- 
tive influence on the sinner, although it is difficult to see how Fair bairn's 
apologetic for innocent suffering is in any way adequate. Although man is 
immediately responsible for evil, God must ultimately be considered responsible, 
at least to the degree that he did not 'prevent' the entrance of evil into the 
created world. But he chose not to prevent the entrance of evil, since only 
by giving man freedom (and thus making him potentially an evil-doer) could he 
create per sons ', and
'the only creation worthy of a personal God is a universe of persons; 
and persons born as potentialities who can be educated by experience, 
awakened to reason, won to love, and persuaded to obedience.' (2)
1. Philosophy, p. 167.
2. Ibid, p. 158.
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Hence evil, though in itself unmitigated badness, can be made a factor for good 
as it is fought by man, since moral character can be formed only through such 
conflict, 'and the higher the character the fiercer must the conflict be.'
Fairbairn maintained that natural theology could carry his apologetic 
thus far. But he further raised the question whether it might not be possible 
that the existence of evil would explain and justify the Incarnation.
iv. God and History.
Fairbairn's interpretation of history was deeply coloured if not, 
indeed, regulated by the point of view which Professor Brunner aptly character- 
izes as 'the illusive optimism of progress of the nineteenth century, the
2 
secularized form of Christian eschatology'. History in this view is a sort
of 'cosmic escalator 1 . Since man is free, he can impede the progress or throw 
the whole process into deep shadow because of the evil he conceives and actual- 
izes; but the purpose immanent in the whole carries on the movement toward its 
goal in time, the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. Thus for
Fairbairn history had no centre: although he did suggest that we may speak of
3 
our Lord 'as the keystone of the arch which spans the gulf of time', yet
basically he had the 'inclined-plane' view of history which has no 'end' and 
in which man is steadily improving. We must think, he urged, not of a single 
individual or generation but of
'an endless series of mortal persons on the way to immortality, each 
a miniature deity, each in time yet destined for eternity, each with 
inexhaustible potentialities within him, each realizing himself under 
the conditions which a measured existence affords, and all contributing 
to make the wondrous and varied life which we call the history of man' . (4)
Unquestionably Fairbairn was 'more impressed with the sanity than
5 
the vanity of things', although he had too poignant a realization of the
1. Sermons, p. 202.
2. The Mediator, p. 37.
3. Philosophy, p. 567.
4. Ibid, p. 144.
5. Forsyth, op. cit., p. 2.
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wickedness of man in society, the suffering caused by injustice of man to man, 
as well as of the forces apparently working for evil in nature, to make his 
picture of history wholly idyllic. If he could speak of 'a world which is 
radiant in its very shadow, and, in spite of all its evil, is good, because 
capable of being made ever better', he was also keenly aware of the antagonisms 
between people, whether individuals or groups, when dominated by the unreason
of 'petty aims and mean ambitions' which find expression in war or in the 'open
2 
violence in a modern city'.
The principle Fairbairn educed in developing his concept of nature, 
 i. e., that lower forms and orders must always be interpreted in terms of the 
higher and not vice versa as the naturalistic thinkers insisted on doing, he 
also applied to history, which he considered continuous with nature. That the 
ideas of unity and order became actual in history, despite all natural tendencies 
in man having been radically opposed to them, he interpreted as pointing to a 
teleology in man (even as he traced a purpose in the evolutionary process of
nature), a teleology which 'makes man's progress in civilization a progressive
3 
realization of reason' . Within the continuum of history he saw the idea of
unity very slowly being actualized, and this idea he traced in the development 
of group life as it spread from family to tribe to nation, in the growth of 
commerce and industry, in the springing up of the arts, and not least in the 
creation of religion, all of these being the work of reason, the underlying 
unity being seen in the fact of the comraunicability and exchangeability of 
these various achievements of the human race.
The idea of order in history, formulated by theology before it was 
used by philosophy, at first took the form (according to Fairbairn's interpre- 
tation) oi)4 voluntarism which made the arbitrary will of God the efficient
1. Philosophy, p, 151.
2. Ibid, p. 178.
3. Ibid, p. 176. Forsyth epigrammatically expressed Fairbairn's point of view 
when he said that Fairbairn was more engrossed with the 'rationality of 
redemption than with the redemption of rationality'. (pp. cit. p 2 )
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cause of movement and change. But the determinism in systems of thought built 
on this substructure, and Fairbairn cited as examples the theologies of 
Augustine and Calvin, and philosophies like those of Spinoza and Leibnitz,  
made them unsound since they contradicted the 'most invincible' belief of man 
in his own freedom. In spite of the rough and tumble aspect of history with 
its confusion always coloured to some degree with a haunting sense of futility, 
 Fairbairn saw in it not chance or fate or necessity, but the moral and 
rational activity of mind.
'The factors of order in history must be stated in terms of 
mind rather than of matter, i. e., as reasons and motives, as needs 
and desires, as beliefs and aims, rather than as forces, static and 
dynamic.' (1)
There is no room in Fairbairn's idea of history for any determinism nor for 
a 'demonic 1 factor: for him mind is the maker of order in history. As mind 
struggles toward self-realization, its movement is progressively away from 
all restrictions from all that is not mind which impedes its progress.
Although his own thought is tinged with the positivist notion of 
history, conceiving history, that is, in terms of sociology, Fairbairn 
maintained that history cannot be explained in the naturalistic notion of the 
struggle for survival. Actually Fairbairn saw man in history seeking to 
substitute an ethical process for the struggle for existence in nature. 
Gradually (he argued) man is succeeding in replacing the struggle in nature 
by altruistic principles.
Fairbairn ! s categories of interpretation again are transcendental. 
History must be conceived in terms of 'some process or power which subordinates
first the individual and then the whole to some higher law than the mere
2 
struggle to live f . This higher law, which must be authoritative enough to
quell the atavistic tendencies in man, is ideal, governing man through his
1. Philosophy, p. 180.
2. Ibid, p. 184.
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reason and conscience. The ideas of unity and order, then, which make up this 
higher law and which must be germane to man's nature if they are to influence 
him at all, cannot come from within the evolutionary process, in which the 
end-all is the survival of the fittest, but must come (so to speak) from the 
Beyond that is within. That is to say, the source of the higher law which 
guides history in Fairbairn f s view must be transcendent even if expressed 
immanently. History itself reveals that this authoritative higher law had its 
beginning in and was sustained by religion. Hence it is to religion that we 
must look to discover the nature of the source of the higher law of history.
It was Fairbairn's contention, then, that making an unbiased 
survey of history yields the evidence that man cannot be man without being 
religious. He further maintained that in man's religions can be found the 
higher law which constrains him toward order and unity in history. However 
much his natural impulses cause him to rebel against this constraint and thus 
retard the outworking of the immanent teleology in history, the movement of 
progress continues.
Fairbairn's emphasis on inevitable, gradual progress in history 
mirrors the immanentist, idealist and evolutionary thought of his day, as well 
as giving a reason for the entire neglect in his writing of the Christian 
eschatology. But if his immanentism and idealism was revealed inthis neglect, 
his emphasis on personality showed how he retained in his thinking the idea of 
transcendence. He did not, that is to say, follow the general trend of the
British neo-Hegelian school, which tended to minimize the significance of
1 
personality in man and to lose the idea of personality in God. He himself
pointed out that religions which have stressed immanence (e. g., Hinduism) 
have not produced creative personalities as have those which have emphasized 
1. Cp. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850. ch. v.
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transcendence (e. g., Judaism). But those religions which have produced great 
personalities have been strongly influenced in their line of development by 
the action of these persons. Not only religion, but the whole course of 
history, has been shaped by the great personality, since Fairbairn held that 
men make the historical movement and not the movement the men. Especially in 
his consideration of the moral consciousness is this emphasis evident. He 
maintained that the moral law, since immanent in man, must be personal in 
source as in actualization. It must be realized in persons. His thought
concerning personality in relation to morality led him to the following
1 
conclusion:
'If, then, man, by his moral being touches the skirts of God, and 
God in enforcing His law is ever, by means of great persons, shaping the 
life of man to its diviner issues, what could be more consonant, alike 
with man's nature and God's method of forming or re-forming it, than that 
He should send a supreme Personality as the vehicle of highest good to 
the race? Without such a Personality the moral forces of time would lack 
unity, and without unity they would be without organization, purpose or 
efficiency. If a Person has appeared in history who has achieved such a 
position and fulfilled such functions, how can He be more fitly described 
than as the Son of God and the Saviour of man? 1
This quotation illustrates how Fairbairn in his natural theology 
was all the time pointing to revealed: hi§ discussion of natural religion 
always included intimations of the 'special' revelation in Christ. This 
tendency is marked in two other instances, one in his consideration of the 
problem of evil, when he suggested that the very presence of evil in the world 
may justify and explain the Incarnation; the other, of greater consequence for
his theology, when in his treatment of the processes of nature he seemed to
2 
place the Incarnation within the evolutionary process.
 Would it not be absolutely consistent with the whole past history 
of the creative action as written in the living forms which have dwelt 
and struggled on our earth, that the Creator should do for the higher 
life of man what He has done for the lower create the first form,_i. e. 
first not in the chronological but in the logical and essential, or 
typical and normative, sense the form after and from and through which
1. Philosophy, p. 95.
2. Ibid, p. 60.
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the higher life may be realized? 1
Fairbairn's apologetic for theism, then, even while directed 
against the current naturalism of his day, also formed the substructure of his
Christian theology. This approach to the Christian religion was exactly
1 
opposite to that proposed by Harnack in What is Christianity.
'Had they (these lectures) been delivered sixty years ago, it 
would have been our endeavour to try to arrive by speculative reasoning 
at some general conception of religion, and then to define the Christian 
religion accordingly. But we have lately become sceptical about the 
value of this procedure.'
As we have seen, Fairbairn proposed to 'explain religion through nature and
2 
man' and to 'construe Christianity through religion'. According to his
system, then, this consideration of his natural theology leads directly to 
his delineation of our Lord, as historical person and as the determinative 
ideal for Christianity.
The philosophic principles in which Fairbairn grounded his theology 
have been traced in this chapter. In the following chapter I propose to 
consider his historical interpretation of Christ. In succeeding chapters his 
system of Christian theology and ecclesiology will be sketched.
1. P. 5. I have taken the quotation from B. L. Hobson's review of Fairbairn's 
Philosophy, Princeton Theo. Rev., Vol. I, 1903, p. 111.
2. Philosophy, p. vii.
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CHAPTER IV. THE JESUS OF HISTORY AND THE CHRIST OF FAITH.
i. The Recovery of the Historical Christ.
The most distinctive feature in modern theology was characterized
1 
by Fairbairn as ' a new feeling for Christ'. The rise of the historical
method and its application to all areas of thought and research a tendency 
eventuating in the so-called 'historicism f during the century was responsible 
for this attitude. By this method (Fairbairn and others claimed) the Jesus of 
history had been recaptured and Christian faith rehabilitated. For only as 
the historical figure of the Founder of Christianity was clearly portrayed by 
drawing on materials in the Gospel sources could the Christ of faith as
*
speculatively construed be understood. In other words, the revelation in 
Christ could be 'checked 1 only by investigating the original sources.
The 'Jesus of history 1 was held to be the actual historical Figure, 
who by means of the historical and comparative methods was discovered to be the 
supreme Person of all time. The 'Christ of faith', i. e., Jesus as interpreted 
by His followers, by this approach was considered the ideal of the Christian 
religion and the factor which made Christianity worthy to be considered the 
universal religion. In Fairbairn's words: 'There are two distinct. . . points
of view, the historical and ideal, or the Person as He lived in the region of
2 
reality, and the Person as He lives in the region of the Spirit.' it was
Fairbairn's contention, then, that from the vast amount of New Testament 
research done in the second half of the nineteenth century, the greatest result 
had been the recovery of the historical Christ.
A critical and constructive historical resume of the rise and 
growth of Biblical criticism in Germany and Britain was the canvas, so to say 
uponjriiich he limned his own interpretation of our Lord. He contrasted the
1. Place of Christ, p. 3. ~~
2. City of God, p. 219.
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theological revivals in the two countries by pointing out that if the Anglican 
movement had held more strictly to the scientific, historical spirit in its 
research, its findings would not so often have violated truth; whereas if the 
Germans had been more reverent in their approach, they would not so often have 
been irreligious.
In Germany the movement which was given its initial impetus by the 
literary work of Lessing, Schiller and Goethe, found its first important 
exponent in criticism strictly historical in Herder, whose literary insight 
guided him into shrewd discoveries far ahead of his time (e. g., the Gospel 
tradition existed before the Gospels).
JHe showed that to approach Jesus through history 1  Fairbaim 
wrote ^was to make Him a more real, more living, more universal figure, 
and that to construe Him was to be forced to deal with the Gospels as 
histories and as literature.' (1)
But modern criticism really developed out of the transcendental 
philosophy which came to birth in Germany during the early part of the century.
For when Strauss, whom Fairbairn called the 'Frankenstein of the Hegelian
2 
philosophy', attempted to apply the Hegelian categories to the study of
Christ, Fairbairn maintained that he gave the world of thought a jar violent 
enough to stimulate, in reaction, the modern critical approach to the Bible. 
The Hegelian conception of philosophy and religion as identical in matter and 
differing only in form, religion being but the pure thought of philosophy still 
clothed in pictorial form, this conception Strauss used as the starting point 
in his Leben Jesu. With this wholly speculative approach Fairbairn emphasized 
that history could not be taken seriously: and the life and work of Christ 
were transformed from the realm of historical event to that of myth. Hegel 
had evaded the difficulty of reconciling his speculative construction of 
Christianity with historical fact 'by dealing with the faith as authenticating
1. Place of Christ, p. 203. ~"
2. Ibid, p. 214.
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1 
the fact rather than with the fact as creating and justifying the faith 1 .
Nonetheless theology at first was happy that Hegelianism apparently had recon- 
ciled philosophy with itself, and that she could express in her own tongue the 
thoughts of her erstwhile enemy. But when Strauss carried Hegelianism to its 
logical outworking in the historical data of Christianity, Fairbairn noted that 
it did not take long to realize that peace between philosophy and theology had 
been effected only because Christianity had betrayed its inner citadel, as it 
were, into the hands of the enemy.
Fairbairn's criticism of Strauss showed that the German iconoclast 
was but carrying into the interpretation of the Gospel records the speculative 
a priori method used by the various idealist philosophers in constructing their
Christologies. Strauss 1 Leben Jesu was 'throughout a pure creation of the
2 
philosophical imagination'. He made no attempt to place his work within the
perspective of its historical setting, tried only to force the evangelical 
facts into the Hegelian mould. That is to say, he interpreted these facts as 
being expressed in the sensuous form which needed translation into the notion 
of pure thought. The Vorstellungen of the Gospel record must become the 
Begriffe of ideal Christianity. Thus the historical Person of Jesus was lost 
in order to express the eternal truth of Christianity in the idea. As Fair- 
bairn succinctly summed up Strauss' results:
'The unity of the Divine and human natures was realized in man, 
not in a man. The Incarnation was the self-manifestation of God, the 
realization of the Idea, not in a single person, but in humanity; not 
at a particular point of time, but from eternity.' (S)
In order to make this speculation at all compatible with the historical facts 
of the Gospel, Fairbairn explained that Strauss developed his mythical theory, 
whereby these facts were made the unconscious creations of the primitive Church 
 an apostolic amalgam (so to say) of prophetic promises and reminiscences of
1. Place of Christ, p. 221.
2. Ibid, p. 235.
3. Ibid, p. 238.
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Jesus. Although modifying to some degree this radical theory in the third 
edition of his Leben Jesu. Strauss completely re-affirmed it in the fourth.
Although Fairbairn held that Strauss' work could hardly be taken 
as a 'serious performance', yet he made plain the German's manifest contribution 
to the development of historical criticism. For Strauss stimulated among the 
strongest thinkers of his day a thorough investigation of the New Testament in 
order to keep the Gospel sources from being dissolved into myth. The literary
criticism of the Tubingen School, led by F. C. Baur, developed at first in
v
concomitance with, then as corrective to, the work of Strauss. Since Fairbairn 
in his approach to the Christian sources had to meet the criticism of both 
Strauss and Baur, it is as necessary to consider his critique of the Tubingen
j
School as o'f Strauss before turning to his own explication of the Gospel records.
*»
Baur like Strauss (Fairbairn pointed out) was essentially Hegelian 
in his thought and constructed a speculative Christology: but the former
^
retained the historical reality of the Person of Christ as a necessary port of 
his system and hence had to refute the mythical theory. Baur approached the 
Gospels through the Epistles and the history of the early Church, and in 
essence made the mind of Paul the generative power in Christianity. Fairbairn 
interpreted Baur as having maintained that Christianity developed by a dialectic 
process in which Jewish Particularism was the thesis (Jesus is Messiah), 
Universalism the antithesis (Jesus is the Christ, Saviour of the world) and the 
Catholic Church the synthesis (a new law and sacerdotalism, but a ministry to 
all). To support each of these tendencies a party arose in the primitive 
Church, Matthew (the oldest Gospel), Luke and Mark respectively being the work 
of the Particularist, Universalist and Mediatory groups. The Fourth Gospel 
Baur placed late in the second century, and he thought of it as showing the 
process of conciliation in its most elaborated stage. As over against the 
mythical theory of Strauss, where the Gospel records were explained as 
unconscious creations of the disciples, Fairbairn showed that Baur and his
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school developed the tendency theory, which accounted for the Gospels as the 
result of conscious design on the part of the writers.
Fairbairn's cardinal criticism of the Tubingen School was that 
while 'formally historical 1 , it was 'essentially philosophical'. Its internal 
criticism was all carried out with a priori assumptions, and neglected the 
historical setting. Fairbairn's more specific criticisms were: (1) Although 
Baur held that Christianity depends for its very being on the person of Christ, 
he made the mind of Paul rather than the mind of Christ constitutive. (2) 
Baur argued that it was the ethical in the Person and work of Christ which made
Him significant, and yet he made the 'highly metaphysical Paul. . . His truest
1
exponent, while the intensely ethical James is dismissed as a typical Ebionite 1 . 
(5) The 'rival parties' notion appears more significant when considered by 
itself than when placed in historical connection with Jesus. For instance, 
why should the Petrine party, bearers of the 'pure original tradition', miss 
the- true import of Christ whereas Paul, who had never even seen our Lord, 
discovered it? (4) 'The Church, as Baur conceived it, had in its first age
well-known men, but almost no literature; in its second a great literature,
2 
but almost no known men.' Fairbairn suggested that such &. violent anomaly in
itself immediately made the Tubingen criticism suspect when viewed in historical 
perspective.
If the results of Strauss had led to a more thorough-going histori- 
cal criticism, those of the Tubingen School had made even 'a more radical, and
therefore a more historical, criticism an imperious necessity, and had defined
3
as its final yet primary problem the discovery of the historical Christ'.
Thus Fairbairn characterized the aim of historical criticism during the 
formative and constructive years of his own life, the epoch of the 'lives' of 
Jesus, so to speak: Renan, Ecce Homo, the new Leben Jesu. Schenkel, Keim, 
et al. The distinctive factor about this period was that the a priori idealist 
1. Place of Christ, p. 275. 2. Ibid, p. 276. 3. ibid, p. 277.
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method of constructing Christologies was given up, and thought became increas- 
ingly historical. In citing some evidences of this growing 'historicism' 
Fairbairn at the same time was setting forth his own position. Emphasis came 
to be placed not only on investigating the environment of the primitive Church, 
but also on studying the interaction between the early Christian organism and 
its milieu. The dating of the^ospels was changed and Mark was found to be 
the oldest. Christ was seen more clearly to have been the creator of the 
society which became the Church. In general the true historical method in 
criticism had been attained and with it the recovery of the historical Christ 
as the norm of theological inquiry and of the Church.
Fairbairn opposed the prevailing fashion of his day, to set the 
historical Christ as antithesis to Christological dogma. Rather he acted as 
mediator between the two. Thus in respect to Fichte's cardinal notion that 
the metaphysical alone and not the historical saves, Fairbairn answered that 
unless rooted in history the metaphysical becomes but abstract speculation,
wholly void of reality. 'Where the historical sense is least real, the
1 
theological construction is most empty. 1 But the metaphysical was for him
an essential factor in such construction, and he maintained that had it not
been 'for the metaphysical conception of Christ, the Christian religion would
2 
long ago have ceased to be'.
The quest for the historical Jesus turned the current of theologi- 
cal thought, at first in Germany and then in Britain, into the Christological 
channel, one instance of the trend having been the exaggerated Christocentrism 
of the Ritschlian school. This trend as it developed and spread more generally 
was described by Professor Webb in 1905 when he quoted the then Master of 
Balliol as speaking of 'some writers who are so zealous against the idea of a
1. Place of Christ, p. 328. The sentence was written in reference to the 
Epistle of James.
2. Philosophy, p. 4.
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Christianity without Christ, that they are in danger of teaching a Christ 
without Christianity 1 . Professor Webb pointed out that nothing was more 
noticeable in Fairbairn's The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, and this
characteristic is true of all his writing, than his emphatic protest against
1 
this tendency. That is to say, Fairbairn was theo- rather than Christocentric
in his critical and constructive work. To be sure, Christ held a central 
place in his theology: and yet it was always Christ as the interpretation and 
interpreter or revelation of God.
ii. The Jesus of History.
How can the Jesus of history, the man of Nazareth, be reconciled 
with the Christ of faith, who is the Head of the Church and the Master whom 
Christians profess as Lord? This is the problem, as Fairbairn stated it, which 
faces historians and philosophers, and indeed anyone who seeks to understand 
Christianity. The relation of Jesus who lived in space and time to the Christ 
of the creeds, of the historical person to the metaphysical figure: this 
central mystery Fairbairn named the supreme paradox of religion. He held it 
could be transcended only through a dialectic process wherety the apparent 
antithesis is overcome in an all-embracing synthesis. For if the attempt be 
made to resolve the paradox in natural terms and consider the Christ of the 
creeds merely as an apotheosis of a Galilean peasant, then Fairbairn argued 
that we fail to account for what the Christian religion has accomplished in 
history or for the continuing way in which our Lord has gripped and held the 
hearts of those who follow Him. As we have seen, Fairbairn did not seek to 
approach this problem directly on the basis of the general canons of criticism 
which he held should be applied to the Founders of all the historical religions,
 
but gave answers only by implication through the pages of his exegetical
1. Review of Philosophy, Jl. of Theo. Studies, Vol. IV, 1903, p. 292. Fairbairn
 
himself spoke of a fault committed in many an evangelical sermon, that 'the 
Son has been so preached as to hide the Father'. (Place of Christ p 381 )
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interpretation of the New Testament.
That the Synoptic Gospels were written after the Apostles had 
already interpreted the life of Jesus and had come to think of Him as the 
Incarnate Son of God does not in any way lessen may indeed enhance their 
value as historical records of the origin of Christian faith (according to 
Fairbairn), since mediated history with its greater perspective is more trust- 
worthy than immediate. The Synoptic Gospels are of such singular significance 
just because written after a period of Apostolic activity, for thus they are
»lives' written not of a Teacher or Leader but of the Founder of Christianity,
1 
One who was known to have created a new religion. Thus Fairbairn said:
'As a teacher there are many men in many lands and times with 
whom He may be compared; but as a creative and sovereign personality 
there are in the whole of history only two or three, if indeed there are 
so many, with any claim to stand by His side. As a Teacher He is a 
natural person, with historical antecedents, a social environment, a 
religious ancestry, and a position honourable but not unique amid the 
great masters of mind; but as a sovereign personality He is a new 
Being, without father, or mother, or genea\Logy, separate, supreme, 
creating by His very appearing a new spiritual type or order. 1
The Evangelists wrote out of the background of what Fairbairn 
termed this 'prophetic and creative hypothesis' which the primitive Christian 
community had formulated: that Jesus was the Messiah sent by God, nay, 
rather God Himself manifested in flesh and appearing in time. With this 
background the writers of the Synoptic Gospels delineated a Figure who is a 
unity, the divine and human so conjoined that each contributes equally to 
portraying this Person who stands out so vividly alive from the pages of the 
record. Fairbairn contended that the remarkable verisimilitude in the Gospel 
record is powerful evidence that this writing is no fabrication, even as its 
restraint and its detailed local colour is evidence that it is not merely part 
of a mythologizing process. The Gospels cannot be considered as idealizations: 
their writers speak as 'men who have stood face to face with the reality, and
1. Philosophy, p. 304.
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1 
are conscious of only describing what they saw'.
Our Lord is pictured in the Synoptic Gospels, as Fairbairn inter- 
preted the record, as both natural and supernatural. His human nature was 
emphasized. He was a man who suffered the vicissitudes of human life, even as 
He appreciated its joys and shared in its fellowships. The realness of the 
temptations and the temptations in Fairbairn's view meant that our Lord was 
tempted to let the divine side of His nature overshadow and negative the 
human and the agony in Gethsamane were extreme examples of the full humanity 
of our Lord. But He was fully conscious of His supernatural powers, and in 
the miracles His physical transcendence can be clearly seen, the Person as well 
as His works here having transcended nature without having been contra-natural. 
The miracles were not wonders, however, nor even special evidences of our 
Lord's divinity, but rather (Fairbairn urged) a natural expression of our 
Lord's character, a spontaneous expression, as it were, of His gracious 
beneficence. That His supernatural powers were used only to benefit others,
never Himself, is used as evidence by Fairbairn to show that our Lord's human-
2 
ity was absolutely real. They were the expected outworking of His perfect
obedience as Son to the Father; and even as God does not negative man's 
freedom although man disobeys Him, so our Lord never employed His powers to 
invade, so to say, another's personality. But though He had supernatural 
powers, Fairbairn maintained that He was not omniscient. His knowledge, as He
1. Philosophy, p. 520.
2. In his efforts to explain the miracles without sacrificing the complete 
humanity of our Lord, Fairbairn's exposition is confusing, and it is not 
possible to discover exactly what his point of view was. He spoke, for 
instance, of our Lord's acts being 'naturally supernatural', of the miracle 
'as the normal speech of His will', of a 'normal manhood' with a 'super- 
natural function', of a 'personal being 1 and an 'official capacity'. The 
Bse of such phrases was apparently due to Fairbairn's effort to avoid any 
form of Docetism on the one hand, or on the other to keep from being 
'unscientific'.
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Himself realized, was limited; and His life, since human, was involved in the
contingency of historical events. 'Experience was indeed to Him, as to us,
2 
a teacher.'
But the moral transcendence of Jesus was of vastly more significance 
than the physical. Fairbairn portrayed with eloquence the moral beauty of our 
Lord, emphasizing especially that He never showed any consciousness of sin and 
forgave sin while apparently Himself having no need of forgiveness. Our Lord's 
sinlessness was not impeccability, Fairbairn explained: that is to say, His 
was not the power of being unable to sin, but of being able not to sin. This, 
too, was part of His being completely human. In His sinlessness He did not
show Himself independent, rather wholly dependent on and obedient to the
3 
Father's will.
But this moral superiority of Jesus was more than a personal 
quality, since Fairbairn always underlined the point that our Lord was proto- 
type for collective man. Thus the moral perfection of Christ became an ethical 
ideal which because of its originality, catholicity and potency established 
Christianity as the supreme moral religion. Through the perfection of our Lord's 
moral character He created in man a sense of sin and a longing for holiness, 
both at once more poignant, more heart-searching, than he had ever before had: 
»a fear of sin that almost craves annihilation' and yet 'a love of holy being
1. 'Christ recognizes the limitations of His own knowledge (Mk. xiii, 32: cf. 
xiv, 35, 36). He knew, indeed, what was in man (Jn. ii, 25: cf. Mt. ix, 4; 
Luke v, 22; Mt. xii, 25; Luke xl, 17). But this was the note of the prophet, 
(Luke vii, 39). There were things in man, too, that surprised Him (ifx. 
vi, 6j Mt. viii, 10); so in nature (Mk. xi, 13).' (Place of Christ, p. 353.)
Bishop Gore in his article in Lux Mundi (1890) had broken new 
ground in interpretations of our Lord by insisting on the limitation of 
knowledge in the Incarnation.
2. Philosophy, p. 395.
3. Although Fairbairn states that Jesus 'claimed to do always the will of God', 
Findlay points out that only once (Jn. viii, 46) does He actually allude to 
His sinlessness. Cp. Jesus. Divine and Human, p. 48.
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1 
that yearns towards the vision of God' . It can readily be seen that Fair bairn
held the view of our Lord which finds its culmination in the Abelardian theory 
of the Atonement. In this view our Lord is considered as the supreme exemplar 
for man, the educator of the human race, a dynamic factor which as it works on 
man can transform him into being what Christ Himself was. Fairbairn is emphatic 
in this particular connection that to be sinless is to be not God, but God-like, 
which is to say that our Lord was the supreme religious personality of all time. 
He gave an example which, if man follows, constrains his obedience to the Will 
of God. He demonstrated to man what he as man is capable of becoming,  indeed 
what he is potentially,  if he wholly surrenders himself to God. Fairbairn's 
notion, in short, was that our Lord 'did not so much
nature, though to be the only person in history who achieves it is to transcend
2 
empirical nature while realizing the ideal' .
To limn the Jesus of history involved three Steps for Fairbairn:
the first two the tracing of the physical and moral transcendence of our Lord,
3
the third the 'attempt to construe Jesus from within'   what Brunner calls
4 
a ' psychological construction, which always means a natural explanation ' .
Fairbairn maintained that the Synoptic picture of our Lord revealed Him as 
becoming conscious of His Messiahship at the time of His Baptism. His true 
identity Jesus disclosed gradually to the disciples, so that it was not so 
much disclosure on His part as discovery on theirs. In the early ministry our 
Lord's consciousness of His Messiahship was revealed (thus Fairbairn's 
delineation) by His realization of His close connection with the Jewish law, 
which He came to fulfil; His relation to sinners, whom He came to seek and 
save; His conditions for disciple ship, that He would brook no rival; His sense 
of personal sovereignty, since His followers were to be persecuted for His
1. Philosophy, pp. 372-3. ~
2. Ibid, p. 378.
3. Ibid, p. 389.
4. The Mediator, p. 362.
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sake; His unique relation to God, that is, His clear and continuous awareness 
of Sonship. The disciples' gradual discovery of Jesus' consciousness of His 
unique and pre-eminent position culminated in-Peter's confession at Gaesarea 
Philippi, which in Fairbairn's view showed that they had finally realized that 
He was the Christ, the Messianic King.
But the other names Christ applied to Himself Son of God and Son 
of Man are equally significant. Fairbairn made clear that while our Lord
completely identified Himself with man, yet 'He detaches Himself from man
1 
and distinguishes Himself as in a pre-eminent sense the Son of God'. Although
in the Synoptic Gospels He never applied the name to Himself, yet in all the 
Gospels He is portrayed as being vividly aware all the time of being in a 
supremely unique relation with God. Fairbairn's explication of this idea is 
the heart of his entire theological construction, that the continuous apprehen- 
sion of our Lord's filial relationship with God was the constitutive idea in 
His consciousness. 'Son of Man', a conception which Fairbairn held came to 
Jesus from Daniel and Enoch, signified to our Lord that He stood as a represen- 
tative person to universal man as the Messiah had stood to the Jewish people. 
As such, while bearing within Himself common humanity, He at the same time is 
alone the norm for humanity. Hence in the full significance of these two
 
names, Son of God and Son of Man, Fairbairn maintained that the whole meaning 
of our Lord's life was expressed.
'The ideal man was the conscious Son of God, and His function was 
by the creation of the ideal consciousness to create ideal men. . . Sonship 
is of the essence of humanity as paternity of God, and so He who is by 
nature Son of God appears as Son of man, that men through Kirn may attain 
the filial state and spirit and relation. . . And as necessary and unique 
He is universal.' (2)
Once the disciples had appreciated who He was (as Fairbairn 
expounded the Gospel record), our Lord unfolded to them how His mission must
1. Place of Christ, p. 360.
2. Ibid, pp. 568, 369, 370.
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of necessity end: thus began the new teaching which arose out of His growing 
realization that He would be killed by the forces which were arraying themselves 
against Him. In His capacity as Son of Man, Jesus realized that He would be 
sacrificed to reconcile God and man. He thought of His death not as a martyrdom, 
however, but strictly as a sacrifice, since He gave up His life with perfect 
freedom in obedience to the Father's will to rescue (ransom) man (collective 
mankind) from the sin which enslaves him. Fairbairn contended that the note of 
sternness in the Jerusalem ministry toward those who rejected Him was due to 
our Lord's realization that the very persons He would die to save were by
killing Him making their salvation 'a matter more infinitely hard, more vastly
1 
improbable'. This recoil not from death but from a death which seemed to
involve its perpetrators in 'inexpiable guilt' caused not only the agony in 
the Garden, but the death on the Cross, which was due to a broken heart rather 
than to the actions of those who had hung Him there. Fairbairn apparently
followed this line of reasoning to make indubitable his conclusion, that 'the
2 
death which redeems was all the work of the Redeemer'.
iii. The Christ of Faith.
If as we have seen Fairbairn conceived the task of the Synoptists 
to have been to depict the 'Jesus of history' and he spoke of the three first 
Gospels as 'histories' he considered that the Apostolic Epistles (and he 
thought especially of the principal Pauline Epistles, together with the 
Epistle$ to the Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel) set forth the 'Christ of faith', 
developing a doctrine of the Person. This point of view is succinctly expressed 
in a passage which is of central importance as an epitomization of Fairbairn's
1. Philosophy, p. 431.
2. Ibid, p. 433. The words spoken to the woman who anointed our Lord's feet in 
Simon's house Fairbairn interprets as indicating that Jesus was conscious 
that His mission and message had a universal and enduring significance. The 
Supper, moreover, further explicated our Lord's consciousness of Himself as 
a sacrifice for mankind, since He identified Himself (concluded on next page)
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whole attitude in this matter.
 In the former (the Synoptic Gospels) we have the representation 
of a real individual who lived, suffered, and died, and who, as regards 
His character, words, and acts, may be criticized and appreciated like 
any other historical person; in the latter (the Apostolic Epistles) we 
have this Person regarded sub specie aeternitatis, interpreted according 
to His place and function in universal history and as the central term 
in a theology or system of religious thought. The name of the uninter- 
preted person, the hero of the spontaneous biographies, is Jesus of 
Nazareth, but the name of the interpreted person, the Being who exists 
to thought and for it, is Christ; and these two are as distinct yet as 
indissolubly related as the mathematical diagram on the blackboard and 
the mathematical truth in the mind, which is by the diagram made explicit 
and applied to the interpretation of nature. In other words, Jesus is a 
symbol which the Epistles explicate for human belief and apply to human 
experience, individual and collective. 1 (1)
It was in the Pauline Epistles, written within a generation of our 
Lord's death that the new, seminal idea, as Fairbairn described it, unparalleled 
in human thought theretofore, was developed: namely, that Christ, in whom 
dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily, is the normative type for the new 
humanity which is established when mankind through Him is reconciled to God, 
whose only Son He is. Thus Fairbairn seeks to show how St. Paul speculatively 
construed Jesus into the doctrine of His Person, how for the first time he made 
articulate the identification of the Christ (the office) with Jesus (the Person),
 So the Christ was at first like a predicate waiting for a subject; 
it denoted an office which no one had as yet filled; but by the time 
Paul began to write the office had been so occupied that it could never 
again be vacant: the personal name, Jesus, had become official, signified 
the Saviour; the official name, Christ, had become personal, denoted 
Jesus. 1 (2)
In this way Fairbairn explained that within the Pauline theology an abstract 
was transformed into a vibrant monotheism, interpreted in terms of the Father- 
hood and Sonship within the Godhead. The Pauline soteriology, largely expressed 
in the antitheses, Fairbairn showed to have been based on St. Paul's conception
(continued from previous page)
with the Paschal lamb: thus Fairbairn maintained that Jesus considered 
Himself as both sacrifice and host, as the one being offered to redeem 
mankind, as the other Himself identified with mankind which made the 
sacrifice.
1. Philosophy, p. 438.
2. Place of Christ, p. 306.
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of the purpose of God, set forth in the Epistles as having been fulfilled 
first through the natural law within man but having come to its complete 
realization only in the transcendent act of God in the Incarnation. Thus 
salvation was explained in the earlier Epistles as a historical, in the later 
as a cosmic process.
In the Epistle to the Hebrews our Lord is interpreted through the 
categories of Levetical Hebraism as the Son of God, although Fair bairn did not 
fail to stress, as he also did in his treatment of the Pauline literature, that 
the humanity of Jesus was at the same time made poignantly real. Fairbairn 
noted especially that in this Epistle both God and Christ, although distinguished
f a /
from each other, were termed o 0£oi, without the author having felt that he was 
betraying his intense Jewish monotheism. Fairbairn further stressed that by 
the writer's identification of Christ as both priest and sacrifice, he cleansed 
the new religion of any sacerdotalistic tendencies.
The motive of the writer of the Fourth Gospel was 'a transcendent
1 
enthusiasm for a person', and Fairbairn sought to show that he attempted what
no other New Testament writer had done: to bring together into a unified 
'tragic parable' the speculative idea of Christ and the personal history of 
Jesus. Fairbairn depicted the author of this Gospel as conceiving God not as 
solitary but through eternity with the Logos, who when He became flesh was the 
Son, the only begotten of the Father. What the writer of this Gospel did,  
and here Fairbairn interpreted the Fourth Gospel, so to speak, in terras of 
his own doctrine of the Trinity, in which he closely followed St. Augustine,  
was to personalize the transcendental terra Logos (which had originated with 
Heraclitus and passed from him through the Stoics to Philo).
 A solitary Deity was an impotent abstraction, without life, 
without love, void of thought, incapable of movement, and divorced from
1. Place of Christ, p. 545.
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all reality. But his (i. e., the author's vision passed through the ^ 
region of speculation, and discovered the Person who realized his ideal. 1
The Logos he then called Son, and made this person take flesh, indent if ying Him 
with Jesus of Nazareth. In this way, Fairbairn concluded, the writer of this 
Gospel made the life of God assume visible, tangible, knowable form in the 
life of the Son.
Granting that these Apostolic writers speculatively construed this 
stupendous idea which brought to its close the ancient world and formed the 
mind which created a new era, it was still necessary to explain the genesis of 
the idea. The very core of Fairbairn's thought is that this creative idea 
could have had its inception only in the mind of our Lord. To establish this 
thesis, he examined and repudiated in turn three theories: that the Christ- 
idea originated in the mind of St. Paul (as the Tubingen School had contended), 
that the idea was developed through a mythologizing process (the theory Strauss 
had promulgated), and that Christianity is essentially a syncretism.
Many of the current speculations about St. Paul Fairbairn passed 
by as being, if not entirely insignificant or false, at the least quite 
inadequate to be considered sufficient causes to have generated the Christ-idea 
in his mind. Two factors, however, he thought to be of cardinal importance: 
(1) that the Christ-idea, so radically antagonistic, apparently, to St. Paul's 
rigid and stern Jewish monotheism, could so quickly and tenaciously root itself 
in the Apostle's mind can be understood only by realizing that for St. Paul the
new idea 'prevailed only because he conceived that through Him (Christ) the one
2 
God was made the only God of universal man'; (2) that the impotence St. Paul
had felt under Judaism to obey the law, and the new power to obey which he saw 
in followers of the Nazarene and which he himself experienced after his 
conversion could be explained only by assuming that some dynamic, overwhelming
1. Philosophy, p. 455.
2. Ibid, p. 465.
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occurrence had transformed his life. Yet significant as these factors were, 
Fairbairn maintained that they failed to account for St. Paul's having 
conceived Jesus not simply as Messiah, but as essentially Divine, nor how such 
an idea could change so completely his whole Weltanschauung» nor yet how it 
could be the cause of a new religion rising into power throughout the then- 
known world with what seemed to be incredible speed, nor finally how the idea 
could hold the loyalty net only of St. Paul but of the other Apostles with whom 
on other points he differed widely.
According to the mythical theory, Fairbairn asserted that Jesus lost 
His historical but retained His ideal significance. Those who held this theory, 
as Fairbairn expounded their view, explained the whole idea of Christ as based 
on visions and interpretations of visions which came to the disciples after 
Jesus' death: for in spite of their despair, they had such an invincible faith 
that it was impossible for them to give up their Messianic idea of their Master. 
So the Resurrection came to be concieved as God's action, the crucifixion as 
man's; then even the latter was interpreted as having been directly motivated 
by the Will of God, those persons who actually seemed to perpetrate the act 
having been but pawns in the hand of God. And so the mythologizing process 
continued, achieving at length a supreme literary culmination in the Pauline 
Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews and the Fourth Gospel. Fairbairn pointed 
to three obvious defe^cts in this mythical theory: it lacked proof, since 
Biblical evidence in the Acts of the Apostles used to establish the theory was 
manifestly of later date than St. Paul's early writing; it was improbable that 
the early disciples, all simple folk, could conceive and carry out such a 
sophisticated scheme; it was inadequate, because it made the Christ-idea, which 
turned the then-known world up-side down, the chance product of the dreams of 
visionaries. To turn this architectonic idea of all history into the product 
of chance or accident, Fairbairn iterated more than once, was tantamount to
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conceiving the whole universe not as cosmos, but chaos.
But there are more serious criticisms which Fairbairn directed
against the mythical theory, since he held that it offends 'against certain
1 
of the laws which govern human development'. According to the first law which
 *
Fairbairn stated, the imaginative faculty which stimulates the mythical 
tendency always precedes speculation. The older Biblical critics, aware of 
this order of development, considered the Gospels as products of the mytholo- 
gizing tendency since they thought the Gospels represented the oldest literature 
in the New Testament. But actually the authentic Pauline Epistles are the 
oldest; and Fairbairn argued that it is just in these that a metaphysical system 
highly speculative in form had been worked out, in which a whole philosophy of 
history and of the relations between God and man had been promulgated. This 
system cannot be explained as due to this mythical tendency stimulated by a 
'reminiscent and regretful love 1 for a dead Leader, since its author did not 
even know our Lord in the flesh.
Fairbairn further contended that the material with which the
mythical impulse works is historical incident and anecdote, whereas speculation 
ordinarily follows upon such imaginative interpretations and tries to work them 
into a rational theory. But the Pauline Epistles were concerned not so much 
with history as with the Person of Christ, speculatively construed.
The third law of development which Fairbairn explicated is that 
there must be close agreement between speculative construction and the environ- 
ment in which it takes place. In the instance of the early Christian literature, 
however, the development of the Christ-idea is wholly alien to the Jewish 
background in which St. Paul's mind was steeped, a Jewish background in which 
the notion prevailed that God is wholly Other than man. Had the idea of the 
Incarnation sprung up on Greek soil, Fairbairn granted that we might well speak
1. Philosophy, p. 470.
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of apotheosis. In this connection Fairbairn asserted that the term is radically 
incorrect (although it will be remembered that when he was considering the 
relation of Christianity to Buddhism and Islam he was not so outspoken on this 
point), for Judaism knew nothing of the Greek idea that God could become man  
or man, God. In fact the most remarkable feature of the beginning of the 
Christian religion is that
'the idea of the Son of God who was equal with God, though it seemed 
most seriously to threaten the divine unity, has yet been the supreme 
means of its conservation. And this relation to the idea of one God 
makes the Christian incarnation a belief at once singular and original.'(1)
The place given to Christ, moreover, intensified, did not lessen the difference 
between God and man which the Hebrews had always stressed, God's eternity over 
against man's finitude. Fairbairn further pointed out that the formulation of 
the Christ-idea was in no way a 'deificatory' process, since the Apostolic 
writers 'would not have described as divine any one they did not believe to be
essentially God; and so they never represent Christ as attaining Deity or
2 
achieving a rank which He had not known before 1 . That is to say, they always
propounded the idea of the pr*e-existencQ of Christ.
The Christian religion, then, could not have originated in a 
mythologizing process, according to Fairbairn's argument. No more could it 
have found its beginning in a syncretism, though no doubt it was influenced by 
religious and philosophic ideas current in its formative years. But Fairbairn 
maintained that a syncretism per se is always the outcome of a decadent move- 
ment: yet one of the most striking features of Christianity was the fresh
*
verve, so to say, which it brought to a decaying civilization. More specifical- 
ly, Fairbairn suggested that the leaders in the primitive Church were too 
ignorant of other theologies and philosophies to draw consciously on them in 
formulating the guiding principles of Christianity. Moreover, these principles, 
rather than being formulated, grew as the living organism the primitive Christi-
1. Philosophy, p. 474. 2. Ibid.
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an society developed. For the Christian religion in these formative years
1 
1 behaved as a living being behaved 1 , the architectonic idea which was its
immanent life force (to carry on Fairbairn's figure) having been the faith in 
Jesus Christ, the dual belief composite of remembrance of Jesus of Nazareth, 
the historical Figure, and of the transcendental ideal which had been specula- 
tively construed by the Apostles.
Thus the notion that Christianity is a syncretism Fairbairn declared 
to be as false as that it originated in the mind of St. Paul or through a 
mythologizing process carried on during the Apostolic Age. The genesis of this 
creative Christ-idea (as we have seen) Fairbairn could trace to only one source: 
the mind of our Lord. Apostolic thought could not otherwise be accounted for. 
Without this idea that Jesus was the Incarnate Son of God, which was our Lord's 
own idea of Himself and which He passed on to His disciples, the sect of the 
Nazarenes might have developed, but not the Christian religion. As it developed, 
Fairbairn held that this new religion first became different from, then 
independent of Judaism; after that it absorbed all that was good in other 
religions, and finally, with Christ triumphant, became the religion which alone
is true, which alone is 'as universal in its unity as the one God in His sole
2 
sovereignty 1 . The historical Jesus in His life on earth showed how the
religion was to be expressed in life: but what made the religion a power and 
gave the Church Catholic its inception was 'the significance His person had for
thought, the way in which it lived to faith, the mode in which it interpreted
3 
to reason God and the universe, man and history'.
1. Philosophy, p. 518.
2. Ibid, p. 478.
3. Ibid.
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iv. The Christ of Faith in History.
'The conception of Christ stands related to history as the idea of 
God is related to nature, i. e., each is in its own sphere the factor of order, 
or the constitutive condition of a rational system.' In this way Fairbairn 
linked his explication of the theistic proofs with his portrayal of Jesus Christ 
and His place in history, the two names thus used together signifying for him 
the union, as it were, of the historical Jesus and the ideal Christ. Considered
thus, Fairbairn rhetorically asked., 'May we not speak of Him as the keystone of
2 
the arch which bridges the gulf of time?' The answer for him obviously is in
the affirmative, since he thought of the triumphant Christ as the determinative 
principle which has regulated the development of history since the Incarnation.
Taking the Christ-ideal as construed by the Apostles, Fairbairn 
argued that it could have given birth only to a theology, not to a religion. 
A religion could have developed only as this creative idea was released, so 
to say, into the rough and tumble of history, where the idea and its environ- 
ment could freely interact. This approach brought him to consider the doctrine 
of development, especially as it had been brought specifically into theology 
by Newman.
Newman 1 s idea of development as applied to the Christian religion 
Fairbairn criticized on three counts. It was logical rather than biological. 
Its starting point was too late. The end product whose development he sought 
to trace was but a fraction of the whole collective organism which had been 
involved in this process. This is to say: Newman tried to trace the develop- 
ment of an institution without taking into account the environment in which it 
developed. His starting point, moreover, was the primitive Church and not the 
creative Personality who formed it. Finally he considered only the Roman 
Catholic Church as the end result of this developmental process: actually all
1. Philosophy5 p. 18.
2. Ibid, p. 567.
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Churches, all denominations, must be taken into account if the investigation 
is to be scientific. Hence Fairbairn maintained that Newman used the theory 
of development not for historical but for polemic or apologetic purposes, 
using history only to illustrate his own especial thesis, that thesis having 
been that the development of doctrine was to proceed under an external, 
infallible authority, namely, the Roman Church. All this was but to set aside 
the historical method of interpreting processes the evolutionary, biological 
method for a method which lays down as presuppositions principles which them- 
selves (according to the biological method) must be investigated.
This brief resume'of Fairbairn's critique of Newman shows that 
his own method of approach was the evolutionary, which studied the organism
as living 'within a living world, affected by all its forces, and sensitive to
1 
its every change'. In short, Fairbairn contended that the action and interac-
*
tion of both the organism and the environment must be investigated if the 
process of development is to be traced. The organism to be studied is not the 
Church, but the historical Christ; and the environment includes both the 
 society He created 1 and the world in which that society was born and lived. 
With this principle Fairbairn sought to trace the development which occurred 
as the Christ of faith acted in history. In this development to use the 
terms which he employed in so many ways, formal and material the material 
factor is the mind of our Lord, the formal the environment.
Within the Jewish environment of the Apostolic Christian group 
the Christian Church came into being. Fairbairn pointed out that this organism 
could develop only out of the determinative principles of the religion. 
Basically these were the Christian idea of God, the new worship and the new 
ethic. If followed, these could not but have shaped Christianity into a 
universal religion. For Fairbairn maintained that even as God interpreted by
1. Place of Christ, p. 35.
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Christ is in essence Father, so man 'by the very fact of his creation in Christ
1 
was constituted a son*. This is to say that Christ changed not only man's
idea of God, but his idea of himself, since our Lord, by assuming, dignified 
human nature. But to think of all men as sons, potential or actual, of the 
Father of our Lord was to make both the Christian worship and ethic universal, 
since both were rooted in God as interpreted by Christ, even as both were 
determined and built about the death of Christ.
Fairbairn f s own sharp antipathy to all sacerdotalism is suggested 
by the detail with which he explained that the early Christian society was 
held together by a priestless religion, without a trace of sacerdotal custom 
or law. A universal religion cannot be tied either to local shrines or 
institutions of worship, and Fairbairn showed how the early Christians elimi- 
nated both by making the only institution of worship ideal. In other words, 
Christ Himself replaced the Temple as the institution of worship; and since He 
was interpreted both as priest and sacrifice, He established an unmediated 
relationship between God and man which superseded the Levitical system of formal 
sacerdotalism. Similarly our Lord transcended the Rabbinical Law, since through 
Him as Redeemer man was to gain salvation not through his own efforts, but 
solely through the grace of God. Fairbairn further interpreted the ethic of 
Christ as embracing a social ideal and method which rose above all distinctions
of race, location or time. The ideal Fairbairn defined 'as perfect obedience
2 
towards God, embodied in perfect duty towards man'. By the social method was
meant that men should by imitating become like Christ, Christ Himself on this 
basis furnishing the 'moral dynamic' for man to realize the ideal. Because 
both the social ideal and method were demonstrated in the life of our Lord, 
Fairbairn concluded that His Person symbolized, as it were, all that the
1. Philosophy, p. 543. 2. Ibid, p. 524.
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Christian society should have been in its early days, or that the Church should 
be at the present time. Thus His Person continues to be constitutive of the 
Christian Church, and faith in God through Him is the central nerve of Christian 
worship and of the Christian ethic.
But already in the sub-Apostolic Age, Fairbairn explained that the 
new religion tended to become more legal and lesa ethical; and some of the Old 
Testament ceremonialism was again creeping back into worship. The thought of 
the ancient Church and the point is important for Fairbairn's later argument 
in regard to the Church developed from this general point of view rather than 
from the Apostolic. In these days Christianity was influenced in doctrine by 
the pagan philosophy, in organization by Roman polity, in cultus by the popular 
religions.
Fairbairn further traced the various changes effected in Christian- 
ity by the action on it of the environment. Although the delineation of these 
changes has become the commonplace in all considerations of Christian thought, 
Fairbairn's treatment of this development is suggestive and original. He began 
by stressing the importance of Philo to the development of thought. By 
effecting a confluence of Hebrew monotheism with Platonic idealism, Philo 
changed the approach of both theology and philosophy: for Fairbairn asserted
that 'God holds a place in all systems subsequent to Philo such as He had
1 
never held in those prior to him 1 , since the personal, ethical God of the
Hebrews after Philo always had to be taken into account in any philosophy which 
purported to explain man and the universe.
The further development of Christian thought (as Fairbairn described 
it) centred more or less about the Incarnation and its significance for man. 
The emphasis of the Greek Fathers, nurtured in Hellenic philosophy, was 
naturally metaphysical; of the Roman Fathers, trained in Roman jurisprudence, 
legal and forensic. For this reason Fairbairn suggested that the Eastern
1. Place of Christ, p. 65.
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Fathers were theologians, whereas the Western tended to be anthropologists. 
According to Fairbairn's interpretation, the Greek theology failed because it 
became more metaphysical than ethical, became abstracted from the Christian 
history, and did not develop its doctrine in terms of the consciousness of 
Christ, though it did endeavour to construe a scientific doctrine of the Godhead 
and to resolve the antinomy between the transcendence and immanence of God. 
The Roman theology, on the other hand, developing especially under Tertullian,
changed the Christian religion 'from a system priestless and spiritual into one
1 
sacerdotal and sensuous 1 j the ecclesia became a civitas, and God, together with
Christ and His death, came to be conceived who!3.y in juridical terms, a process 
which eventuated in the formulation of the satisfaction theory of the Atonement 
and the basic tenets of the Roman Catholic Church.
The Western Church quickly settled into a traditionalism, and 
Fairbairn pointed out that from the eighth century onward the fresh stimulation 
to thought came from transalpine minds, whereas the cisalpine leaders were 
responsible for polity and administration. The period of scholasticism, 
beginning with Anselm and governed by Aristotle, was concerned with three 
questions: a religious (the relation of faith to authority and knowledge), 
a theological (the exact nature of the work of Christ), and a philosophical 
(the contest between Nominalism and Realism). But however significant 
scholasticism was for the development of theology (according to Fairbairn's 
review of its history), it became increasingly apparent that the Church was 
drifting farther and farther away from its creative source. 'While the
Christianity the Church had made was known, the Christianity that had made the
2 
Church was not. 1
The Renaissance brought the Christian humanists face to face with 
the originating mind of Christianity, and Fairbairn stressed that the only 
1. Plaoe of Christ, p. 110 2. Ibid, p. 152.
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outcome could have been the comparison of the 'parent form 1 with the 
'living 
organism'. Out of this comparison, as it grew vivid and sharply outli
ned,
came the Reformation with its attempt, as Fairbairn phrased it, to 'r
eturn to
1 
the Christianity of Christ', and its formulation of two distinctive d
octrines:
Luther's justification by faith and Calvin's sovereignty of the Will o
f God. 
Finally Fairbairn showed how theology became fixed in various systems 
in the 
seventeenth century: the Roman Catholic predominantly institutional; 
the 
Lutheran essentially soteriological, based on the Scriptures and the S
acraments; 
the Reformed voluntaristic; and the English, as expressed in the High 
Church 
and the Broad, institutional, as expressed in the Puritan and Evangel
ical, a 
modified Reformed theology.
The significance of tracing this development of theology for Fair- 
bairn was that in it he saw the material factor of Christianity remain
ing ever
the same while the formal principle (i. e., the mind of Christ) was in
terpreted
2 
differently in accordance with the changing environment. The followin
g quotation
will illustrate Fairbairn's power in making historical generalizations
 and will 
summarize his conception of this theological development.
'The direct effect of every fresh return to the sources has been 
the enlargement and re-formation of religious thought. This is true i
n 
the case of the anti-Gnostic Fathers, whose use of the sources is seen
 
in the way they transcend rather than repeat tradition, and leave a 
theology richer than anything that had preceded it, especially in thos
e 
elements most distinctive of the original and Apostolic Word. Augusti
ne 
marks another moment of return; and his pre-eminence over Tertullian 
is 
due to his deeper reading of Paul. The Reformation is a similar momen
t, 
the only possible result of the recovered knowledge of the Scriptures 
by 
men who believed that they revealed the mind of Christ and His Apostle
s. 1
The recovery of the historical Christ in the nineteenth century 
(as explained at the beginning of this chapter) was a more meaningful 
return 
to the sources than any of these previous ones, for Fairbairn stresse
d that 
the cardinal influence in all these earlier 'returns' was Pauline. B
ut in 
the nineteenth century the effort was made to return directly, so to 
say, to
1. Place of Christ, p. 141. 2. Ibid, p. 187.
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the mind of Christ: and Fairbairn considered this the starting point for any 
theological construction. Such construction he felt to be especially necessary 
after the searching literary and historical criticism of the latter half of 
the century; and as more necessary, also more possible if, as he said, 'a
Christian theology means a theology of Christ, at once concerning Him and
1 
derived from Him 1 , since Fairbairn contended that knowledge of Him was greater
at the close of the nineteenth century than at any previous moment in history.
From this historical survey the leading principles of Fairbairn f s 
theology have emerged, the formal and material, respectively the consciousness 
of Christ and the Fatherhood of God. The mind of Christ was organized (as it 
were) about the central awareness of Sonship, of which the Divine Fatherhood is 
correlate. Since our Lord was human and an integral part of the race, the 
Sonship extends to all humanity, even as the Fatherhood is for all men.
This distinction between the two principles Fairbairn based on the 
older systems of theology, where the principium cognoscendi and principium 
essendi were differentiated, and more directly on the later distinction in 
Reformation theology, where (as he pointed out) the formal principle was 
conceived as the Scriptures; the material, justification by faith. He main- 
tained, however, that the Scriptures (or the Scriptures and tradition, or the 
Scriptures and the Church, or the Church alone) do not give an adequate formal 
principle; nor is the Incarnation as the Anglicans (follov/ing the Lutherans) 
held, nor justification by faith, nor the Church, nor the sovereign Will of 
God, adequate as material principle. Against all these notions Fairbairn 
contended that the only adequate formal principle for Christian theology is 
the mind of our Lord; and there, as we have seen, he pointed out that we find 
the material principle to be the Fatherhood of God. About these cardinal princi- 
ples he constructed his dogmatic theology: hence this review of his conception
1. Place of Christ, p. 297.
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of the historical and ideal Christ leads naturally into a consideration of 
his system of Christian theology.
Note on Chapter IV.
Sections i and iv of this chapter for the most part are synopses 
of divisions in Book I of Place of Christ; Section i, of Division II, 
"Historical Criticism and the History of Christ1} Section iv, of Division I, 
"The Law of Development in Theology and the Church".
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CHAPTER V. FAIRBAIRN'S SYSTEM OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY.
1 
The problem which faced Fairbairn as a theologian was set by two
dominant trends in British religious thought. One was his inheritance as a 
Free Churchman of Puritan theology, as modified successively by Arminianism, 
the Evangelical Revival, Socinianism, and finally in the nineteenth century by 
the influence of Erskine and Campbell in Scotland and Maurice and Robertson 
in England. The other trend was the Tractarian movement, grooved theologically
by 'Newman's attitude on Justification by Faith, on the sources and bases of
2 
authority in religion, on the agencies and channels of grace'. Both of these
tendencies had a direct and potent influence on Fairbairn's thought, the 
former more specifically on his theology, the latter on his ecclesiology. 
The Puritan theology, erected on the substructure of Calvin's 
voluntaristic doctrine of the Sovereignty of God, had been strongly predesti- 
narian and laid its chief emphasis on the saving work of Christ in the Atone- 
ment as the means of redemption. The Arminian theology placed its emphasis on 
human free will and the rights and dignity of man as conditioning the absolute 
rule of God's Will. Wesley in the Evangelical Revival, because of the 
religious power of the movement he started, modified the rigid Calvinism of 
Nonconformity by the very vehemence of his Arminianism. The Evangelical 
Revival had brought the doctrines of Justification and Atonement into the focus 
of attention, and it was against these that the Socinians directed their 
attack, itself based on the notion of the mutual independence of God and man.
This controversy was only beginning to lose its force at the midpoint of the
3 
century. Fairbairn pointed out that
'it is a note distinctive of the period that the ideas of Atonement 
which were assumed on the Evangelical side in order to meet the 
Socinian attack were drawn from an Arminian rather than a Calvinistic
1. Cp. supra, Ch. I, pp. 5-11.
2. "Dale as a Theologian" by Fairbairn, Ch. 27 In Life of R. W. Dale, pp.698-9.
3. Ibid, pp. 702, 703.
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source, from Hugo Grotius rather than Turretine. . . . Their distinctive 
position may be described as an attempt to reconcile a universal 
Atonement with a particular Salvation through a theory of Public Justice 
or qualified Satisfaction. 1
This is to say that the defenders of the Evangelical position 
conceived the sovereignty of God as conditioning His fatherly character, since 
they believed that the justice of God must be satisfied by the sinner himself 
or a substitute before the love of God can be expressed in forgiveness. This 
hybrid Puritan-Evangelical theology was further modified by the emphasis of 
Erskine and Campbell on the personal and gracious nature of God as conditioning 
and regulating (so to say) His Will; and by the stress of Maurice and Robertson 
on the Person rather than the work of Christ, the Person determining the nature 
of the work.
In this theological atmosphere Fairbairn spent his early years, 
and the burden of his strictly theological work was concerned with strengthen- 
ing this modifying trend. That is, he interpreted the work of Christ through 
the Person, and the Will of God through His nature as revealed by Christ: the 
Sovereignty and Paternity he conceived as correlates, and his aim was never 
to let the Paternity be made subsidiary to the Sovereignty in his theological 
construction. The heart of his theology thus found expression in what he 
called the Sovereign Paternity of God.
i. The Doctrine of God.
As we have seen, Fairbairn purposed to construct his theology 
about twin principles, the formal and material, the former being the conscious- 
ness of Christ, the latter the Fatherhood of God. Actually he sought to 
reconcile two trends of thought in his theology: the first was the Calvinist 
bias with its notion of the Sovereignty of God which apparently he carried 
away from his early conditioning in Scottish Presbyterianism; the other was 
the growing tendency during the nineteenth century to emphasize what have been
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called the humanitarian attributes in God, His benevolence and graciousness
1 
and mercy. Hence the Paternal Sovereignty really became the determinative
principle in his conception of God.
The New Testament interpretation of God through Christ, in Fair- 
bairn's understanding of it, was an interpretation of Fatherhood in terms of 
Sonship. That is to say, our Lord (according to this view) thought of Father
and Son in the Godhead as 'having a common being and as sustaining common
2 
relations to man', and yet as being distinct in their 'mutual relations'.
Fatherhood and Sonship thus are correlates: the being of both is necessary to 
the being of either. Both must essentially be in the nature of God, if our 
Lord's awareness of His own unique Sonship was true. The Apostolic writers, 
in developing their conception of God as revealed in Christ, tried to hold 
together the idea of God as being both Father and Son, a unity in which 
distinction was not lost; and out of this pristine interpretation of the early 
Church developed the idea of the Godhead, which Fairbairn considered a
\
conception essential to a true interpretation of the God who is 'God and 
Father of our Lord Jesus Christ'.
Fairbairn developed the concept of the social Trinity. Since God 
in essence is Love, in nature He must be social, for love must have an object 
on which to bestow itself. Similarly God as Reason must have an object that 
there may be activity of thought, that reason may be articulative. Both love 
and its object, and reason and its object, must be in the nature of God and 
not products of His Will. For if they were not in the nature of God, they 
must have been created and hence could not have existed eternally, in which 
instance God could not be considered eternally perfect. Fairbairn noted that 
ancient philosophy had entertained the idea of a Logos abiding in God and a
1. It is interesting to note that one of Fairbairn's former students, Principal 
A. E. Garvie, uses this same idea, but expresses it with the more mellifluous 
phrase, 'the fatherly rule of God'.
2. Place of Christ, p. 393.
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Logos ever going forth from Him. But the 'translation of the idea of an 
articulative Thought and an articulated Reason into the notion of the Father 
and Son' in Christian thought (a translation originating in Apostolic intuition 
which was inspired by our Lord) was the transformation of an abstraction into 
a living reality, the concrete Godhead 'which is no simplicity, but a unity 
where love and thought are ever in exercise, and all the graces or beatitudes
of social existence are things of the Divine essence, necessary to the nature
1 
of God'.
Fairbairn maintained that the doctrine of the Trinity is essentially 
Christian, since suggested parallels in Hindu systems of thought arose out of 
polytheism tending toward pantheism, the so-called Trinity in these systems 
being radically different from the Christian Godhead, where God is conceived 
as personal, conscious and ethical. Parallels in Greek thought, moreover, 
Fairbairn considered to be philosophical, not religious.
The chief emphasis in Fairbairn's constructive theology was always 
placed on the Father-Son relationship within the Godhead, and Principal Garvie
has suggested that Fairbairn's argument led him to a duality rather than a
2 
trinity. But actually Fairbairn developed a doctrine of the Holy Spirit (not
in detail, to be sure) in which he construed the Spirit as a Person in the 
Godhead, co-essential with the Father and Son. Fairbairn pointed out that the 
important place given to the Holy Spirit in the New Testament is manifest.
1. Place of Christ, pp. 394-5.
2. "The Theology of Dr. Andrew Martin Fairbairn", op. ait., p. 38.
Dr. K. E. Kirk points out that such a tendency toward 'binitarian- 
ism' was marked in the early Church, and that Trinitarianism had to 'fight 
its way and make good its footing against a strong tendency, both within 
and without the Church, towards belief in a Godhead of two persons only'. 
This is written to refute the idea that Christianity merely assimilated the 
Trinitarian idea from contemporary paganism. ("The Evolution of the Doctrine 
of the Trinity" in the symposium ed. by Rawlinson, The Trinity and the 
Incarnation, p. 162.)
As a matter of fact Fairbairn referred to this very trend, showing 
how confusion regarding the Person and work of the Holy Spirit obtained in 
the Church until the fourth century, when the doctrine began to be fixed 
in its orthodox form.
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'His work was as great and as necessary, and expressed attributes 
as divine, as those of the Father and Son ubiquity, holiness, truth, 
infinite energy ever exercised and ever resultful.' (1)
Even though Patristic thought failed at first to realize the full significance 
of the idea of the Hoty Spirit, that meaning could not be evaded in the develop- 
ment of Christian thought; and so the creedal formulation of the Church finally 
expressed the Christian belief in
'the Holy Spirit, the Lord and Giver of life, who proceedeth from the 
Father, and who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and 
gbrified.' (2)
The Holy Spirit, then, as Fairbairn conceived Him, is God immanent 
in man as 'personal energy', whose creative action is essential not only for 
revelation and the renewal of the Church but to man's realizing his sonship to 
God. In short, Fairbairn stated and held as true (at least so far as can be 
judged from his writings) the orthodox conception of the Holy Spirit, even 
though he probably did not give it the place it should have held in his system, 
especially in view of his emphatic Congregationalism, in which of course the 
doctrine of the Holy Spirit is of vital and central importance.
It was Fairbairn»s contention that the Christian doctrine of the 
Godhead had 'ethicized' the idea of God inherited from the Hebrew and Greek 
tradition and hence the theism of natural theology. For he considered that 
the Hebrew idea of God was conceived primarily not in ethical but in legalistic 
terms. Even St. Paul did not wholly escape his Judaic heritage, for in Fair- 
bairn's view he argued at times more like a Jew than a Christian Apostle, as 
for instance in Romans when he speaks of God as potter and man as clay,  
conceiving God not in terms of His nature but of His Will (ix. 19-24). As the 
Jewish idea of God was more legal and political than moral, so (Fairbairn 
asserted) the Greek was more metaphysical and abstract: in striking contrast 
to both came the personal and moral idea of the Godhead, as conceived by the
1. Place of Christ, p. 490.
2. Nicaeno-Const. Symbol., quoted in Ibid.
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Apostles and generated by the creative life of our Lord, personal and moral 
because Fatherhood and Sonship were conceived as of the very essence of the 
Godhead's being.
'The relations that belonged to the very constitution by virtue 
of which He was God, (Fairbairn wrote), involved moral character, 
duties, ends. We shall utterly misconceive the Apostolic mind if we 
reduce the terms Father and Son and Spirit into rigid ontological 
symbols; the realities they denote are ethical. . . . ' (1)
As Fairbairn traced the development of this central notion of 
Christianity, he maintained that it had been perverted when it came under the 
influence of the Roman legalism, which caused the development of the Catholic 
institutional or political system of theology; and likewise under the masterful 
sway of the dialectic or constructive Calvinism, with its voluntaristic inter- 
pretation of God in terms of will, rather than in terms of His nature as Father. 
During the eighteenth century a reaction set in against such a forensic concep- 
tion of Deity, and towards the close of the century the general democratic 
movement further stimulated this reaction. That is to say, as the rights of 
man were asserted against the sovereign and autocratic will of earthly nionarchs, 
so these rights were asserted before God. This general theological movement 
against the over-emphasis on the Divine Sovereignty found expression during the 
nineteenth century in a marked stress on the Fatherhood and love of God, this 
trend having been stimulated by the historical movement which tried to return 
to the original Christian sources and recapture the spirit of the early Church. 
This emphasis in turn often resulted in a sentimentalizing tendency, whereby 
God was conceived merely as a benovolent and indulgent Father. Because of this 
maudlin trend there sprang up through the century recrudescences of the emphasis 
on the Sovereignty of God, an emphasis which in some parts of Britain (it 
should be noted) had continued unmodified throughout the entire era.
Fairbairn, as we have observed, attempted to bring together the
1. Place of Christ, p. 406.
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two ideas of Fatherhood and Sovereignty, the determinative notion with him 
having been the Fatherhood.
'We must not construe God (he contended) from our forensic 
sovereignty, but the sovereignty through God and God through the 
filial and normative consciousness of Jesus Christ.' 'Many people, 
indeed, speak of the will of God as if it could do harsh things without 
being cruel, unequal things without being unjust, and have ascribed 
things to Him that they would have held themselves accursed had they 
even schemed to do. But where Absolute Sovereignty is so conceived 
as to be an offence to the human conscience, it is not conceived as 
Divine. . . The basis of all faith in the ways of God is belief in 
His goodness.' (1)
Thus he would have replied to Zwingli's remark, 'We call God Father, because
2 
he can do what he pleases with us': we call God Father, because our Lord
revealed Fatherhood to be an essential part of His nature; and He cannot do 
what He pleases with us, because what He does is determined by His nature.
Fairbairn differentiated, to be sure, between what he called the 
older and newer Calvinism: the older, he said, was filled with the majesty 
of God, the newer was but a hard and brittle legalism. But whether 'old' or 
'new', he took his stand against the voluntarism in this Calvinist trend, 
because in it he saw the moral and personal attributes of God sacrificed. But 
he was equally against the sentimentalism which so often arose out of stressing 
the love of God; and he had been soundly enough indoctrinated in his youth with 
the stern and rigorous moral undergirding in the Calvinist interpretation of 
God that he could not easily give up the notion of Sovereignty in Deity.
The idea of Sovereignty, as expressed in the Calvinism still 
current in Fairbairn1 s day, interpreted God primarily as Creator and Governor, 
and Christ as the only Son by nature; the only other sons of God were the 
elect, who became sons through adoption. It was particularly against this 
restricted view of the Fatherhood of God that Fairbairn contended. He conceived 
God as the Father of all men, and further thought that all men were sons of the
1. Place of Christ, p. 440; Sermons, pp. 197-8.
2. Quoted in McGiffert, op. cit.. p. 243.
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Father, not by adoption but by nature, and that because Christ had guaranteed 
it (so to say) by assuming human nature in its fullness.
The two ideas of God's Paternity and Sovereignty, in Fairbairn's 
view, must be held together. The government of the universe should not be 
conceived in terms of autocratic monarchy, where the sovereign creates the law, 
but in terms of the primitive state where the natural sovereign was the father. 
The whole idea of sovereignty arose from the patriarchal society where one 
person was both sovereign and father. Hence Fairbairn argued that the govern- 
ment of the universe should be conceived in terms of the family, in which to be 
sure the father has absolute authority; but it is the authority, if not perverted, 
which has its grounding in the fatherly nature, and not in his will.
 The two, Fatherhood and Sovereignty, must then live together, 
and be incorporated into a living and effective unity, if we are to 
have a government of ideal perfection, such as becomes God 
and is suitable to a universe full of the realities and infinite 
possibilities of good and evil. 1 (1)
Since the universe should be conceived in this way, Fairbairn
maintained that the violation of moral law was not so much punished as chastised 
by the Paternal Sovereign. That is, such violation was not punished merely to 
uphold the dignity and majesty of the rulerj rather was it chastised in order 
to discipline and educate, much as one might chastise the child in the family 
or the citizen in the state. Naturally Fairbairn argued that offences were 
not to be overlooked as being inconsequential by either the fatherly or the 
sovereign aspects of the Divine nature. Both (so to speak) must deal with the 
offender. But the autocratic sovereign thinks only of vindicating his own 
imperial position, whereas the father is concerned to redeem the child.
Fairbairn thus held that the absolute Sovereignty of God must be 
strongly affirmed, but that sovereignty must not be interpreted through the 
civil court or from the ideas of autocracies and monarchies. It should be
1. Place of Christ, p. 436.
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interpreted only in terms of the Fatherhood of God, as revealed by Christ. In 
other words God must be conceived not as arbitrary will but as a Being whose 
attributes are personal and moral. Thus since God is omnipotent, He has the 
power to will anything that is consistent with His fatherly nature: but the
action of His will is always conditioned by that nature. This idea is expressed
1 
time and again in Fairbairn's writings, as for instance in his sermons.
God 'can never be false to Himself.. . . He acts in a way worthy 
of Himself. 1 'There is, in a sense, a law that binds the very will and 
throne of God; there is a sense in which even in the supreme act of His 
grace God followed law the law of His own eternal sovereign paternity.'
His exposition of the Fatherhood and Sovereignty of God naturally 
led Fairbairn into considering the problem of how God can be both Justice and 
Love. He held that even as the Fatherhood and Sovereignty are correlates 
conditioning each other (the Fatherhood, however, being the more determinative), 
so justice and love in God are correlative. Love which is not righteous becomes 
sentimental and hence ceases to be love. Justice which is not essentially 
determined by love becomes so rigid in its judgments that it can no longer be 
considered justice. As Fairbairn himself expressed the idea: 'Love regards an
object whose good it desires: righteousness is the conduct which fulfils the
2 
desire of love.' For either justice or love to exist they must exist together,
and Fairbairn held that only in God do they so exist. Thus in God alone do we 
find the moral perfection termed Holiness, a state where nature and act or 
character and will exist in absolute agreement.
Fairbairn's formulation of the Christian doctrine of the Godhead 
was regulative for his exposition of the attributes of God. Of these he gave 
particular consideration to the doctrines of God as Creator and Providence, 
since he considered that these doctrines gave the most difficulty to theism, 
and since the scientific thought of his day denied (directly or by implication)
1. Sermons, pp. 84, 90, 52.
2. Place of Christ, p. 441.
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both doctrines with their notions of a self-originating and self-sustaining 
universe. The difficulty of conceiving the creation at the least is mitigated, 
Fairbairn maintained, when the Godhead is thought of as social by nature, the 
persons being related by essence and hence through eternity, and since related,
ever active. 'Creation was for God not the beginning of action; he was by
1 
essence active because a Godhead. 1
But what is this activity in the Godhead? In Fairbairn's view it
was the activity of love, as we have seen, since God is the 'eternal activity
2 
of love 1 . Because the Father is eternal love, creation, even while increasing
the 'objects' of His love, does not increase the amount (so to speak), since 
that is infinite and immeasurable, able to bestow itself boundlessly without 
diminishing the supply.
The Godhead, then, retains its unchangeableness even while ever 
active. Yet while unchangeable, Fairbairn pointed out a want in God because 
of Kis very nature, which is Love. Since love is satisfied only when giving 
itself, God must have been in a sense unsatisfied until receptive beings had 
been created as objects of His love. In developing his argument in this
connection, Fairbairn followed Lotze and Rothe. He quoted Lotze as follows,
3 
'It is the living love which wills the happiness of others.' But if God
wills the happiness of others, Fairbairn argued that He must also will the
life on which happiness is to be bestowed. 'And so He wills to create, that
4 
the happiness He has willed may be realized.' In this way Fairbairn held
that God^is determined, while not physically necessitated, to be Creator,
1. Place of Christ, p. 409.
2. Ibid, p. 410. In an address delivered in 1883, Fairbairn also spoke of the 
creation of man in this way: 'Men became that the subjective happiness 
of the Infinite might become objective.' (Studies, p. 94.) This extreme 
Hegelianism, where the idea of love is wholly metaphysical, was usually 
modified by his stress on the ethical nature of love, which (he said) 
must be ethical to be love at all.
3. Mikrokosmus, vol. Ill, p. 608, quoted in Place of Christ, p. 411.
4. Place of Christ, p. 411.
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 determined by the moral perfection of His nature, the libertas major of a 
Being whose action and essence are one.
God cannot be conceived as having created the world and then left 
it to fend for itself, and Fairbairn vigorously defended the orthodox Christian
position that God is both transcendent as Creator and immanent in the world
1 
as Providence. Creation, in fact, cannot be considered a finished act but
rather a continuous process; and Providence is thus continuous creation. 
Fairbairn maintained that both the Deist and Pantheist views expressed only 
partial truths. God is transcendent, as the Deist declared, since He was 
before and is above nature. Similarly with the Pantheist Fairbairn insisted 
that God is immanent in nature; and without His Presence everywhere in nature 
it could have no being and would be at best only mechanical. If God were not 
immanent, if He had wholly cut Himself off from His creation, He could not 
be conceived as either omnipotent or omnipresent on the one hand, and thus He 
would be limited; and on the other, He could not be considered moral, since 
refusing ill intercourse with the beings whose creation was determined by His 
nature.
Nature itself Fairbairn conceived as being wholly instrumental, an
arena in which man is to build character, having only a relative reality for
2 
God, since it is basically but 'a middle term between minds',  the minds of
God and man. This was but another way for Fairbairn to explicate the idea of 
transcendence and immanence: for the maker of an instrument must be prior and
transcendent to it, yet the maker's mind must also be present and active in it
3 
if it is to function.
1. 'The old Hebrew psalmist, by placing in striking contrast the infinitely 
great and the infinitely little, brings out, in the most effective way 
possible, the providence of God as at once comprehensive enough to 
superintend the interests of the collective universe, and kindly and careful 
enough not to neglect the smallest individual. 1 (Sermons, p. 207.)
2. Place of Christ, p. 420.
3. Cp. supra, Ch. II, pp. 60 ff.
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In this way Fairbairn contended against the basic idea of Spinoza, 
that God can be thought of simply as substance, or of Schopenhauer, that He can 
be conceived as unconscious will. Nor did he follow to its radical outcome the 
evolutionary idea of conceiving Ultimate Reality merely as an immanent life 
force, a notion which was becoming increasingly prevalent in Fairbairn's day 
and which has found more recently its most articulate expression in Bergson.
Fairbairn himself steadily maintained that God must be conceived 'as a Subject,
1 
i. e., as a conscious centre of thought and volition 1 . As Subject, God is
unchangeable in character, though often He will seem different as He presents 
various aspects of His character to meet different needs in an individual.
Fairbairn's doctrine of God, then, was constructed about the central 
conviction of the Divine Fatherhood as revealed in the consciousness of Christ, 
the Divine Sovereignty being correlative and yet subsidiary. This is but to 
say that God must be conceived as determined by His nature. Since His nature 
is love, best characterized by the Father-Son relation held together in unity 
within Himself, He is Creator: for love can be satisfied only when bestowing 
itself. But creation is not so much a single act as a continuous process, and 
God is ever active in His creation as Providence. He is, moreover, not active 
merely as impersonal energy; He is present as the Holy Spirit (whose activity 
is especially evident in revelation and within the Church), who represents God 
within man, so to say, as personal energy. Even though active in creation and 
immanent in man and nature, God is unchangeable because His character remains 
ever the same, His moral perfection even while able to express itself in an 
infinite number of ways ever expressing the same holiness. In his holiness God 
is infinitely majestic, high above man and his ways; and Fairbairn always
stressed that God cannot be conceived as standing 'but a few degrees above man
2 
. . . without bringing Him in some respects several degrees below'. Yet He is
1. Philosophy, p. 154. 2. Ibid, p. 481.
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not 'wholly Other 1 , since man is created in His image and has knowledge of Him. 
God is personal (though in a sense far beyond -what is meant when man is termed 
personal), since such attributes as love and justice and fatherhood have no 
meaning when considered as hypostasizations, have reality only when incarnated 
in a person. Finally God is passible, and this attribute has particular 
significance when viewed in relation to the Atonement, since He is 'tender,
compassionate; then nil sorrow, all pain, and all anguish are to Him painful,
1 
the cause of deepest pity and regret'.
2 
An eloquent passage from the City of God epitomizes Fairbairn's
doctrine of God.
'Into this world, with its chaotic thought of God, yet its equal 
necessity for Him, Christ came. He came and declared that the First Cause, 
the Final End of the world, viewed in relation to man, is an Eternal 
Spirit which can be represented by no name but the name of "Father". The 
Father must be in an equal degree Love and Righteousness, as Love seeking 
the good of His children, as Righteousness seeking their good through an 
eternal law of truth and right. Love is eternal, had no beginning, can 
have no end in God. Love, too, is social, can exist only as there is the 
subject and the object of love. Love made God happy; love craved to 
create happiness; wished, as the ever-blessed God was blessed in Himself, 
to fill the silent places of the universe with glad voices, with happy 
souls. Man is not a necessity to God, but God needed man, needed man to 
satisfy His infinite love, the large and eternal emotion, of His own great 
spirit; and as God needed man, man rose obedient to God's need. But the 
need was not simply creative, it was redemptive as well. Love must aim at 
the good of the child it caused, and labour for it; as the individual 
rises out of love, love ever continues to work his good, to seek his weal. 
Ill to a child is ill to a parent; sin in man is suffering in God. Out 
of man's ill came God's suffering, revealed, realized, made to the 
universe for ever apparent in the Person, in the sacrifice of Christ. 1
ii. The Doctrine of Sin.
One of Fairbairn's most basic convictions was that man is created 
in the image of God. Because so created, he is son of God, and that not merely 
by adoption, but by nature. On this point Fairbairn again differed from the 
strain of voluntaristic Calvinism which persisted in theological thought; for
1. Religion in History, p. 92.
2. p. 267.
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according to this Calvinist view, man could be son of God only by adoption, and 
only the elect could be adopted, Fairbairn contended vigorously against this 
notion, not only maintaining that to be son by adoption is not to be son at all
(since to be really son one must be so by nature), but also insisting that all
1 
men are sons of God by nature. The bond between God and man is not merely
physical, based on creation, but essentially moral, the very purpose of God in 
creating man having been to fashion beings in His own likeness who could be 
recipients of His love. Sonship, then, is real to begin with, adoption for 
Fairbairn meaning the redemption of man from the sonship of nature into the 
sonship of grace.
Since God is by nature Father and man by nature son, Fairbairn
maintained that the normal relation between them is one of communal fellowship.
2 
Only from this point of view can the concept of sin have any meaning, since
Fairbairn held that sin is the act or disposition which interferes with or 
makes impossible this relation of intimate fellowship between God and man. Sin 
is thus a religious idea. As such it is distinguished from the philosophical 
concept of evil, though similarly involving suffering and loss; from the ethical 
concept of vice, though similarly involving disobedience and blame; from the 
legal concept of crime, though similarly involving revolt and wrong, culpability 
and penalty. When man therefore sins (if such sin is viewed from 'within' 
religion), he is not being what he was created to be, and is himself responsible
1. Because man carries within himself the Imago Dei, Fairbairn stressed that 
the evolutionary principle the survival of the fittest in the struggle for 
existence is not adequate to guide human life, however much it may obtain 
in the animal world. Because man as immortal spirit bears the image of his 
Creator, he has value as a person in God's sight. He cannot be considered 
merely as a unit who must be victorious in the competitive struggle of 
society, or be carelessly thrown aside as useless. Fairbairn asserted that 
in the Christian view of man, man as son of God is as 'immortal as his 
Parent; time no scene of selfish struggle, but an arena which disciplines 
for eternity. The men who live by faith do not feel as if their lives were 
moments in the being of the eternal silence, but rather fore-gleams of the 
eternal day 1 . (Sermons, p. 106.)
2. For Fairbairn 1 s further treatment of the problem of evil, physical and moral, 
cp. supra, chapter II, pp. 78 ff.
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1
for his failure. in a sense sin is usurpation, since man when he sins allows 
his own will, by nature evil, to usurp the place which should be held by the 
holy Will of God. As Fairbairn wrote: 'We make ourselves into our god, and
attempt to force Him and all He has created into servants to our wills, means
2 
to our ends. 1
God permits while not condoning sin: for it is not possible for 
Him, having created man free, to suspend the will inclined to sin by destroying 
the freedom of that will. As we have already seen, this view is determinative 
for Fairbairn's entire approach to the problem of evil and sin in the world. 
That is to say, he conceived God as creating beings capable of sinning, because 
only so could he create beings capable of obeying, and hence sons rather than 
automatons. According to this view, God as Love created man to give him 
beatitude, but that beatitude had to be earned (so to say) through man's 
striving, by the grace of God, to achieve character within the arena of the 
world. The goal of God for man is character or moral perfection. That goal 
'may be attained, but cannot be created; God can make a being capable of moral
action, but not a being with all the fruits of moral action garnered within
3 
him'.
Original sin, as Fairbairn conceived it, is that collective evil 
which as part of man's inheritance acts in the individual prior to the operation 
of the will. Original sin has 'spoiled' human nature. That is to say, Fair- 
bairn pointed out that the nature which acts as well as the acts themselves 
must be taken into account in a moral judgment: and by that judgment human
1. Fairbairn does not develop the doctrine of the Fall, refers to it several 
times only casually. One of his explicit references to it is the following! 
'Since man is His (i. e., God's) breath, he is His kin, with a dependent 
being, yet with an independence of will which fits him to hold fellowship 
with God who made him. This dignity, which he can keep only by obedience, 
he receives but to lose; for on the very morrow of the creation, which, as 
it left God's hand, was so good, evil enters because man, who has been made 
so much greater than he knew, was by his very innocence and inexperience so 
open to its enticements. 1 (Philosophy, pp. 246-7.) Here, it would seem, 
Fairbairn makes ignorance the root cause of sin.
2. Place of Christ, p. 453. 3. Ibid, p. 457.
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nature is found to be evil. Yet Fairbairn tended to suggest that it is 
potentially evil or is inclined to sin, rather than that it is really evil. 
Thus although he held that original sin underlies and precedes all individual 
sin, he also maintained that it does not involve culpability and guilt, which
comes only from actual sin. In other words, man is not really responsible for
1 
the nature he inherits, only for the sinful acts he commits. The whole
doctrine of original sin for Fairbairn naturally is tied up with the interdepen- 
dence and interconnection of all mankind: mankind is a family or organism, 
and the sin or good of one is evil or gain for all: thus collective righteous- 
ness is correlative with collective sin, a notion which is closely related to 
the social emphasis of the nineteenth century.
It was Fairbairn 1 s contention that Christianity had really created
the consciousness of sin. In the light of the moral purity of our Lord man
2 
first became poignantly aware of the heinousness of sin. But Fairbairn pointed
out that Christianity, while making man vividly conscious of his sinful nature, 
also provided the means, as it were, whereby he might be redeemed. For in
Fairbairn does not raise the question, who then is responsible? His position 
in this regard stands at odds with his stress on man's free will. As Canon - 
Hodgson points out: 'TWhat is really at stake is the existence of human 
freedom at all, for to identify the two (i. e., original sin and temptation 
to sin) must end in looking on human actions as caused by something other 
than the man himself, something for which he is not responsible. If a man's 
actions are caused by temptations over which he has no control, if they are 
not the expression of his character, they are not his actions at all, nor 
have they any moral quality.' (Essays in Christian Philosophy, p. 94.) 
The trend toward monism in the nineteenth century tended to close the 
orthodox chasm between good and evil. Fairbairn, too, was not unaffected 
by this trend, which of course became more marked wherever Hegelianism 
dominated thought. Although Fairbairn did not fail to stress the unrelieved 
badness of evil, it was also possible for him to speak at times of the 
'accident of sin* (Philosophy, p. 483; Place of Christ, p. 477), or again 
of sin being 'more a misfortune than a crime' (Philosophy, p. 547). The use 
of such phrases would tend to show that he completely ignored the idea of 
Divine over-ruling. In this connection it is of interest to note that 
he criticised Pusey's sense of sin (described in Liddon's Life) as 'more 
sensuous than spiritual' and as 'morbid' (Philosophy, pp. 332-4). Note 
also Forsyth's remark in an 'obituary' notice on Fairbairn: Hegelianism 
'always comes to grief on the sunk rock of human sin', (op. cit., p. 2.) 
On the whole, when he is not dealing specifically with the problem of evil 
or the concept of original sin, Fairbairn is prone (concluded on next page)
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Fairbairn»s world-view, redemption is indissolubly linked with creation: that 
is, he held that the love which creates cannot but seek to redeem its creatures 
from sin.
In considering God's relation to sin, the Fatherhood and Sovereignty 
again must be held together. As Righteousness, God will not tolerate sin or 
allow it to have any place in his universe; as Father, he keeps on loving man 
even after he has sinned, so that he must ever keep on seeking to save him. 
Fairbairn held that for God as Sovereign to annihilate sin would be tantamount 
to destroying man's freedom of choice, and that would be equivalent to annihi- 
lating the sinner. This in turn would be but God's acknowledgment that He knew 
no way of mending, except by ending, His creation. He further argued that God 
as Father, to be true to His own nature, must become Saviour. Thus the 
Incarnation was determined by the very nature of things, and the Cross as the 
means of redemption exists eternally within the Creator heart of God.
In this connection Fairbairn touches on the 'view of sin as taken 
up into a larger purpose of grace which seems to some ... to lie at the heart
of Christianity, and which finds classical expression in the Holy Saturday
1 
hymn 0 felix culpa 1 . Thus he suggests that creation is only in the process of
being made, and sin occurs in the 'first act of the drama': its real or whole 
significance can be understood only when the last act is complete. We do know 
that through sin 'attributes of God have become known that could not otherwise 
have been manifested, and the beatific vision win be all the richer and the
more ecstatic that the Father it sees is one who loved too deeply to surrender
2 
the lost'. This idea of Divine over-ruling, however, is not developed by
Fairbairn and has no important place in his constructive theology.
(continued from previous page)
to allow (if not, indeed, to stress) that man is inherently good rather than 
radically evil. This tendency is quite in accord with the moral optimism 
of the century, and with the general bent of the era toward absolute 
idealism.
1. Webb, Review of Philosophy. op_. cit.. p. 297. Professor Webb criticises 
Fairbairn for completely ignoring this view in his Philosophy.
2. Place of Christ P p. 457.
134
iii. The Incarnation. ,
Fairbairn realized how closely the doctrine of the Incarnation 
(which he called the centre of gravity in positive theology during the nine- 
teenth century) is related to that of Creation. For in creation God limited 
Himself by giving to man at least a relative degree of free-will. Could He
not further limit Himself by ma/ntesting Himself in history at a particular
1 
moment of the time series? In this connection Fairbairn wrote:
'There is no problem raised by the idea of God manifest in the 
flesh as to the relation of the divine nature to the human unity of 
one person,, or as to the historical origin of such a relation, i. e., 
its beginning in time; or as to the action of the limited manhood on the 
illimitable Godhood, which is not equally raised by the inter-relations 
of God and nature. 1
In construing the doctrine of the Incarnation Fairbairn again used 
his determinative principle of the Fatherhood and Sonship in the nature of the 
Godhead. Since he held that man is son of God by nature, he emphasized the 
affinity between the Divine and human natures, the differences between them 
being only in degree. Yet he maintained that the affinity is ideal, rather 
than actually manifested in man or realized in history. In reality man through 
sin has become estranged from God: the affinity between the Divine and human 
natures has been obfuscated: man though created in the Imago Dei has 'gone 
bad 1 , so to say. But if the purpose of God in creation is not to be frustrated, 
He will seek to redeem man, and that (Fairbairn argued) by the very 'ethical
necessities of His nature, ... the gentle constraint of love and the imperious
2 
demand of righteousness 1 . Hence God seeks continuously to win man back to
Himself. He cannot coerce, since coercion is contrary to His nature and since 
it would involve destroying man's free-will, which (as Fairbairn expressed it) 
was tantamount to killing the patient to cure the disease. The only way man 
could be won was through a man. Philosophically expressed, the Universal had
1. Philosophy, p. 479. 2. Place of Christ, p. 469.
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to become the Particular, since man can know the Universal only through the
1 
particular instance. The ideal had to become the real. So God manifested
Himself as man because only so could the ideal Father-Son relationship between 
God and man become actual.
'Sonship can be realized only where Fatherhood is known, and 
Fatherhood can be known only where it is seen with all its qualities 
in fullest exercise ... If God's Fatherhood is to be a reality to man, 
he must see it as it is, know it by experience, by handling it and being 
handled by it. But the only way in which it can thus come to him is 
in the form of humanity. He must see a real son, whose knowledge of the 
Father is inner, and not, like his own, outer only. He must learn what 
the Father is from one who has lived in His bosom.' (2)
And Fairbairn concluded that only through the God-man could this end be achieved,
by the second Person of the Trinity becoming incarnate. Fairbairn maintained
3 
that the actual act of Incarnation could best be explained by the kenotic theory.
Fairbairn 1 s approach to the difficult question of thetwo natures 
was little different from the Patristic treatment of the problem. This is but 
to say that his approach was metaphysical rather than psychological. His 
general thought was that two substances, divinity and humanity, were so brought 
together as to form the God-man. Thus a perfect manhood expressed in time the
perfection of the Godhead, 'the inner qualities, the hidden loves and energies
4 
which were . . . the God of God 1 .
In Fairbairn's judgment, then, there were no basic obstacles to the 
thought of the eternal Logos, which he conceived as 'going out1 continuously from
1. One of his former students, who probably has followed Fairbairn's approach 
to religion more closely than any other, has lucidly expressed this point. 
'It was to give to the Individual and the Contingent the weight and value 
of the Universal and Abiding, and to give to the Universal and Abiding the 
power of the Individual and the Contingent over the human spirit. It is 
the triumphant solution of this problem in the Person of Jesus, that 
constitutes the originality and special genius of Christianity. 1 (Franks, 
The Atonement, p. 140.)
2. Place of Christ, pp. 474-5.
3. At this point Fairbairn's exposition is left hanging in the air, so to speak. 
He did not explain what he meant by reference to this theory, nor did he 
connect it with the rest of his exposition. As a matter of fact, his whole 
treatment of the doctrine of the Incarnation may not unfairly be called 
cursory. If, as he said, the Incarnation was the centre of gravity for 
theology during the Victorian years, it can further be added that he did not 
so consider it in his own system. 4. Place of Christ, p. 479.
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the Godhead, assuming a full humanity. Such an interpretation of the Person 
of Christ he further maintained had been vindicated by what He had done in 
history. That is, he contended that the pragmatic test showed that the 
 effect 1 of His action in history could best be explained by accepting the 
Apostolic interpretation of their Lord, namely, that He is the Incarnate Son 
of God.
'We must look at the centuries that have come after Him, and His 
action in these centuries, if we would know either whom or what He is. 1 
 We may, therefore, infer that, as the Person who has been most efficient 
in the creation of order, Jesus Christ is the most ordered Person in 
history; that as He who has done moat to create progress, He most 
expresses the will that works in all for all. By causing God to be 
realized in history He is proved to be God manifest in the flesh. 1 (1)
iv. The Atonement.
Fairbairn»s general approach to the redeeming work of Christ was 
that usually linked with the name of Abelard. What this Abelardian theory of 
the Atonement means is succinctly epitomized by Principal Franks.
'It is the doctrine that Christ reconciles man to God by 
revealing the love of God in His life and still more in His death, 
so bringing them to trust and love Him in return. 1 (2)
Though in general the avowed intention of Fairbairn is definitely to interpret 
Christian theology from this point of view, actually his exposition is often 
strongly coloured by legalistic terminology and ideas.
As we have seen, Fairbairn considered that all Christian doctrines 
took their rise from and should be grouped around the Sovereign Paternity of 
God. The ideas of Fatherhood and Sovereignty must be held together within a 
unity, and Fairbairn thought that much of the difficulty in correctly inter- 
preting the work of Christ had come through conceiving the righteousness of 
God as a sort of independent entity (e. g., his friend Dale's notion of the 
'eternal Law of righteousness 1 ) instead of realizing that the absolute 
righteousness or justice of God could be understood only as construed through
1. Sermons, pp. 6, 8. 2. The Atonement, p. 2.
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His Fatherhood.
Viewed in this light, then, Fairbairn considered that the work of 
Christ was two-fold: (1) He showed to man what the Eternal Father is really
like; (2) He made man poignantly conscious of the awfulness of sin. In his
1 
last book Fairbairn expressed the idea in simile.
'The still pool or the solitary tarn may, as it looks into the 
silent face of heaven, reflect either the innumerable stars, or the 
radiant sunshine, or the passive moonlight; and so the Crucifixion is 
like a glass in which we may see standing together, for contrast and 
comparison, two infinities, the winsome grace of God and the hideous 
Evil of man, especially in the undisguise it wears when it feels 
conscious of victory. 1
Fairbairn thus maintained that the Atonement is the creation of grace and 
does not in itself create grace. Its saving power is not arbitrary in its 
effect, nor is it efficacious for some men and not for others. That is to 
say, its saving power is not restricted, as Calvinists in the nineteenth 
century thought, to the elect. Fairbairn insisted that it is efficacious for 
all men, even as God is Father to all. Yet the Atonement does not guarantee 
(so to say) the salvation of anyone, since to appropriate its saving power 
man must have faith. Thus salvation is made possible for all men, but actual 
for none.
It can be seen that Fairbairn held a modified universalism, and 
his thought is undergirded by the three Morisonian universalities: 'that
God loves all, that Christ died for all, and that the Holy Spirit strives in
2 
all' . But salvation cannot be made compulsory for any man without violating
the free-will without which, as Fairbairn steadily maintained, he would not 
be man. The only constraint consistent with His nature which God can use on 
His creatures is the constraint of love which gives itself without stint. Such 
love was supremely shown forth on the Cross, and man to be saved need but
1. Studies, pp. 445-6.
2. Garvie, London Quat., op. cit.» p. 28
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respond to it through faith. But Fairbairn further pointed out that it is 
conceivable that man may not so respond, even though this constraint of love
be directed upon him, as it were, eternally; it is conceivable that he might
1 
forever refuse to respond to that love. If he does not respond, there is no
power in heaven or on earth which can compel him, and so in a sense he 'damns 1 
himself. Yet God can never forget any of His children, even those who will 
not respond to His love, any more than a mother can forget the child who has 
died, even though overtly she seems to be directing all her love toward her 
living children. Fairbairn would have repudiated the idea set forth by Ivan 
in Dostoevsky's novel (as Ivan narrates an old legend) that certain sinners
sink to the bottom of a burning lake in Hell so that they cannot swim out.
E 
'And these God forgets.' Fairbairn held that God could not forget: He could
not erase from His memory (so to speak) the names of any of His children. 
Hence He would never withdraw His love from any of them. But since the sinner, 
by eternally refusing that love, might eternally carry on the process of 
rejecting salvation, God's purpose for all men in Fairbairn f s view might be 
eternally thwarted because of the human free-will which God persistently 
refused to over-rule.
In the death of Christ, then, God passed judgment on sin, and in 
that way He vindicated His nature, whether viewed from the side of His Father- 
hood or Sovereignty, his justice or love. A quotation will illustrate the 
point, and certain words I have italicised will indicate the legalistic 
colouring in Fairbairn1 s thought which was mentioned above.
His judgments 'are not merely retributory or retaliatory, penal 
or vindicative, in the judicial sense, but they are corrective, 
reclamatory, disciplinary. While they vindicate authority, they are 
intended to be not simply deterrent and exemplary, but reformatory and
1. Sin 'is in its nature so malignant that it may for ever divide God from 
the spirits He created that He might enjoy their society for ever.' 
(Place of Christ, p. 455.)
2. The Brothers Karamazov. p. 260, Heineraann edition (1913).
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restorative. This affects the function of the Atonement; it works in 
the universe as the manifest and embodied judgment of God against sin, 
but of this judgment as chastening and regenerative rather than juridical 
and penal. 1 (1)
Similarly in another connection he wrote:
'We may be too fastidious to use the terms "vicarious" and 
"substitutionary", but it is easier to object to the terms than to 
escape the idea they express. 1 (2)
This tendency in Fairbairn was due to his making the same approach which 
Principal Franks has criticised in McLeod Campbell»s and Moberly's statements 
of the doctrine of the Atonement, to wit, that 'these modern doctrines are 
still based on the notion of making sin forgivable, which abstracts from the
personality of the sinner, and so misses the true problem which is to make the
3 
sinner forgivable'. Fairbairn's notion of the death of Christ as a sacrifice,
then, is tied up with his idea that the sacrifice was made for man as corporate 
personality, in the Old Testament sense. Without question Fairbairn expressed 
the idea that the sinless Christ offered Himself as a vicarious sacrifice for 
sinful, corporate mankind, the work of Christ in His death thus being considered 
essentially substitutionary in nature, and satisfying both the love and right- 
eousness of God: the love because the sinner is made so conscious of the 
abysmal awfulness of his sin that he is shown, through Christ, the way of 
recovery and salvation, Christ also providing the 'moral dynamic' (as Fairbairn 
termed it) to effect the recovery; the righteousness, because sin has been
judged in terms of the universal law of God, and so the authority of the
4 
Divine will has been vindicated. In this way Fairbairn clung to the Anselmic
notions of recapitulation and satisfaction, modified, however, by the Protestant 
theology which utilized the idea of public instead of private law. Despite his
1. Place of Christ, p. 482.
2. Philosophy, p. 500.
3. The Atonement, p. 184.
4. 'Salvation is freedom from penalty; ... it is penalty escaped, it is not 
attainment won.. . . Salvation has regard to sin forgiven, penalty remitted, 
to the guilty proclaimed just and justified.' (Sermons, p. 50.)
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assertion that the ways of God to man should be conceived in terms of the 
family, he used here the forensic figure of the law court. Thus, as he himself
said, the death of Christ 'does not mean an expedient for quenching the wrath
1 
of God, or for buying off man from His vengeance 1 : yet the penal as well as
corrective work of God had to be done, penal by vindicating the authority of 
universal law, corrective by burning into the sinner the sense of the awfulness 
of sin and so making him turn away from that sin to the Divine love which is 
freely offered.
Fairbairn stressed the Marcan text, 'The Son of Man came not to be 
ministered unto, but to minister and to give His life a ransom for many' (x, 45) 
as being of central importance in understanding the nature of the saving work 
effected on the Gross. In this connection Fairbairn maintained that in speaking 
of His death as ransom, our Lord was thinking of the efficacy of His death as 
accomplishing the purpose of God. But he used the word not in the sense of 
buying man off from the world or the devil, nor of paying a debt to God or 
making satisfaction to law. The idea rather is that man is enslaved to sin, 
and by His death is rescued (ransomed) from that bondage. Here he followed 
specifically the Abelardian interpretation of the Atonement.
'The "minister" has to seek the person he would save, bear him 
in his own soul, quicken the dead energies of good within him by the 
streams of his own life, burn out the evil of the old manhood by the 
fire of consuming love. . . He is therefore the person whose function 
it is as the way to lead to the Father, as the truth to show the Father, 
as the life to generate, enlarge, and perpetuate on earth the Spirit 
which is of God.' (2)
In Fairbairn's view our Lord thought of His death in terms of 
sacrifice and ransom. But He also considered that His death stood alone, was 
unique: He conceived His Person most highly when foreseeing His death most 
clearly and identified Himself with all the righteousness of the time, even 
as He found within Himself the unified being (as it were) of all the good who
1. Philosophy, p. 500. 2. Ibid, pp. 407, 409.
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are hated of all the evil. Thus once again the theory of recapitulation is 
met in Fairbairn's exposition. Of more significance, however, is his emphasis 
on the uniqueness of the Cross because there is no parallel to it in other 
religions, and in this connection he contrasts particularly the Buddha and the 
Christ. Whereas the Buddha was pessimistic in his world-view, Christ in His 
passion and death was optimistic, showing a faith in the goodness of existence 
by obeying the Divine imperative to rescue it from sin. The Buddha was 
considered as a leader to be imitated; but what Christ did no other can do,
since 'He offers Himself as a sacrifice that He may win eternal redemption for
1 
man'. Again, the Buddha was ascetic: Christ is Redeemer in that His suffering
is curative, since through it He restores human nature to personal and social 
health. Finally, the basis of the Buddha's salvation was a metaphysical 
nihilism: in the world which Christ redeems, however, where man in his own 
degree is as real as God and where God cannot cease being pure nor can man
will himself out of existence, the death of Christ has a singular character in
2 
reconciling the guilty man to the pure and eternal God.
It was pointed out earlier that Fairbairn considered the doctrine 
of the passibility of God essential in his interpretation of Christian theology. 
Especially in explicating the doctrine of the Atonement did he emphasise the 
Divine passibility. If he could assert that 'Patripassianism is only half a 
heresy', his general point of view would carry him much farther into maintaining 
that it is no heresy at all, but the deepest truth about the ways of God in 
relation to the universe. For the Incarnation, passion and death of our Lord 
revealed with pellucid clarity the nature of God and espcially, Fairbairn
1. Philosophy, p. 483.
2. In view of the influence of Hinduism on nineteenth century British thought 
(expressed, for instance, in Schopenhauer and, it may be noted, expressed 
also in New England Transcendentalism, especially in Emerson) and the 
general neo-Hegelian trend, it is of significance that Fairbairn consistently 
stressed personality in God and in man, particularly significant when we 
remember his own idealist bias and his own immersion (so to say) in Indian 
thought.
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pointed out, God's attitude to sin. That attitude he described as one of 
 hate' toward sin, 'the sorrow in the heart of His happiness. . . If He is 
capable of sorrow, He is capable of suffering; and were He without the capacity 
for either, He would be without any feeling of the evil of sin or the misery
of man. The very truth that came by Jesus Christ may be said to be summed up
1 
in the passibility of God'. God suffered, then, not as the Son (and here
Fairbairn differed from Patripassianism), but in Himself, in the sacrifice He 
made by sending His Son into the world. Since it was to judge sin that the 
Son became incarnate, Fairbairn concluded that the purpose of the death of 
Christ was to reveal to man the suffering which sin cost the Father and in 
that way bring man to the sharp awareness of the heinousness of sin,
'an offence so awful in its guilt as to involve the passion of God and 
the death of His Son'. For 'we may ... construe the sufferings and 
death of Christ as if they were the sacraments, or symbols and seals, 
of the invisible passion and sacrifice of the Godhead. 1 (2)
In Fairbairn's system of Christian theology the Cross held a 
central position: for our Lord in His death revealed most clearly His 
consciousness. And in the consciousness of our Lord was to be found, as we 
have noted, the material principle of Christian theology, namely, the Father- 
hood of God. The Fatherhood, however, must always be viewed in direct 
relation with its correlate, the Sovereignty. This double aspect of God's 
nature found its supreme expression in the Cross. The 'why' of the Cross is 
seen by looking at the nature of man. For man was created in God's image, 
and created to be in continuous fellowship with his Creator. But to be created 
man a being capable of attaining character through moral action involved 
giving him freedom of will: and man in the innocence of his freedom sinned,
1. Place of Christ, p. 483.
2 » Philosophy, p. 372; Place of Christ, p. 485. In a sermon he also suggested 
that the idea of suffering in God helps to mitigate the difficulty of under- 
standing suffering in man. 'Trust in God even while He slays only expresses 
the faith that He is in slaying good, that He has gracious ends not other- 
wise attainable, attained so at His pain no less than ours, but so attained 
that our good and His glory may be together furthered and secured.'(Sermons,p.198)
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and thus was estranged from God. God, to win man back into fellowship with 
Himself by the only method consistent with His fatherly nature, became incarnate 
in the Son. In order to redeem mankind, the second Person of the Godhead 
'emptied' Himself, and was made man. As man he constantly taught the Fatherhood 
of God. But especially in His death He revealed the true fatherly nature of 
God, who is Infinite Love, and the actual sinful nature of man, who is potential 
love. By this revelation in His life but most especially on the Cross our 
Lord made possible for all men the salvation which is fellowship with the 
Eternal Father.
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CHAPTER VI. FAIRBAIRN AS CHAMPION OF INDEPENDENT PROTESTANTISM.
A. DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH.
i. The Contemporary Ecclesiastical Situation. 
Fairbairn's account of a personal experience during his travels 
will provide a setting into which to introduce an exposition of his ecclesiology, 
He tells of being in a Roman Catholic Cathedral in Italy and watching 'what was 
conceived to be an act of Christian worship ... going on'. He recounts how 
a procession of priests marched round, carrying a cross on which hung a figure, 
presumably representing our Lord, together with various paraphernalia of
torture. The crowd of priests chanted and genuflected in unison. His reaction
1 
Fairbairn described as follows:
'I could not help saying, in what was not pride but utter 
humiliation of soul, "Your worship is not mine, nor is your God; and 
as for this cross you carry, it speaks rather of the wickedness of the 
men who slew the Saviour than of the grace of Him who saves man by 
His love".' 'There is nothing that fills me with darker horror or 
deeper aversion than the apotheosis of wounds and death which the 
Roman Church offers as its image of Christ.'
The illustration is cited not only to show Fairbairn's complete 
lack of sympathy with Catholicism: his reaction to this act of Roman worship 
really sets forth his whole thesis in regard to the Church. For him the Roman 
and Anglo-Catholic positions as contrasted with that of Independent Protestant- 
ism represent not merely different ecclesiastical systems, but different 
religions, different underlying philosophies, entirely different world-views.
The impassioned and reasoned criticism which Fairbairn levelled 
against Catholicism continuously throughout his active life in the Church 
must be viewed against the background of the historical situation in Britain 
during the Victorian era. The Tractarian movement had passed through its 
first flowering period and its first decline and was again becoming a potent 
power among the so-called 'younger 1 Anglo-Catholics when Fairbairn began his
1. Philosophy, p. 556.
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1 
work in England. The joining of a not inconsiderable group of Anglican
clerics, led by Newman, with the Roman Church had given Roman Catholicism an 
entirely new position in England. Not only had its prestige been greatly 
enhanced, but for the first time in its history (as Fairbairn suggested) it 
became to any extent indigenous to England. The third factor to be taken into 
account is that the long struggle of Nonconformity to attain equal legal status 
with Anglicanism had finally resulted toward the close of the century in the 
removal of most disabilities from Dissenters. Under its new freedom Noncon- 
formity rose to power during the last quarter of the century. Its strength was 
further increased by the fact that the group of capitalists directing the 
rapid spread of industrialism through the English midlands for the most part 
joined Nonconformist Churches. Because of this ascendent Independency, Fairbaim 
(with others) prophesied the end of the Establishment in England and proclaimed 
as the mission of Nonconformity the making of Free Church principles regnant
throughout the land. In an address before the Congregational Union in 1885
2 
Fairbairn said:
1 If we so interpret our mission, then we shall accomplish a 
work that will make it impossible for the sceptre that controls English 
destinies ever to pass into the hands of a disestablished sacerdotal 
church, and we shall help to keep it for ever in the hands of the risen 
and reigning Christ. 1
After making allowance for the igfttoric of peroration, the quotation gives a 
definite indication of the abounding confidence with which Fairbairn defended 
the Independent position. On the basis of his purview of the Church situation 
in England in his day Fairbairn vigorously set forth what he called the 'new 
Puritanism* as opposed to the f new sacerdotalism', and he contended that the 
latter is sensuous and places its emphasis on ecclesiasticism, whereas the
former is spiritual and theological: f the one magnifies the church, the other
3 
magnifies God 1 .
1. Cp. Ch. I, pp. 5 ff.
2. Studies, p. 141.
3. Ibid, p. 128.
146
The fundamental principle on which Fairbairn's entire ecclesiology 
was based was that Congregationalism was vastly more than a Nonconformist 
denomination. In his view the Congregational polity represented the form of 
Church organization which most closely corresponded to the New Testament idea 
of the Church and hence most fully expressed the mind of our Lord in regard to
His society. It will be well to have before us the basic Congregational
1 
principles, as tersely stated by Fairbairn's contemporary, R. W. Dale.
'The Congregational Church most clearly expresses the mind of 
Christ.
'The Congregational idea is permanently rooted in the central 
truths of the Christian revelation.
 The Congregational-polity is at once the highest and most 
natural organization of the Christian Church.'
These principles Fairbairn steadily and consistently promulgated.
ii. The Church and-the Kingdom of God.
»In its most general sense, 1 Fairbairn defined the Church, 'it 
may be described as the society He (i. e., Christ) instituted, and constituted
out of those who through faith in Him were elect unto the life and fellowship 
2
of God.' Our Lord spoke always in terms of the Kingdom, Fairbairn pointed out, 
at the most only twice in terms of the Church. Hence His emphasis was on the 
people who composed the Kingdom, who were members of His society; and He never 
thought in terms of organization. He had nothing at *3.i to say about officials 
or sacramental acts in His society, nor did He make any sacerdotal claim for 
Himself. That is but to say that His primary thought was of persons, and their 
relation to one another and to the living God.
As Fairbairn interpreted the New Testament, our Lord's idea of the 
Kingdom was of a people of God who would live according to the principles 
which He Himself had enunciated in His teaching and demonstrated in His life.
1. Quoted by Albert Peel in Christian Freedom, p. 24,
2. Place of Christ, p. 513.
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These people were to live in accord with the law of love, which simply meant 
that they would act as sons of God because of their love for the Father, and 
that this transcendental love could not but be expressed in love to their
fellows. In Fairbairn's words, 'Love to one's neighbor was but active and
1 
applied love of God.' Hence the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man
were correlative: and Fairbairn held that these twin ideas formed the rock, 
so to say, on which our Lord had planned that His Church was to be built.
The term ecclesia first became current in the thought of the 
Apostles, who conceived the local Church as the incorporation of Christ's idea 
for His society: that is, a local Church was conceived as a brotherhood of 
persons who through faith in Christ became a society of the redeemed. St. 
Paul's conception of the body of Christ, first applied to the local Church to 
suggest the unity of persons which composed it, came to be used also to refer 
to the 11 local Church, to the inter-relation and interdependence of the local 
units. Fairbairn emphasized, however, that each unit was to retain its auton- 
omy, even while having this organic .connection with the whole. In the later 
Epistles, St. Paul conceived Christ as the Head of the Church, thought of in 
universal and ideal terms, the emphasis so.far as its members were concerned 
having fallen on their vocation, f the called', who through embodying what 
Fairbairn called 'social virtues' were to establish the universal and ideal 
society.
Thus Fairbairn maintained that our Lord's idea of the Kingdom was 
realized in the Church of the Apostles. Furthermore, he held that only in the 
sense that the Church is the filial society can it be conceived as continuing 
the Incarnation, since the new humanity in the Church, embodying the 'ideal




2. Place of Christ, p. 529.
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This New Testament idea of the Church, which he held to be the 
basis for all construction in regard to the Church, Fairbairn epitomized as 
follows:
1 (1) As regards material character the Church is the people, 
the society of the sons of God; and (2) as regards formal character 
the Church is described in theocratic, ethical, and social terms, but 
not in sacerdotal or ceremonial.'
iii. Church Polity.
In view of this interpretation of the New Testament Church, 
Fairbairn argued that the claims of neither Roman nor Anglo-Catholicism were 
valid, since both broke away from the primitive Christian conception by empha- 
sizing the sacerdotal ministry and by maintaining that a particular ecclesias- 
tical polity was in a direct line of development with the early Church. 
Catholic doctrine seemed to imply that the clergy and polity constituted the 
Church: but Fairbairn contended that actually the Church (in the New Testament 
interpretation of it) must constitute the clergy and polity,
No polity can claim to be divinely inspired, to have sprung full- 
blown (as it were) from the mind of Christ: thus Fairbairn f s fundamental 
thesis. The principles of historical method must be applied to every Church 
polity: none can claim to be supernatural in origin. Historically viewed, 
then, Fairbairn maintained that the Roman polity had grown up to meet on a 
more equal footing the immense organized power which confronted it. Gradually 
as the Church gained strength and the Roman Empire became decadent, the Church 
vanquished the Empire. The converted Emperor had been Pont if ex Maximus under 
the old regime, for religion and state, and continued thus under the new. 
Thus the polity of the Church became imperial because of the environment in 
which it lived, to the detriment (in the long run) of the Church. Fairbairn 
concluded: 'The name that distinguished the dynasty was the name of Christ: 
but the form under which its power or monarchy was constituted was the form
1. Place of Christ, p. 555.
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of Caesar.* The organization of the Church developed in a sort of opportunis- 
tic way until the fifth and sixth centuries, when the polity was given a 
philosophical basis, largely under the influence (Fairbairn contended) of 
neo-Platonic thought as mediated by St. Augustine, Synesius, and especially 
the Pseudo-Dionysius.
Fairbairn granted that the imperial form of polity may have been 
what was needed during the centuries when the Roman Church created and maintained 
order throughout the world. But as the Church under its monarchical system 
itself became corrupt, it became manifest that it was not adequate to mediate 
the Christian religion. In Christianity the idea of God as revealed by Christ 
was the determinative idea of the religion. When the institution became 
determinative, Fairbairn asserted that 'the centre of gravity is, as it were,
changed; the church experiences a kind of apotheosis, God suffers a sort of
2 
political incarnation 1 . The Reformers attempted to change the centre of
gravity again, back to what it had been in primitive Christianity. That is 
why they propounded their doctrine of the invisible Church.
Fairbairn traced both the Roman doctrine of the visible Church and 
the Reformed doctrine of the invisible Church to the same origin in St. Augus- 
tine. In his theology, Augustine maintained that grace is free and men are 
saved (whether within or without the Church) by the will of God, whereas in his 
ecclesiology grace was made conditional, and salvation dependent on grace as 
communicated through sacraments and priests constituted by the Church. As 
Fairbairn explained the historical development, the Roman Church followed 
St. Augustines ecclesiology; the Reformers, his theology.
The Reformers had first conceived the idea of the invisible Church 
to explain the pre'sence within the Church of men manifestly evil: but these
1. Catholicism, p. 184.
2. Ibid, p. 201.
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men, they had argued (according to Fairbairn f s interpretation of the history) 
were members of the visible, not the invisible Church. Only persons redeemed 
by the free grace of God, only men justified by faith, belonged to the people 
of God: and these, as-members in Christ's Kingdom, formed the invisible Church.
The Reformers 1 arguments against the Roman idea of one Holy 
Catholic Apostolic Church Fairbairn presented in these terms. To say, *I 
believe in the Holy Catholic Church 1 means that the Church cannot be merely an 
ecclesia sensibilis. since the objects of faith are invisible.
 God who loves, Christ who saves, the Spirit which renews the 
soul, are unseen^ unseen, too, is the soul they love and save and renew, 
and unseen the society constituted of God out of this and all the other 
souls He has saved.' (1)
Furthermore the Church is not one, since divided into many sects; nor Catholic, 
since Roman; nor holy, since ruled by sinful men; nor yet Apostolic, since its 
political and sacerdotal organization is a far remove from the primitive Church. 
Finally, man can be saved only by the free grace of God, and that grace can 
never be bound to one institution.
Nonetheless, the Reformers did not give up the idea of the visible 
Church: for Fairbairn maintained that for them visible and invisible Church 
were related as body and soul, each necessary to the other. Now this conception 
of the visible-invisible Church, Fairbairn argued, more nearly than any other 
incorporated the primitive Churstian society's idea of polity. The modern
polity which was determined by this conception but stemming, like it, in the
2 
primitive Christian society, was the Congregational polity of Independent
Protestantism.
Historically speaking, there were three steps to what Fairbairn
considered the ideal Church polity: from the Roman to the Lutheran to the
3 
Congregational. About the first he wrote:
1. Place of Christ, p. 545. 3. Philosophy, p. 564.
2. The word should really be written with a small letter, since Fairbairn was 
oot thinking primarily of the denomination, but of the ideal polity.
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'The Church which survived the Roman Empire was an assemblage of 
new ideas and of ancient customs that had proved their suitability to 
human nature by living in many religions and surviving many changes of 
culture and belief5 and though it may have helped to preserve the 
Christian religion, yet it was at the expense of its higher ethical 
and finer spiritual qualities. 1
The Lutheran polity with its emphasis on justification by faith was sounder 
theologically, but not socially, since failing dismally to give adequate 
emphasis to the doctrine of the brotherhood of man. Only in the Congregational 
form of polity, after the long struggle of Independency to establish itself, 
had the ideal of the primitive society been regained, for in its democratic 
government the brotherhood of man was assumed to be the only possible expression 
of the Fatherhood of God. As Fairbairn conceived it, the movement toward 
realizing the ideal polity had been cyclic, so to say, for the polity of the 
early Christian society had been Congregational.
'And so it is but what was to be expected when we find that 
the men nearest to Him, who best understood His mind, his own disciples 
and apostles, followed the Congregational way. 1 (1)
From the outlook of his idea of the primitive Church and his 
historical survey, Fairbairn considered the Jour principal types of possible 
Church polity: the Monarchical, either absolute as in the Roman Church or 
limited as in the Anglican; and the Republican, oligarchical as in the Presby- 
terian Church or democratic (or communal) as in the Congregational. Of the 
Republican forms of polity, he considered the Congregational superior to the 
Presbyterian, since the latter is governed by a spiritual aristocracy made up 
of its ministers and elders, whereas in the former governing powers are not 
delegated but exercised by all the people as a body. The Papal Church, and in 
a modified sense the Anglican, could continue only in a feudal state: in a 
democracy the only polity which can endure is the Republican, which rests 
solidly on the will of the people on the one hand, on the other upon the will
1. City of God, p. 277.
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of God.
Fairbairn contended, then, that the Catholic polity neither met the 
needs of the people nor continued the primitive Christian tradition, since
according to his argument the whole neo Catholic movement was based on presuppo-
1 
sitions drawn from Patristic thought. He maintained that actually the idea
2 
of the   Divine right of episcopacy 1 or papacy had been made of no account by
historical criticism, and that the study of the early Church form of government 
revealed that the only ties binding the Churches together were fraternal, never
in any sense hierarchical. No man in the early Church, whatever his position,
3 
was considered a primate: final authority was always vested in the whole
people, although of course men were appointed by the Church (i. e., the people) 
to exercise a limited authority for the maintenance of order. But nothing 
could be more obvious, in Fairbairn* s view, than that the early Christian 
society had a Republican organization, since it was democratic or communal in 
form.
The Establishment of Anglicanism was an incidental factor in his 
more general criticism of Monarchical polity, an 'accident 1 , which he thought 
was destined soon to be set right. He did not think of the Established Church 
as the National Church, of which he insisted the Nonconformist Churches (or, 
as he preferred to call them, the ' Free Churches of Jesus Christ') were an 
integral part: after the disestablishment he saw the Anglican and Nonconformist 
Churches standing on a more or less equal footing, and then his concern was
1. Forsyth suggested that Fairbairn 'did much to rescue English thought from 
Patristic obsession', (op. cit.» p. 2.) All of Fairbairn's arguments were 
supported with considerable documented historical data, based on the vast 
amount of research done during the century in the field of Patristic thought.
2. Studies, p. 168.
3. Fairbairn maintained that the evidence of authentic contemporary literature 
is 'altogether against both the primacy and Roman episcopacy of Peter. The 
question is capable of being argued only when tradition is introduced. And 
the tradition, though ancient, is neither apostolic nor primitive can, 
indeed, hardly be placed earlier than a century after the event, though it 
soon becomes uniform and general. The case is arguable, but it is no more. 1 
(Catholicism, p. 179.)
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that the predominant English Church should become non-sacerdotal. In regard to 
the Establishment he held that whenever religion is made a matter of civil law, 
when man is religious rather as a citizen of a state than as a son of God (so 
to speak), as in Rome both before and after it was conquered by Christianity 
or in England, then religion becomes a matter of conformity and not of personal 
conviction. Hence it loses its power as a regenerative influence on man as 
individual or on society as a whole. For this reason he considered disestab- 
lishment important, since in his view the Established Church, because bound to 
the State, was not free to preach the Gospel of Christ, especially in its social 
implications. Yet working for this end was secondary for him, whereas crusading 
against the Catholic (Roman and Anglican) polity and sacerdotalism was of 
primary concern, since these were interfering with the proclamation of Christ's 
essential Gospel to the people of England. Thus he kept reiterating that the 
basic grounds for dissent were religious rather than political.
YWe dissent because we believe that she. (i. e., the Church of 
England) fails adequately to interpret and realize for the people of 
England the religion of Christ.' (1)
Fairbairn's idea of Church polity, then was grounded in a marked 
religious individualism. It seemed obvious to him that the Congregational 
polity of all modern polities most closely coincided with the organization 
of the early Christian societies and hence, he insisted, with the mind of 
Christ. This conviction was further strengthened try his belief that the early 
Christian societies could best be compared in their polity (as the very name 
ecclesiae suggested) to the free Greek city states, where ideally each person
had an equal share in the responsibility of governing and in the opportunity
2 
of carrying forward the work of the Church. Thus he concluded that the
1. Studies, p. 5.
2. Fairbairn pointed out that the Apostolic writers in their use of theperm 
ecclesia blended the classical (i. e., as used in reference to the Greek 
free city states) and Hellenistic meanings. The makers of the Septugint 
he maintained, had applied the Hellenistic meaning (concluded on next page)
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Congregational polity, ideally and not denominationally considered, is 
established on the belief that
'.as instituted by Christ and as administered by Christian men, it is 
designed to be the most flexible and educative of polities, the least 
capable of being perverted from spiritual and ethical to formal and 
interested ends'. (1)
B. CHRISTIAN WORSHIP.
i. The Ministry; Sacerdotal and Non-sacerdotal in its 'Orders'.
Fairbairn was as militantly opposed to a sacerdotal ministry as to 
the Monarchical form of Church polity, and the two, although not necessarily 
connected, were (he held) usually conjoined. He defined sacerdotalism as the 
limiting of the action of God's grace to a particular channel. That is to 
say, according to the sacerdotal claim, the grace of God can be mediated only 
through a ministry which is specially constituted by the Church through its 
bishops, who stand in Apostolic succession. Furthermore, the Sacraments are
held to be 'the means necessary for the creation and maintenance of spiritual
2 
life 1 . Thus the sacerdotal 'orders' are considered essential to the being
of the Anglican Church.
Against this claim Fairbairn defended with great vigour what he 
considered the historic Protestant position, that worship, to be Christian, 
must be wholly non-sacerdotal. Any trace of sacerdotalism contaminates 
Christian worship with the pre-Christian notion that man can take the initia- 
tive in the Divine-Human relationship, and that God is a Being whose mind can 
be changed or whose wrath can be propitiated by the acts of men. But the very 
genius of Christianity, he contended, was that it did away with all sacerdotal-
(continued from previous page)
of ecclesia in the Bible when they used the word to translate the Hebrew 
Kahal, the people in the sense of their corporate being as the holy nation, 
the elect of God.
1. Studies, pp. 143-4.
2. Ibid, p. 121. Fairbairn here was referring particularly to Anglicanism, 
and based his interpretation primarily on the writings of Liddon, Lightfoot 
and Gore.
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ism by making Christ the sole institution of worship, and »in forming and
1 
founding this institution ... the initiative was God's and not man's 1 .
In the light of the New Testament interpretation of the Church, 
then, Fairbairn argued that the sacerdotal point of view cannot be sustained, 
since there is not a trace of sacerdotalism in the New Testament idea of the 
Christian society. In fact the New Testament writers were studiously careful 
to reinterpret into their spiritual meaning any sacerdotal ideas which might 
have been carried over from Judaism. Thus Fairbairn maintained that there is 
no suggestion in the New Testament that any of the men chosen to represent the 
new faith were ever named priests, or were ever designated to carry out priestly 
functions. Ministers were considered neither necessary to the being of a 
Church nor as intermediaries, but as preachers, teachers, and distributors of 
beneficences. In fact the basic idea of the new religion was that man could 
approach God directly, and that in this sense each individual worshipper was 
himself the priest.
'Where all men, by virtue of their faith and common brotherhood 
in Christ, become priests as He is Priest, the priesthood has ceased 
to be an office or an order, and become the synonym of Christian manhood, 
the symbol of the great truth that the reign of official mediators is 
over, that man and God are now intended to stand face to face as Father 
and son. 1 (2)
In this emphasis on the priesthood of all believers, Fairbairn but re-asserted 
the faith of the Reformers, who (he maintained) had risen to power in their 
effort to throw off from the Church the trammels of two 'heathen' influences, 
one sacerdotal and the other, as noted above, political.
To make the transmission of grace dependent on the mediation of 
a human priest is radically opposed to the New Testament idea of the Church: 
such was the contention of historic Puritanism and of Fairbairn's so-called 
'new' Puritanism. 'God has bound His grace to one Person,' he wrote, 'and to
1. Philosophy, p. 562.
2. Studies, p. 160.
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one Person alone, in the whole history of man.' Fairbairn's fundamental 
argument, then, was that New Testament Christianity is established on one
basic principle; 'the way of the soul to the Father and the Father to the soul
2
must be open, common, free.' When a Church endeavours to limit the universal- 
ity of Divine grace to the mediation of sinful man, it is vitiating this 
cardinal Christian principle.
The development of sacerdotalism in the tradition of the Church 
thus cannot be considered as the evolution of factors latent in primitive 
Christianity, but due to superadded accretions drawn from the environment. To 
support this thesis Fairbairn pointed out that before the beginning of the 
third century the Church had not been contaminated with sacerdotalism: the
emphasis was religious-moral, as it had been in the primitive Christian society.
3 
The prevailing ideal was stated in one sentence by Fairbairn.
'Christ was no priest, appointed no man a priest, erected no 
temple, established no ritual, laid down no law of sacrifice, enjoined 
no sacrifice but the sacrifice of clean hands and a pure heart, a holy 
and noble life unto God.'
When the third century opened, however, Tertullian in Africa
described the bishop as summus sacerdos; 'Hippolytus in Italy claims for
4 
himself, as successor of the Apostles, the high-priesthood'j and Origen in
Alexandria suggests the similarity between Christian ministers and the ancient 
priests and Levites. In the middle of the century Cyprian firmly established
the foreign sacerdotal tendency by giving the clergy 'appropriate sacrificial
4 
functions and intercessory duties'. Henceforth sacerdotalism had a permanent
place within the Church and grew rapidly. Fairbairn maintained that both 
Neander and Ritschl were correct in the reasons they gave for the entrance of 
sacerdotalism into Christianity: Neander, in pointing out that the priesthood
1. Studies, p. 126.
2. Ibid, p. 128.
3. Religion in History, p. 182.
4. Catholicism, pp. 171, 172.
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was carried over directJy from Judaism; Ritschl, in holding that it was allowed 
a.place in the new religion because Gentiles could not understand a non- 
sacerdotal religion. The entrance of the sacerdotal element into Christianity 
but signalized the victory of the old religions over the religion of Christ, 
and for this reason Fairbairn believed that in contending against sacerdotalism 
in religion he was but urging the return of 'Christianity to Christ'.
A sacerdotal ecclesiology further contradicts what Fairbairn held 
to be the basic tenet of religion, namely, that man is religious by nature and 
that God has revealed Himself to every man. To maintain that God's presence 
can be revealed only through a particular Church or a particular sacrament is 
but to maintain that humanity has been 'forsaken* by God. God is no longer 
conceived as the majestic Sovereign of man, but as One whose activity can be
determined and limited by imperfect man. Thus in one of his articles directed
1 
against neo-Catholicism he wrote:
f lt (i. e., the Anglican ideal of worship) doubted the presence 
of God in humanity, the activity and reality of His grace outside the 
limits of a constituted church, and apart from sacramental persons, 
instruments and symbols. It doubted the sanity of the reason He had 
given, thought that this reason had so little affinity with its Maker 
as to be ever tending away from Him, its bent by nature being from God 
rather than to God. And so it was possessed of the great fear that the 
reason, freed from the authority and guardian care of an organized 
and apostolic church, i. e., clergy, would infallibly break from the 
control of His law and His truth.'
This general line of argument Fairbairn utilized particularly in 
his polemics against Newman. If we allow Newman's contention (Fairbairn argued) 
that there are but two alternatives open to man, Atheism or Roman Catholicism, 
 man is led either by his conscience to infallible authority or by his intel- 
lect to Atheism, it follows that man's nature is divided and conscience is 
pitted against reason. As we have already seen, however, Fairbairn had implicit 
faith in the power of reason to establish theism on an impregnable basis, and 
from that position he. could not be moved. Not only can the reason establish 
1. Catholicism, p. 57.
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the natural proof for God's existence, but this is the only proof which can 
have universal validity. Hence Fairbairn steadily maintained that Newman's
argument for the authority of the Church and against reason was not only
1 
basically unsound, but led Newman into the 'purest individualism'.
The ministry, then, in Fairbairn f s view, must always be conceived
in terms strictly non-sacerdotal. The minister is a prophet, and he can in
2 
no wise ever be considered a priest. The collective society (i. e., the Church)
has a priestly function inasmuch as it, as the body of Christ, continues His 
work. But this function of the Church cannot be delegated to the individual 
minister, and the attempt to invest him with sacerdotal duties has but caused 
the ministry to deteriorate, since Fairbairn held that with a sacerdotal 
clergy the chief attention was paid to the office and not to the man. The 
function of the ministry is prophetic, and as such its method is that of 
persuasion, which Fairbairn thought one of the most distinctive things about
the religion of Christ. 'It comes and appeals to reason, it speaks to intellect,
3 
it tries to persuade spirit. 1
Fairbairn's conception of the ministry may be summarized in several 
propositions. It must be personal, not official, since 'the man does not
become sacred by virtue of the office, but the office is sanctified by the
4 
man 1 . The minister is placed in his position by the act of God, and is
responsible only to Him. The only priesthood possible to him comes from him- 
self, since he, as one of its members, is an organic part of the Church. His
ideal should be 'to act and think and speak as if in him Jesus Christ really
5 
lived, and was once more serving God by saving man'.
1. Catholicism, p. 130.
2. When speaking of the minister leading his people in prayer, however, he 
said that the minister 'stands in their place and pleads in their name 
before God'. (Studies, p. 274.)
3. Religion in History, pp. 189-90.
4. Studies, p. 417.
5. Ibid, p. 418.
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In taking its resolute stand for a non-sacerdotal ministry, 
Independent Protestantism in England during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, with Fairbairn as one of its leaders, re-affirmed with power the 
historic Protestant position: that each individual should have f the right to
worship God as the reason knew Him, and the conscience honoured Him, and the
1 
heart loved Him 1 . And in this crusade against sacerdotalism Fairbairn thought
of himself as in the van of theological thought and ecclesiastical life.
ii. The Word of the Gospel and the Sacrament.
For the continuance of the visible Church, Fairbairn maintained
2 
that only two 'elements' are necessary: the Word of the Gospel and the Sacrament.
The Word as contained in the New Testament is the authoritative Gospel, 
authoritative because through it the revelation of God in Christ is mediated to 
modern man. Thus Fairbairn held that the Word is the living link between the 
primitive and contemporary Church, between the mind of Christ as interpreted by 
the Apostles and present-day men. The Word of the Gospel is the basis for 
preaching, and preaching is the central nerve of the Church. For even as praise 
and prayer are the ways in which man speaks to God, so preaching in Fairbairn ! s 
judgment is the medium through which God speaks to man. The sermon, as Fairbairn 
expressed the idea,
'ought to come as the response of God to the cry of man, as the uprising 
of His light upon those who are sitting in darkness, half inclined to 
fear that the dawn might never come.' (3)
Fairbairn was insistent that not the Eucharist (or in Roman Churches 
the moment of consecrating or elevating the Host) but the sermon was the supreme 
act of Christian worship. No act of ritual could have the significance of the 
sermon for him, since he considered that hearing it exercised the intellect,
1. Studies, p. 59.
2. In this connection Fairbairn speaks of Sacraments, that is, in the plural. 
Actually he never mentions Baptism in all his writing, except when it happens 
to come into his historical surveys. For this reason only the Eucharist 
will be considered in this section.
3. Studies. P- 276.
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whereas participation in ritual all too often but dulled the mental faculties. 
His authority for thus making the preaching of the Word the central act of 
worship he drew from our Lord's example: for he maintained that our Lord 
Himself was pre-eminently teacher and preacher, and similarly the Apostles by 
His explicit command were primarily preachers. The theme of their preaching 
was Jesus Christ and Him crucified. The reason to Fairbairn seemed apparent: 
they were seeking to exhibit truth, not in its manifold aspects, but in a
 splendid focus 1 where all its rays converged, as it were, in a 'point of
1 
living light, which they termed the Christ'. They were seeking to engender
among their hearers faith in a Person, and thus the people who listened were to 
enter the Kingdom of Truth. And their method was always that of persuasion.
»
Hence it is the minister not as priest but as prophet, as preacher, who is 
significant as an emissary of our Lord: the inspired man who, as Fairbairn
expressed it, 'sees and knows the truth which is God's', 'the man who can sendi
forth winged words bearing the quickening truth of God, who has done most to
2 
conserve religion, enlarge and refine the Church and uplift man. 1
The Sacrament of the Eucharist (as such) is not a peculiar means 
of salvation, in Fairbairn's conception of it. He considered it as a symbol 
which expresses the relation between the 'people of God 1 and Christ, their
common Head, at the same time binding these people into a brotherhood. It
3 
is a   condition of higher fellowship, a means of communion'. To make the
Eucharist the solitary channel for God's grace and thus to place into the hands 
of sinful men, considered as priests, the power to give or to withhold such 
grace is a veritable travesty of the Gospel, according to Fairbairn's convic- 
tion: for he kept insisting that the most determinative idea in the New 
Testament is that grace is free- to all men and that it would be wholly impossible
1. Studies, p. 24.
2. Ibid, p. 418, and Life, p. 209.
3. Philosophy, p. 561, Fairbairn thought of the Eucharist as a means to estab- 
lish communion between Christ as High Priest and man. (Concluded on next page)
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to conceive of that grace being controlled by any Church or by any man because 
he happened to hold a certain position. Even to imagine that it might be 
possible so to confine it resulted inevitably in the conception of a limited
God who was not Sovereign but 'whose working men condition, whose mercies they
1 
circumscribe, whose grace they regulate and distribute 1 .
Christian worship, then, and the Church itself (Fairbairn ever and 
again stressed) should always be conceived as a means, never as an end in 
itself. The goal toward the attaining of which the Church is the means is 
manifest: that men shall be formed in the image of Christ, that its members 
shall be made so vividly aware of the living God that they will carry into 
action in the world the spirit and principles of our Lord, making that spirit
w
and those principles determinative for all their relations with their fellows.
C. THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS SOCIAL IDEAL.
i. Religion and Morality.
In his polemics against Catholicism Fairbairn roundly said that 
worship and the Church is never an end in itself, but primarily a means to 
the attainment of one goal, the development of moral man and a moral society. 
Later he modified this extreme position, and stated that the function of worship 
is to 'qualify man to fulfil the divine purpose'. Looked at in this light,
worship has an ultimate and a proximate end, the former being the glory of God,
2 
the latter fto form the good man, but this is conceived as the way to that'.
His general contention was that faith and morality are indissolubly
conjoined, and that faith cannot but express itself in moral action. As he
3 
stated the idea in a sermon:
'The religious man must be moral, the man who is really moral in
(continued from previous page)
Curiously enough, he did not consider this communion as worship of God, but 
only preparation for such worship.
1. Place of Christ, p. 548.
2. philosophy. PP. 563-4. 3. Sermons, p. 186.
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being and action must be religious. Religion is the manifestation of 
morality; morality the incarnation, the manifestation in the flesh of 
religion.'
The notion that religion had nothing to do with morality he considered pagan. 
That it is nothing but morality he held to be completely false and a view most 
representative of eighteenth century rationalism. In this emphasis on morality 
as an integral part of the Christian organism, Fairbairn repudiated the position 
of Kant, who tended to make of faith but an appendage to morality; nor did he 
follow the Ritschlian modification of the Kantian position.
One of the chief reasons for Fairbairn's mordant criticism of any 
sacerdotalism in religion was that he considered that inevitably a stress on 
the sacerdotal involved a neglect of the moral outworking of religion. When 
the sacerdotal is emphasized, he asserted time and again, worship deteriorates 
into the giving of a quid pro quo; and ethical implications are lost in the 
sensuous ritual of the cultus. He illustrated this principle from Hinduism, 
in which the ethical emphasis of its early stages was sloughed off when an 
official priesthood developed; similarly in ancient Greece, where morality was 
the concern only of philosophy, not of the sacerdotal religion; in the same way 
the ethical standard in Rome came from the Stoics, not from the official state 
religion which was dominated by priests; even in Judaism the prophets in making 
their ethical demands of Israel had to combat the influence of the priests.
Although Fairbairn pointed out that early religion when most
domestic and least official was the 'most lucid, imperative and impressive in
1 
its ethical teaching', his main contention in this respect was that in Christ
faith and morality had first been bound together, at least morality considered 
not so much as external law as internal motivation. For Fairbairn argued that 
even as our Lord superseded Levitical Judaism by Himself being the High Priest
1. Philosophy, p. 559,
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and only Mediator, so He also superseded the Rabbinic legalism by Himself 
becoming the ethical ideal for those who believed in Him. Religion and morality 
become one in Christ because God as revealed in Christ is the Holy God, the 
Father who is completely moral in all His relations: Fairbairn then maintained 
that since religion is but the relation between God and man, the relation itself 
must be a moral one (and hence not to be sustained by ceremonialism). And if 
the relation between God and man be real it cannot but result, since itself 
moral, in moral relations with fellow human beings.
Christianity in becoming a universal religion at the same time of 
necessity became social: from this fundamental tenet Fairbairn developed his 
Christian social ethics. For in his view it was an inherent necessity of the 
Christian Gospel to shake off the localizing trammels which would have restricted 
it to one people. Christ's Gospel was both ideal and universal, and was for 
man as man. As the Gospel was interpreted by the early Apostles, it could not 
but become missionary. For Fairbairn maintained that our Lord revealed to 
every man (regardless of race or position) his sonship to God, thus giving him 
a new sense of human dignity, a sense of the value of the individual before God 
and so before all men.
'Hence the Christian idea created two novel notions as to man: the 
value of the unit and the unity of the race.' If, then, 'Christ be 
rightly interpreted, the worst sins against God are those most injurious 
to man. 1 (1)
These principles, entirely new in the world at the time of Christ, 
were not only implied but made explicit in the Gospel, as Fairbairn interpreted 
it: for our Lord consciously held a social ideal and taught (at least by 
example) a social method. The social ideal was tersely described in the twin 
commandment, love (and hence obedience) to God, which found inevitable further 
expression in love (and hence fulfilment of duty) to fellow man. The social 
1. Philosophy, pp. 544, 565.
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method was that of making disciples: the constraint of love for Christ changes
the man and thus changes the environment. The method involved 'teaching men
1 
to become like Himself'. The ideal and method taken together became the »law'
for the Kingdom and hence determinative for the new society which is the Church: 
Christ's people are to become ethical as the articulation (so to say) of 
Himself, and so become in very truth the Body of Christ.
Although Fairbairn insisted that the Christian religion is nothing 
if not ethical, he also pointed out that its morality is not that of a positive 
religion which sets forth a number of laws to be obeyed, as it tended to 
become, however, in the Roman Church. Rather is Christianity based on loyalty 
to a Person who as idea and ideal governs man's reason and conscience, the 
transcendental idea of Christ as the Incarnate Son of God, who is at the same
>
time the embodied ideal, as it were, of humanity.
ii. Christianity and Social Action.
The humanitarian emphasis of the eighteenth century had been carried 
along with the rationalist approach to religion. During the Victorian era this 
humanitarianism became more definitive and gradually changed the stress of the 
Church from individual to social salvation. The recovery of the Historical 
Jesus influenced the Church to re-interpret the Gospel, and in the re-interpre- 
tation the social implications of the Christian proclamation (so it was thought) 
were discovered to be integral to it. 7?hat the Church in its course through 
history had lost and needed to recapture, it was said, was the 'Christianity of 
Christ 1 , a catch-phrase which supposedly pointed to the social implications as 
a definite part of the message of our Lord.
Seeley in his Ecce Homo argued that the essential part of our Lord's 
message, both in word and action, was its humanitarianism; and Jesus Himself 
was delineated as a socialist. The corporate solidarity of society came to be
1. Philosophy, p. 527.
165
stressed: it is saved or lost as a unit. 'Nobody can be saved from society,
1 
he must be saved with it.' Fairbairn in general followed this tendency of
2 
his times. His point of view is expressed in one sentence.
'It (i. e., Christian salvation) is not finished when a man is 
forgiven, or has obtained peace with God; it is completed only when 
Christ is all and in all that is, when humanity has been built up in 
all its parts and regulated in all its relations by the ideal of love 
and sonship that had lived from eternity in the bosom of God.'
Most probably a cardinal motive for Fairbairn's impassioned 
criticism of Catholicism, Roman and Anglican, stemmed from his profound 
conviction that the Catholic revival in the nineteenth century and the Estab- 
lishment of the Anglican Church were the responsible factors for the widespread 
disbelief in England during his time. His reiterated emphasis was that the 
causes of this disbelief were not primarily intellectual, but moral. It did 
not spring directly from Christianity itself, but from the Churches which
failed to preach and teach the religion of Christ and were chiefly interested
5 
in maintaining their 'vested and conventional respectabilities'. At the very
moment (it seemed to Fairbairn) when the Evangelical Revival had brought the 
religious temper in England to a white heat and had prepared the way for 
Christianity really to make giant strides toward attaining its ideal of a 
social brotherhood whose roots were religious, a resurgent sacerdotalism swept 
from the Churches all religious reality, which the Revival actually had re- 
captured. The Established Church, moreover, had severed itself from the life 
of the people, and hence had forfeited the right to exist as the visible 
embodiment of Christ's Kingdom on earth.
This isolation from the people was especially marked, Fairbairn 
argued, in the Church's failure to identify itself with the new and increasingly 
complicated problems of the working man as the factory spread over the indus-
1. McGiffert, op. cit., p. 277. I owe the reference to Ecce Homo to McGiffert. 
The phrase, 'the Christianity of Christ', which Fairbairn used liberally in 
his writing (with the above connotation) may have come into nineteenth 
century jargon from Saint Simon, who used it in his last work.
2. Religion in History, p. 254. 3. Ibid, p. 18.
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trial midlands. The conditions of the working classes, in fact, was the 
problem for the whole point of view defended by Fairbairn; for what of the 
evolutionary doctrine of progress, born in the eighteenth century and carefully 
fostered through the nineteenth, which clearly was shown to be working itself 
out in action by the general increase of wealth and comfort? Yet even if man 
demonstrably was growing better assuredly he was not a fallen but a 'rising 1 
creature and if his social life was improving with him, the condition of the 
working classes obviously was getting worse. This problem, while only slightly 
tempering the buoyant optimism of the century, was probably the chief stimulus 
for the growth of the modern social conscience, as it developed under the 
nurture of such men as Robert Owen and the Christian Socialists. Fairbairn 
himself, while opposed to Socialism as such, worked vigorously at the articula- 
tion of the problem and always insisted that the task of the Church was to aim 
at its solution.
The problem was not to be solved by organizing evangelistic missions 
for working people, Fairbairn dryly pointed out. Nor was the answer to be 
found in the philanthropy which had interpreted our Lord's monition for brother- 
ly love wholly in terms of charity, a situation which had also obtained in the 
pre-Reformation Church. Fairbairn 1 s contention was that in the light of the 
Christian Gospel, man must be viewed as man and hence that all men must be 
treated as essential equals before God and also before their fellows. Striving 
for justice must thus supplant the giving of charity; and since the Gospel 
clearly has economic implications, the Church must work for the attainment of
economic justice*
Without doubt Fairbairn with his confidence in the essential
1 
goodness of man believed in a social reform 'from above rather than below*
1. In his system of theology, it will be remembered, Fairbairn stated that the 
Cross convinced man of the awfulness of sin, rather than convicting him of 
the awfulness of his sin.
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(in McGifferVs phrase), that the privileged classes could be persuaded to give 
up their economic advantages in the interests of establishing social justice 
and more equal rights among men. For that reason he placed his faith in 
stimulating friendly co-operation between Capital and Labour as the method to 
achieve economic justice. 'Were the Christian idea of brotherhood made a living
and governing idea, our gravest industrial problems either were solved or
1 
would never have been propounded.'
Possibly Fairbairn*s general method of approach to social problems 
can be indicated by summarily stating his attitude to one of them: poverty. 
Naturally he pointed out that a land's true wealth is to be measured by the 
area of its distribution, not by the amount concentrated in a few hands. But 
he held that the Church had a very specific responsibility in regard to this 
problem.
'Men have a right to expect that religion, as Christian religion, 
shall cure poverty, shall make the charity that is at once the luxury 
of the rich and the misery of the poor, cease; shall bring a time when 
wealth, equally distributed, shall create the happiest of civil and 
social and secular states.' (2)
But what shall be the method of the Church? For Fairbairn the 
principle always held that religion must save the individual, and the individual 
then will work to redeem society. Thus if a man is possessed by the Spirit of
Christ, f the miserable greed that can make money out of the poverty or destitu-
3 
tion of man is not only impossible, but unholy and abominable 1 . Clearly if
religion and morality are integral to each other, it must be the task of the 
Church to show that faith and conduct cannot be held separate. The task of the 
Church is the redemption of mankind, and to Fairbairn it seemed obvious that 
such redemption included the creation in society of conditions making for moral 
and physical health in each individual. If we can judge by our Lord's attitude
1. Studies, p. 98.
2. Religion in History, pp. 177-8.
3. Ibid, p. 263.
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toward moral and physical sickness, Fairbairn argued, this is plainly part of 
the purpose of God, and the task of the Church is not finished 'while one soul 
remains outside the ends of God; and outside His ends every soul lives who loves 
sin more than his Maker*. But the very point Fairbairn made so forcibly was 
that social sin in many instances made such individual 'love of sin' almost 
inevitable, and hence the Church must strike at the roots of that sin in 
society. The Church, moreover, should not seek to save the sinner 'for his
own sake merely, but for the sake of the God that made him, and made him to be
2 
good, and means him still to become what He made him to be 1 .
But with all his emphasis on the social implications of the Christian 
Gospel, Fairbairn was essentially individualistic in his approach to social 
problems. As he saw it, the cardinal task of the Church is so to surcharge 
individuals with the moral dynamic which is the love of Christ that they will 
be religious men in their offices and trades; and to break down class barriers 
by bringing together men from various groups into the fellowship of the Church. 
He also maintained that all forces working for social amelioration, if not held 
under the aegis of the Church where they originated, lose their essential 
power: for 'Christ created the idea of humanity (and hence, Fairbairn would
say, of humanitarianism), and divorced from Him it is but a bastard idea, at
3 
once emasculated and depraved 1 . Whatever the specific form of social action,
 prison reform, rehousing schemes for the poor, the distribution of wealth,_ 
all
'need to be gathered into an organic whole, into a living structure, 
placed in relation to a great throbbing centre. You cannot have sporadic, 
dismembered, isolated Christian forces, walking up and down the land 
doing their work; you must bring all into unity, you must centre, con- 
verge, weld them into the great central thought, into the mighty living 
organism. Without Christ, without the Eternal Father, without the living
1. Studies, p. 451.
2. City of God, p. 275.
5. Religion in History, p. 258.
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Saviour and the living God, they are impotent, destined to slow, 
inevitable death.' (1)
This attitude of Fairbairn is of especial interest in view of the regret often 
expressed that the Church has not retained its hold over what have become the 
'lost provinces of religion' and in view of the fact that in the past few 
decades (it is generally recognized) many of the Churches in placing particular 
emphasis on the 'social gospel' have tended to become sociological and hence 
secular rather than distinctively Christian in their approach.
 
iii. The Kingdom of God.
Fairbairn's theology found its culmination in the concept of the 
Kingdom of God. He conceived it essentially in Ritschlian terms, that is, the 
Kingdom was founded and personally exemplified by our Lord and is gradually 
to be established in history. There is just a trace of Utopianism in his
notion of the ideal City of God which is realizable: 'though it ever retreats
2 
it is yet being ever approached'. In his concept of the Kingdom there is
also something of the evolutionary idea of a teleological process in history 
which realizes itself, so to speak. Yet essentially his idea is that man must 
achieve the Kingdom; and as he struggles toward attainment, the ameliorative 
forces incarnate within the ideal effect a beneficent influence on all condition 
in society: political, intellectual, moral and religious. In Fairbairn's view 
this ideal is unique to Christianity: the notion of a 'divine society, humanity
organized into a city or state that should perfectly express and realize the
3 
will of God . . . has no parallel in any religion or system of antiquity'.
1. Religion in History, p. 258. 2. Studies, p. 143.
3. Religion in History, p. 162. Fairbairn held that the parables of the 
Kingdom were spoken by Jesus to illustrate the social ideal in the new 
religion he instituted. In this connection he mentions especially the 
parables of the 'second period'; the tares, the mustard seed, the leaven, 
the hidden treasure, the pearl of great price, the net cast into the sea.
Professor Taylor'a reference to the tendency to emphasize these 
parables is of interest: 'Even the most strictly orthodox divines of that 
generation habitually think of the establishment of the Kingdom of God 
itself by preference in terms of the parables of the (concluded on next page)
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In this interpretation of the Kingdom of God, Fairbairn was carried 
in the predominant idealist current of thought of his generation. This idealism
'was above all things concerned to find within this world, within the 
life of the family, of the State, of secular civilization, those 
religious values which had so often been thought of as belonging to 
another world than this where "they neither marry nor are given in 
marriage" and as manifested in this world only or chiefly through 
institutions whose authority and sanctions were supernatural. . . ' (1)
From this general line of thought, too, came the tendency to conceive eternal 
life in terms of a quality of living which can be attained here and now, rather
than in terms of duration of life beyond the earth years. Fairbairn stressed
2 
this 'nowness' of eternal life in certain instances, as when he wrote:
'What does not make the most of man for time and of time for 
man will not make the best of his eternity. Eternity is now; the man 
who is, is man the immortal, and the aim of religion ought to be to 
realize the ideal of God in every man and in all his relations.'
This idealist bias is seen in Fairbairn »s apparent lack of concern 
for the Christian eschatology and his neglect of portions of the Gospel records
which are manifestly eschatological, in his emphasis on the Cross but lack of
3 
it on the Resurrection, in his failure to consider the doctrine of immortality
4 
in his dogmatic theology, in his whole approach to Christian social ethics.
In interpreting the Kingdom, then, Fairbairn was influenced by the 
idealist philosophy and also by the democratic ideal everywhere on the ascendent 
in the nineteenth century. The former led him to interpret the Kingdom as a 
social ideal to be realized in time; the latter caused him to conceive that 
ideal in equalitarian, democratic terms.
(continued from previous page)
unseen growth of the grain of mustard-seed and the slow working of the 
leaven hidden in the mass of dough; they allow the comparison of the 
revelation of the Son of Man with the sudden flash of lightning which lays 
the heavens bare to fall into the background.' (op. cit.. Vol. II, p. 163.)
1. Webb, Religious Thought in England from 1850. pp. 107-8.
2. Studies, p. 99.
3. In his Studies in the Life of Christ he did include a chapter on the Resur- 
rection. But his main concern in this essay was to prove its historicity.
4. He wrote a lengthy essay on "The Belief in Immortality", but this was a 
comparative study of the belief in India and Greece.
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Now as we have seen, Fairbaira believed that Jesus instituted the 
Kingdom as a society on earth at the beginning of His ministry. Yet actually 
it was founded through His Incarnation. Hence Fairbairn maintained that the 
realization of the Kingdom on earth must also be conceived in terms of 
incarnation, that the Kingdom actually is gradually being realized by a process 
which he called 'continuous incarnation' of the Spirit of God in man, which 
results in 'progressive filiation'.
'For the Spirit shapes the later sons, singly, after the image of 
the First-born, collectively, into a unity which is on the Godward side 
a sonship, on the manward a brotherhood.' (1)
Thus through the Spirit man can become ethically what Christ was essentially, 
and the common brotherhood of man is formed through the multiplication of sons 
of God. This idea was vividly expressed by Tolstoi when he said that men by 
imitating Jesus could become 'little Christs'. The Kingdom of God, according 
to this notion, consists in all men gradually being transformed into little
Christs, or as Fairbairn stated it, into ideal sonship. This conception of the
2 
Kingdom, as Principal Garvie points out, is directly related to Fairbairn's
doctrine of God: 'From the divine paternity he not only infers human fraternity, 
but as immediately and necessarily consequent on it liberty and equality- 
democracy.'
The Kingdom in this sense, then, is progressively being realized 
(according to Fairbairn 1 s eschatology) by the mind of our Lord being incarnated 
within the institutions of society because that mind has first been incarnated 
within individual human beings.
To sum up, then, Fairbairn considered that religion and morality 
are integral to each other. But morality cannot be thought of merely in 
personal terms: it is essentially social. Individual nian can be redeemed only
1. Place of Christ, p. 491.
2. Lond. Quat., op. cit.. p. 34.
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as society is redeemed. The progressive redemption of society, by means of 
individuals being surcharged with the Spirit of our Lord, results at long last 
in the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. The Kingdom itself is 
conceived in equalitarian, democratic terms: hence the Church as the Kingdom 
in miniature should similarly be conceived. For that reason the Congregational 
form of polity is the best, although it also most clearly embodies the idea 
its Founder had for the Christian society.
The multitude of sects and Churches did not trouble Fairbairn, 
for he considered them but an indication of the inexhaustible variety of ways 
in which our Lord can work through men. No doubt he would have agreed with the 
position of Canon Hodgson when he writes: 'If the Church is to be regarded 
not primarily as an Ark of Salvation, but as the instrument of God's purpose,
there is no inherent impossibility in the thought that what He needs is not
1 2
a single vessel but a fleet. 1 In this connection Fairbairn's own words are:
'From the strife of the sects we would return into the calm and 
gracious presence of Him who is at once the Head and the Heart of His 
Church. He has given us His peace, and it abides with us even amid the 
collisions and contradictions of men. These are but of time, while He 
is of eternity. And in His presence we may not meet negation with 
negation, and affirm of those who say that there is no Church but 
theirs, that theirs is no Church of Christ; on the contrary, we shall 
draw no narrower limits than those traced by the hand of the Son of man: 
"Whosoever shall do the will of My Father which is in heaven, the same 
is My brother, and sister, and mother. 
1. Essays in Christian Philosophy, p. 140.
2. Place of Christ, p. 548.
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CHAPTER VII. RETROSPECT.
Fairbairn's influence seems to have faded almost completely from 
the theological horizon. As one of his former students remarked, that is the 
initial problem in seeking to appraise his work. It would indeed seem as if 
his work might better be compared with the flight of a comet across the sky 
than with a fixed star.
There is no question that he profoundly influenced the thought of 
his own day. But to think of his stress on the comparative study of religions, 
of his interpretation of German to British thought, of his insistent stand 
against obscurantism in Biblical criticism, and of his resolute and vigorous 
defence of religion against naturalism shows to some degree the importance of 
his work for his contemporaries and accounts for the wide popularity of his 
writing among his generation. If, moreover, he tended to dispel the sense of 
mystery from religious experience, his massive attempts to establish the 
rationality of the Christian faith on a solid foundation provided a valuable 
apologetic for an age of uncertainty, when religious doubt, pessimism, and 
naturalistic speculation seemed to be undermining the foundations of belief.
A partial answer to the sudden eclipse of his influence is given 
by Principal Franks when he suggests that Fairbairn as professor did his work 
so well that those who sat in his classrooms had little need to refer to his 
written tomes after leaving Mansfield College. Another partial answer is that 
he undoubtedly failed to keep abreast of developments in Biblical criticism 
and theological thought; and when rapid advances in both fields were made in 
the early part of this century (especially in the approach to the New Testament 
because of Schweitzer's notable work), his own writings were left far behind.
The fuller explanation, however, lies in the fact that like his 
master Dorner he was a mediator, as his former students agree and his writings
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abundantly testify. In a mediatorial capacity he stood on at least four 
fronts: (1) between dogmatic Calvinism and a more liberal Protestant theology; 
(2) between a dogmatic opposition to science and a reasonable rapprochement 
between science and religion; (3) between the unhistorical approach to Christi- 
anity, and theological investigation grounded in historical and hence in the 
critical method, as applied in the comparative study of religions and in 
Biblical criticism; (4) between the predominant empiricism of British thought 
and the transcendental idealism of German theology and philosophy.
As has been pointed out, all theology to some degree must be 
mediating in the sense of interpreting Christian truth for different generations,
But Fairbairn f s at times was mediating theology in a 'bad sense 1 , 'theology
1 
that blurs its outlines by taking two different ways at once f . The aptness
of this criticism becomes evident as we look in retrospect from the vantage of 
the present theological position toward Fairbairn's work in its setting at the 
beginning of the century.
i. Reason and Revelation.
Fairbairn's basic tenets in regard to religion in general and to 
Christianity in particular may more or less be considered fundamental to the 
position most representative of the main current of modern British theology, 
although they would be wholly repudiated by the dialectic theology. Thus 
Fairbairn's contention that God has revealed Himself to every man, that if man 
were atheistic by nature there would be no Anknttpfungspunkt (so to say) between 
God and man, would be sustained by all who maintain, against Professor Barth, 
that it is only the image of God in man that makes him a human being. It is 
difficult to see how the Word could be preached to any effect to men from whom 
the imago Dei had been totally obliterated. One of the few points on which
1. "The Theology of Andrew Martin Fairbairn", op. cit.
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Fairbairn and Earth would in all probability agree is the importance of the 
preaching of the Word; but Fairbairn always insisted that the Word has a point 
of contact, an entrance point as it were, with sinful man, since God in making 
man for Himself did not make him wholly other than Himself. One can almost 
hear Fairbairn vigorously reprehending Earth by pointing to the sheer futility 
of preaching the Gospel to men who have no more knowledge of God than stones or 
cats. The sheer supernaturalism involved in converting a man from whom all 
trace of the imago Dei had been wiped out would have been utterly repudiated 
by Fairbairn as the sort of miracle which he always termed 'intervention 1 .
Similarly Fairbairn's point of view in regard to the relation between 
Christianity and the other historical religions was wholly opposed to the 
extreme Christocentrism of the Ritschlians, who through Hermann have profoundly 
influenced Earth. The Ritschlian-Barthian Schools emphasize the exclusiveness 
of the revelation of God in Christ: before Christ and hence in religions 
other than Christian there was no true religious or moral knowledge. Against 
this notion, which seems to lose the Father in the Son (as he expressed it), 
Fairbairn stressed the all-inclusiveness of Christ. He quoted with approval 
Justin Martyr,  Whatever things have been rightly said have been said for us 1 , 
and agreed wholeheartedly with those Fathers of the Church who recognized, as 
they put it, Socrates and Plato as 'Christians before Christ'. This point of 
view (which bears the marks of Augustinian and Thomist thought) may be said to 
be fairly characteristic of British (especially Anglican) theology, particularly 
since its own roots are so deeply sunk in Platonism. If the main line of
modern theological thought would hardly follow Professor Horton in his assertion
1 
that 'the man who knows only Christ does not even know Christ', since this
,. , ^-
notion is too closely linked with Max Mttller's idea ('Wer diese Religion kennt, 
kennt keine'), now repudiated, it would, I take it, acknowledge as sound the 
1. Revelation, p. 264Uop_- cit.)
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1 
position stated by Professor Webb.
'Very early in the history of the Christian religion the main 
body of the Church had refused to follow Marcion in seeing in Christ T s 
advent a sudden invasion from without of a world whose maker and lord 
was other than the Father whom Christ came to reveal. But the full 
working out of the principle involved in this refusal was inevitably 
delayed until, with the advance of historical knowledge in the nine- 
teenth century, Christianity could be envisaged as the culmination of 
a universal process which was at once God's revelation of himself to 
man and man's discovery of God; for how could God be discovered except 
by his own act, or reveal himself except to a mind prepared for the 
reception of the revelation? 1
Fairbairn took essentially this position when he maintained that all religious 
truth, wherever or however it may have found expression, is of Christ, since as 
truth it must be of God. As it has been well stated: in so far as Isaiah or 
Mohammed or the Buddha had knowledge of God, it must have been knowledge of the 
Triune God, since that is the only God there is.
While never falling in entirely with the idea that the f highest 
common factor 1 of all the religions can be discovered after investigating them 
all, a notion which quite undercuts the mission motive, Fairbairn did consider 
that Christianity could be known as the supreme universal religion only after 
other historical religions had been studied. With this view he tended to 
consider the Incarnation but a special instance of an evolutionary process of 
progressive revelation, and failed adequately to emphasize what Brunner calls 
the Einmaligkeit of the revelation in Christ, an emphasis made in the symposium 
Revelation by each of the seven writers representative of modern theological 
thought. But Fairbairn certainly did not hold the 'highest common factor 1 view 
in its extreme form (e. g., as promulgated by Spencer), for he always stressed 
that each of the historical religions is unique in its own way. If in theory 
he drew up canons of criticism to be applied to all the Founders of religions 
(Christ included), and it probably would be^nerally admitted that here he took 
the wrong tack, he actually did not apply these canons in his delineation of 
1. Religious Thought in England from 1850, p. 167.
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our Lord.
In his stud7 of the historical religions, while making many shrewd 
insights, especially into Buddhism, it has already been stated that Fairbairn 
did not give what would today be considered an adequate interpretation of Old 
Testament religion, and this chiefly because he drew a sharp antithesis between 
prophet and priest and tended to interpret the Old Testament in terms of 
Levitical sacerdotalism. Since his day the centre of attention in the Old 
Testament has shifted from Law to Prophecy, and the true significance of Judaism 
as the religion which cradled our Lord has become more clearly apparent. Fair- 
bairn manifestly neglected the Prophecy in the Old Testament: hence it would 
generally be admitted now that his entire perspective was wrong, as (for instance) 
when he was led into saying that there was too little of spirit and truth in the 
Hebraic Deity to enable Israel to comprehend the awfulness of sin.
If Fairbairnf s thought in regard to the revelation of God to all 
men is in accord with that of many contemporary theologians, his sharp delimita- 
tion between natural and revealed religion is no longer generally recognized 
among Protestant thinkers. Natural religion has (so to say) been baptized into 
revealed, and thus the idea that God can be the end result of a speculative 
process has been repudiated. Hence the Medieval Synthesis which Fairbairn 
consistently set forth in his exposition of the idea of revelation is no longer 
followed, emphasis now being placed on the conviction that all knowledge of God 
is revealed. Such knowledge, moreover, comes not, it is held, in the form of 
divinely given truths about God (as Fairbairn believed). 'What is offered to
man's apprehension in any specific Revelation is not truth concerning God but
1 
the living God Himself. 1
The contemporary concept of 'general' revelation includes, however, 
the idea (repudiated by the Barthians) that God reveals Himself to some degree
1. Temple, Nature, Man and God, p. 322.
178
at least through nature and history, as St. Pau} declares. But God reveals 
Himself, man does not speculatively construe Him out of data he has himself 
discovered, as Fairbairn steadily maintained he could and should. Thinkers in 
Britain who have more closely followed Fairbairn in defending the thesis that
religion can be metaphysically justified are Rashdall, Tennant, and Principal 
3 4
Franks. Sorley has also set forth with great eloquence the theistic argu- 
ment from man's moral consciousness, and God according to his thesis is an 
inference (as it were) drawn from moral values. The more general consensus of 
theological thought in our day, as I understand it, would maintain that the 
being of God cannot be 'proved' by speculation: if He is not at the beginning 
of a chain of argument, He cannot be found at the end as the final link of the 
chain.
The complete confidence in human reason which is expressed by 
Fairbairn and thinkers such as those just mentioned (which is rather closely 
akin to eighteenth century rationalism) has been greatly modified and in some 
areas of thought completely destroyed. The dialectic theologians would 
disenfranchise reason in God and man, placing their whole emphasis on the 
Ockhamist tradition, that is to say, on the Will of God and on man's being 
completely determined by that Will. According to this view, man is to act not 
because the action is right, but because God has willed that action. Thus 
reason in man has been obliterated with the imago Dei, and reason in God has 
at the least been made wholly subservient to His Will.
Fairbairn himself would have repudiated this extreme voluntaristic 
view, since he always stressed that God is conditioned by His nature: for him 
the character of God was correlative with, yet always determinative of, the
1. Rom. i, 20; Acts xvii, 26-7. H. R. Mackintosh, from whom I have these
references, develops this idea in Tlie Christian Apprehension of__God., pp.37f.
2. Philosophical Theology., C +*« t>^ <-,ii *   
3. The Metaphysical Justification of Religion; The Atonement.
4. Moral Values and the Idea of God.
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Sovereignty. In this contention he would be supported by the tendency in 
theological thought which, while recognizing the tremendous importance of their 
reaction against nineteenth century immanentism, has not completely followed 
the Barthians. Most modern theologians, however, would not be apt to agree 
with Fairbairn that man 'is reason' as God is Reason: rather would they say 
that because man bears the imago Dei he has reason to a limited degree as 
derivable from God. This reason is not redeemed, however, as Fairbairn held, 
else why would man most often be unreasonable in his actions? In failing 
adequately to stress original sin in man, he was inordinately optimistic about 
man's reasonableness: he did not sufficiently take into account what is more 
generally and poignantly realized today, that man is a fallen creature. In 
addition it would usually be held now that he placed too much emphasis on the 
discursive reason and hence failed to appreciate in full measure intuitive 
reason, as in the instance of his controversy with Newraan, when he completely 
condemned the Cardinal's notion of the 'Illative sense 1 . Similarly his 
occasional tendency to hypostatize reason would generally be thought subversive, 
since based on a 'faculty' psychology. Fairbairn's usual emphasis, in fact, 
was placed against such faculty psychology, for he urged time and again that 
intellect, feeling and emotion the whole man are active in religion.
If much recent thought would disparage Fairbairn's attempt to 
establish the existence of God by speculation, it probably would be inclined 
to accept in a more general way his belief in the serviceableness of philosophy 
to theology, in this again turning away with him from the Ritschlian-Barthian 
strongly marked bias against philosophy. Fairbairn no doubt resolved the 
tension between philosophy and theology too easily, and it would probably be 
generally agreed, as Archbishop Temple says, that there 'ought to be tension 
between Philosophy and Religion. That tension is only relaxed when one of the
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two assimilates itself excessively to the other.' But the tension is not to 
be so great as to deny the serviceableness of philosophy in helping faith to 
build an apologetic and an interpretation of itself with which to face the 
world. British thought in general, I believe, would make this approach; and 
Professor Heim of Tttbingen is also a notable exponent of it, in this attitude
standing against the extreme Calvinism of Professor Barth. Canon Hodgson
2 
suggests in this connection:
, In arguing for the usefulness of philosophy to theology, 
I am not asking you to range yourself with Catholicism against protestant- 
ism, or with Calvinists against Lutherans, or with any one church or 
group of churches against any other. I am urging upon you a view which 
is held in every one of the great communions of Christendom. From time 
to time, in this communion or that, it has to fight to maintain its 
foothold against some recurring wave of obscurantism; but we need not 
waver in our faith as to the ultimate issue. 1
This view, I take it, would accurately represent the predominant attitude 
among present day British theologians, as it is the view which Fairbairn 
consistently held.
In the science-religion conflict of the late nineteenth century, 
Fairbairn1 s resolute stand against a naturalistic and for a spiritual interpre- 
tation of the universe and human life was of not inconsiderable significance 
for his generation, and the general lines of his thought have been followed 
by all who seek in the interests of the Christian faith to make a reasonable 
rapprochement between the two fields. The point he emphasized so consistently 
is elementary, and yet the need for stressing it has continued (as in B. H. 
Streeter's writings), namely, that science can deal with processes, but only 
religion can speak of ultimate beginnings and ends. Science can describe, 
but religion seeks to explain. It should be recognized to his credit that 
Fairbairn was one of the comparatively few religionists in his day who never 
contended against the Darwinian hypothesis as being subversive to religion, but
1. pp. cit., p. 55.
2. The Grace of God in Faith and Philosophy, p. 11.
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granted that it was a useful scientific theory. He also pointed out, 
however, 
that neither this nor any other scientific theory can throw any light 
on the 
'why' or 'whither' of man. It can tell nothing of human origins or des
tiny. 
It can take into account (to use Streeter's terms) only the quantitativ
e, never 
the qualitative factors of existence.
Fairbairn also argued ably against the Deist conception of the 
universe which was generally held in the nineteenth century, the notio
n that 
nature is a dead inert mass and that as such it is a closed system. I
f it was 
thought that God worked on the world at all, it was maintained that He
 must do 
so from the 'outside', like Paley's manlike artificer or by an imperso
nal energy 
acting on matter (the nineteenth-century scientists' concept of force).
 Fair- 
bairn emphasized the idea which has been becoming more and more widely
 accepted, 
that nature is not so much like a mechanism as an organism, throbbing,
 alive, 
instinct with Spirit. The Spirit in nature, in Fairbairn's view, is G
od 
immanent: and if at times, especially in his idea of history, his tho
ught was 
tinged with the notion of a nature sustained and carried on by a purbl
ind life- 
force, his chief emphasis was placed against this notion and on the Ch
ristian 
doctrine of God immanent in nature as Providence. With his concept of
 Providence 
he repudiated the Deist notion that if God works in nature, it can be 
only 
through the marvelous and miraculous. The Archbishop of York has rece
ntly 
suggested that it was a great advance in thought to 'see God at work, 
if at all, 
not only now and then, but everywhere and always'. It was the generat
ion of 
theologians to which Fairbairn belonged who made this idea current in 
religious 
thought.
This conception of God as Providence continuously acting within 
nature was quite in accord with the monist trend throughout the centur
y which 
issued in an extreme imraanentism, often not far removed from pantheism
. 
1. Op. ait., p. 47.
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Fairbairn himself always retained in his thinking the orthodox idea of trans- 
cendence. Hence he did not give up the concept of miracle, nor wholly rational- 
ize it by seeking to 'explain' what purported to be miracles in the Gospel 
records (for instance) in natural terms. The concept of miracle, so ably 
defended recently by Professor Farmer, is meant to establish that God, in 
addition to being immanent in nature, can act relevantly to a particular 
situation in response to a particular human need. Professor Farmer, in holding 
that nature (like man) is relatively independent from God, can give an apologetic 
for miracle far more adequate than Fairbairn 1 s, since the latter considered 
nature wholly instrumental and completely dependent for its very being on the 
direct and continuous action or thought of God and man. Fairbairn also retained 
the belief in petitionary prayer, so largely rejected in his day and since then 
(when the main emphasis has been placed on prayer as communion). Petitionary 
prayer, as Farmer declares, is the heart of prayer and 'expresses the confidence
that the ultimate reality of man's world is not uncongenial or unresponsive to
1 
his life task'.
ii. Christianity and History.
Although Fairbairn stressed unduly it would usually be admitted 
today the speculative approach to religion, he was not carried to the extreme 
expressed in Fichte's words, 'Man is saved by the metaphysical element alone, 
and not by the historical'. Assuredly Fairbairn considered the metaphysical 
element essential, and criticised Newman for neglecting it. But if he received 
from Hegel the bias toward speculation in religion, he also got from the same 
source the marked bent toward approaching every subject from the historical 
point of view, which in our day has become second nature to the theologian. 
Thus Fairbairn would have said; the metaphysical is essential, but its roots
1. The World and God, p. 142.
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must be in history.
In addition to making what must still be recognized as a significant 
contribution to the history of Christological doctrine, his share in the strong 
emphasis given in the nineteenth century to the 'recovery of the historical 
Jesus' serves at the least as a salutary reminder that the present stress on 
the 'Word of God' is (as Professor D. M. Baillie has pointed out) a marked 
reaction (tending toward historical scepticism) to this earlier tendency to make 
much of the humanity of our Lord, to centre attention on the 'Jesus of history'. 
Already in 1903 Professor Webb gave some indication of this tendency toward 
historical scepticism when he wrote: 'I should myself (though I do not know
how far Dr. Fairbairn would assent), unreservedly agree with Kant that the
1
historical element is, as such, indifferent.' Judging on the basis of Fair- 
bairn's whole approach to the study of religion and specifically to the inter- 
pretation of our Lord, we can say that he would not have 'assented'.
It is generally acknowledged that to emphasize the historical basis 
of Christianity has again become of importance at the present time, in view of 
the Continental reaction from the extreme immanentism of the nineteenth century 
to the theology of transcendence, and of the Formgeschichte criticism. As 
Professor Dodd writes: 'The Bible, and the New Testament in particular, is not 
any longer to be treated as an historical corpus, revealing tendencies within 
history in which the immanent working of the divine is to be recognized. It 
is the Word of the transcendent God.' Against this tendency he stresses, how- 
ever, that while some religions can be indifferent to historical fact, 
Christianity cannot, since it 'rests upon the affirmation that a series of
events happened, in which God revealed Himself in action for the salvation of
2
men'. Similar assertions are made specifically in regard to Form criticism
by J. A. Findlay (Jesus. Divine and Human) and by Principal Franks. The latter,
1. Review of Philosophy. Jl. of Theo. Studies, p. 299.
2. History and the Gospel, pp. 13, 15.
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... 1 
writing as a theologian, sums up the matter as follows:
 Scepticism about the essential content of the Synoptic narrative, 
both of the teaching and the main outline of the story of Jesus, seems 
to me unwarranted. I do not think that the recent study of Formgeschichte 
has been able to destroy the self-authentication as historical fact, 
alike of the teaching of Jesus as they give it, and of their story of 
how He came forward as the Prophet of the Kingdom of God; and was cruci- 
fied because He claimed farther to be the expected Messiah of Israel. It 
is said that we only know Jesus through the primitive Church; and that 
the Synoptic Gospels themselves are evidence of Christian faith rather 
than simple histories. This is true; and yet the fact of Jesus shines 
through the faith of the early disciples; "That one Face, far from 
vanish, rather grows". f
It is only in a general way, however, that Fairbairn's emphasis 
on the Jesus of history would have relevance for our day, and this for definite 
reasons. The first has already been explained above (p. 55), namely, that 
Fairbairn's exegetical work failed to reckon with the latest New Testament 
scholarship of his own time. Upon occasion, too, he used the New Testament 
records rather to serve his arguments (e. g., in his exposition of the doctrine 
of the Church) than to interpret them in the light of their historical setting.
The 'historicism' of the nineteenth century, moreover, of which 
Fairbairn's work is a particular instance, has been repudiated as a method of 
approach to the interpretation of our Lord, the first definite modifying 
influence having been the publication of Schweitzer's Quest of the Historical 
Jesus, which centred attention on the eschatological point of view. Attempts 
are no longer made to separate out the residuum of so-called historical facts 
about Jesus out of the Synoptic record, carefully distinguishing between such 
fact and accretions of Apostolic interpretation. The stress today is laid 
upon the broad religious significance of the Synoptic Gospels, not on the 
minutiae of the record. Furthermore, it is now recognized that the 'Jesus of 
history* and the 'Christ of faith' cannot be construed separately. They are, 
after all, the same Person. The New Testament records themselves were written
% The Atonement, pp. 32-3. It may be noted that Principal Franks would tend 
to lay less stress on the eschatological viewpoint, more on the 'teaching' 
of our Lord, than would most present-day interpreters of the New Testament.
185
 from faith to faith*, and do not present us with two pictures of our Lord, as 
He really was when on earth (the human Jesus) and as speculatively construed 
by the Apostles (the Divine Christ). Rather is there a single impression of a 
Figure who through His life and death and resurrection generated faith in His 
Divine Sonship and Lordship among those who followed Him and who established 
the early Christian society.
'The historical origin of belief in the divinity of Christ is to 
be found , . . in the experience of the primitive Church after the 
Resurrection rather than in that of the disciples in the days when His 
godhead was so veiled that even the best of them failed to grasp it.' (1)
The whole impression given by Fairbairn's interpretation of Christ 
is that he chiefly conceived Him as a teacher the supreme teacher, to be sure, 
of all time of the Fatherhood of God; and hence, as Principal Dickie comments,
'the ultimate standard of Christian truth (for Fairbairn) is our Lord's personal
2 
message, as criticism restates it for us'. The entire current of modern
theological thought would turn away from Fairbairn's notion that the ideas of 
God, man and human destiny, which the historical Christ (as interpreted by His 
followers) sets forth to us, are of chiefest religious importance. The stress 
today falls rather on the Person Himself who made dogmatic claims for Himself 
and who qua Person, not qua idea conceived by the Apostles, confronts individuals 
now, producing and sustaining faith in Himself as the unique Son of God, who 
'was made man' and in whose mind we see the mind of God, in whose 'life on
earth we find implied in His deeds and words a character which is the character
3 
of God'.
To be sure, Fairbairn considered Christ to be the only 'institution'
of Christian worship. Yet essentially he conceived our Lord not so much as
4 
the object of Christian faith, but as 'ideal believer' who set an example for
1. Hodgson, And Was Made Man, p. 12.
2. Fifty Years of British Theology, p. 60, 
S. Hodgson, And Was Made Man, p. 31. 
4. Dickie, op_. cit., p. 99.
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all to follow who would, whose followers made His teaching the norm for all 
Christian experience. This trend of thought is brought into particularly clear 
focus in his conception of the meaning of the Eucharist, which he interpreted 
not as worship of God, but as preparation for such worship.
There is confusion, too, in Fairbairn's whole idea of the double 
nature of Christ. If, as he held, our Lord was conscious of His supernatural 
power and hence aware that He was the incarnate Son of God, then the 'veiling 1 
was not real for Him. Yet Fairbairn insisted that He lived our life under the 
conditions of 'our common non-miraculous humanity' and hence was not omniscient. 
There seems to be in his interpretation a sharp cleavage between Christ as Son 
of Man and Son of God, almost as if at some times our Lord was Son of Man and
then was supremely teacher of the Fatherhood of God, at other times Son of God
1 
who knew Himself to be the Messiah sent from God. He presents no clear picture
of One who was a real man and yet who gained knowledge through his experiences 
on earth (the only way, indeed, that a human being could gain knowledge),  
knowledge of His unique relationship to the Father, which is probably the 
clearest feature of His character standing out from the Gospel records.
The modern interpretation of our Lord, then, (if indeed it be 
possible to generalize as widely as this), is that He really was God incarnate. 
Fairbairn specifically distinguished between this view and the one he himself 
held to be correct, that Christ was 'the incarnate Son of God', by which he 
meant that our Lord was the unique Son among many sons of man, the supreme 
personality in history, the apogean exemplar of the race, rather than that He 
is God incarnate, the Word made flesh. If the latter rather than Fairbairn's 
view is nearer the truth, it would also be necessary to admit that Christianity
1. At times in Fairbairn's approach there is something of what Canon Hodgson 
calls the »view of uncritical piety, which seems to believe that Christ's 
knowledge of things supernatural is due to His possession of divine 
omniscience in all its fullness, or to His power of drawing as it were on 
a store of memories of pre-incarnate existence'. (And Was Made Man, p. 52.)
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does not stand as one among the historical religions (as Fairbairn always 
emphasized) nor that only after all the religions have been studied can 
Christianity be said to be supreme. Christianity will stand rather as the
absolute, the final religion, not so much the ultimate religion among the
1 
religions as religion itself.
iii. The Character of God. 
A criticism levelled at Fairbairn's theology by those who knew
him is that he always devoted too much time in his lectures and too many pages
2 
in his books to historical survey, not enough to construction. One of his
former students tells of waiting in a class at Mansfield through one whole 
term for construction, but all was devoted to history. At the beginning of the 
next term Fairbairn said, 'Before starting on construction we have a few 
historical points to clear up'. Eventually only about two lectures in the 
second term were devoted to construction.
If his chief contribution in theology was historical, and his 
surveys may be considered in part as 'construction', some of his emphases 
were significant for his day and will remain so. His fundamental tenet, that 
the formal principle in theology is the consciousness of Christ and the material 
the Fatherhood of God, was an important modification of the Reformation 
doctrine of making the Scriptures the formal principle. This stress on the 
consciousness of Christ as being determinative for Christian theology was 
probably the chief contribution of the nineteenth-century historicism to 
Christian doctrine.
1. I think this idea has been expressed in these or similar words by Dean Inge, 
but I have been unable to trace the quotation.
2. From this point onward, some more detailed attention -will be given to
comparing and contrasting Fairbairn's thought with that of certain present- 
day theologians whom I consider representative. The first two sections in 
this chapter have been more general, since dealing more with the presupposi- 
tions than with his theology itself.
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Fairbairn's stress on the Fatherhood of God as the central aspect 
of God's character and as regulating His Sovereignty will remain a cardinal 
principle for theologians whose primary emphasis falls rather on the Being than 
the Will of God. His endeavour, moreover, to hold together the attributes of 
Fatherhood and Sovereignty had even for his day a salutary effect, in that it 
helped to counterbalance the tendency of conceiving God as a benevolent and 
indulgent parent who humoured rather than ruled His children. At the same 
time it kept him from being carried into extreme immanentism, always made him 
emphasize that if God was in the world as Providence, He was also 'above' the 
world as Creator. This tension between the twin ideas of God in the battle 
who is also the God above the battle (in Lincoln's phrase) he consistently held. 
Not to let this tension between transcendence and immanence be resolved in an 
extreme emphasis on either has seemed to be the secret of keeping Christian 
theology from becoming pantheistic or libertarian on the one hand, or on the 
other Deistic or obscurantist.
In our own time the theology of transcendence has swung in extreme 
reaction against the predominant immanentism of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Professor Otto's emphasis on God as wholly Other came as 
a corrective (salutary if extreme, it probably would be generally admitted) 
to the idealist tendency to identify (so to say) God and man, at the least to 
over-emphasize the affinity between God and man without at the same time giving 
the orthodox Christian emphasis on man as fallen creature. Likewise the 
dialectic theologians with their dictum of Deus dixit and their absolute negat- 
ing of human reason are in full flight from immanentism, returning in their* 
basic point of view to the Ockhamist position. Against these tendencies the 
principles which Fairbairn laid down would in turn act as corrective, his 
stress on the 'transcendent immanence' and the 'immanent transcendence* of God 
(to utilize Temple's illuminating phrases), as well as his more direct emphasis
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against this voluntaristic extremism.
As Fairbairn was carried along, to some degree at least, in the 
immanentist stream of idealism, he himself fell into some of the extreme posi- 
tions which, I take it, British theological thought even now is trying to 
correct. One of these extremes was characteristic of the activist Protestantism 
which in Britain became practically a school under the leadership of the late 
Canon Streeter, namely, a predominant emphasis on man's freedom of choice. 
Man's free-will was a cardinal principle with Fairbairn, as with other late 
nineteenth century thinkers (Martineau being a notable example). In his eager- 
ness to repudiate determinism in any form (a necessary part of his apologetic 
against naturalism, so he thought), he neglected all predestination and resolved 
too easily the antinomy in all theology between free-will and predestination.
In one of his'Studies' Fairbairn pointed out that the difference 
between the responses to our Lord of the two thieves who hung on crosses with 
Jesus (the unrepentent one Fairbairn pictured as having been born in a robber's 
cave, the penitent thief as reared in a home where he received religious
instruction but who had 'gone wrong') r so far as their evil is concerned, must
1 
be sought in themselves, though the source of all good is to be found in God 1 .
In this illustration the chief difficulty of the indeterminist position is 
seen, since it must be admitted that determinism at least in a broad way does 
mark out the lines a life follows. Surely in Fairbairn»s example it could hardly 
be allowed that the unrepentent thief chose to be born in a robbers' cave. In 
this respect his final 'synthesis' seems to glide over the freedom-determinism 
problem.
Not only does Fairbairn seem to slough off the doctrine of original 
sin; but in taking his activist stand he seems to be allowing that man has 
considerably more than relative independence from God. As a matter of fact, 
1. Studies, p. 467.
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he himself urged that the 'energy' of the scientists was actually the Will of 
God. Canon Hodgson stresses the same idea (covering new approaches to this 
question which have been made) when he urges that we should regard 'that fount
of energy, described variously as libido, elan vital, life stream, or what not,
1 
as the active will of God'. If this is the correct view to hold, it must
further follow, as Falrbairn pointed out, that we must consider human freedom 
of choice as a prerequisite to the making of character and hence as a necessary 
part of God's plan for the world.
Canon Hodgson makes the further important distinction, however, 
that freedom of choice is but imperfect freedom: the emphasis should be placed 
on that perfect freedom which is complete obedience to the Will of God. In 
this perspective, it will continue to be important to assert the freedom of 
the human will (as we have seen in this century in the contention of theologians 
with the 'new psychology1 , in its behaviourist tendency, either general or in 
the specific form of psychoanalysis): yet the stress will lie not on this 
libertas minor, which at best is but a means, but on the perfect obedience to
God's Will which alone is perfect freedom. The freedom of choice which Fairbairn
1 
emphasized, the freedom of activism, is 'inchoate, imperfect and irrational'.
It is this freedom of indeterminism which ultimately makes the universe undepen- 
dable if the perfect freedom of God does not underlie it. In 1893 a critic of 
Fairbairn wrote: 'However great and painful are the mysteries of the Calvinistic 
doctrine of the divine sovereignty, the alternative view, which implies that the
issue of the world's history is dependent on the wills of men, seems to me more
E 
devoid of comfort, or in some respects positively appalling. 1 Probably most
theologians would admit the very real difficulty with any view of human freedom 
which does not carry with it at the same time the doctrine of the Divine over- 
ruling: and it was just this doctrine which Fairbairn could never admit in its
1. Essays in Christian Philosophy, pp. 33, 43.
2. J. S. Candlish in a review of Place of Christ, Crit. Rev., Vol. Ill,p. 374.
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full force into his thinking.
It has been pointed out that Fairbairn was opposed to extreme 
Christocentrism, exemplified in the Ritschlians of his day or the Barthians 
of our own time. Professor Taylor has suggested that Baron von Htlgel gave what 
he considers f a wise and timely warning against this type of theology (i. e., 
the Christocentric) in the essay on "Suffering and God". 'But to me the most 
significant thing about his admirable essay ... is that the warning should 
have been felt by the author to be so imperatively needed. It could only be
necessary in an age which ascribes to process and temporality a significance
1 
very different from that given to them in any Hellenic philosophy  .
Fairbairn1 s stress on the passibility of God, while quite out of 
keeping with the 'Greek 1 bent of his mind and with his aversion for excessive
Christocentricism, was yet reflecting the mind of his generation and century,
2 
which ascribed great significance to 'process and temporality'. Although he
never discussed the subject of time, an omission from his writing which 
Professor Webb criticised over thirty years ago and which would certainly be 
criticised in the present day when time is considered by many to be the most 
urgent philosophical problem, yet his immanentism showed itself clearly 
enough in his this-worldliness; and as we have seen, one aspect of this general 
point of view is his consistent arguing against the doctrine of Divine impas- 
sibility.
There are certain problems for all who hold with Fairbairn the 
conception of a passible God. Fairbairn at least did not give/( them adequate 
attention. For the most part they fall on the side of immanentism, of identi- 
fying too closely the Divine and human natures, a tendency which he shared with 
his generation. (1) There is first the notion that there can be no real 
compassio without passio, either in God or man: yet the preponderance of
1. Op. pit, vol. II, p. 524. .
2 Some of the emphases of the epoch included: the Kingdom of God to be estab- * lished in this world through the 'social 1 activities (concluded on next page)
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evidence, when judged purely on the basis of man's response to suffering, seems 
to array itself against the soundness of this idea. (2) Suffering, though it 
can be made an agent for good, can so be made only when it is indubitably 
recognized that per se it is intrinsically always radically evil. To allow, 
then, that there is suffering in God is to admit limitation into His nature. 
Further to argue that it is self-limitation on His part, a necessary concomi- 
tant of creating beings with a relative freedom, hardly mitigates the difficulty 
of giving up the idea of perfection in God. The notion of limitation of His 
omnipotence by granting a relative freedom to man is itself made of lesser 
account by the doctrine of Divine over-ruling. But the doctrine of a passible 
God seems to admit evil and hence finitude to the very heart (as it were) of 
the Divine nature. Nor can suffering be admitted into the Being of God, without
at once lessing the unrelieved badness of evil, always a characteristic of
1
immanentism. Fairbairn, too, it wl.11 be remembered, despite his avowed inten- 
tion to stress the unmitigated evil-ness of evil, could fall, possibly uncon- 
sciously, into speaking of the f accident of sin 1 .
(3) The trend shown clearly in Fairbairn or in Martineau, for 
example, and later by those activists who grouped themselves about the late 
Canon Streeter, was to lay a strongly marked emphasis on freedom in man and on 
the possibility of evil being a necessary concomitant of freedom. As we have 
seen, however, perfect freedom (the libertas major of God) excludes choice, even 
as perfect freedom in man would be complete obedience to the Will of God. In
this view good and evil are made necessary concomitants of each other: we can
2 
have either or neither, 'but we cannot have one without the other 1 . This view,
however, like Calvinist voluntarism, makes God subject to the libertas minor; 
He is bound to His Will rather than to His nature. This view also makes evil
(continued from previous page) of men; man to achieve character through fight- 
ing temptation at every cross-roads of choice, etc.
1. Von Httgel quotes Dr. Edw. I^yttelton, for example, as asserting that we should 
'see sin and all evil as a good disguised by our own wrong thinking 1 . 
"Suffering and God" in Essays and Addresses, second series, p. 174.
2. Ibid, p. 203.
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in God potential, both stiffering and sin: if He does not sin (if we may so 
express it) it is because He chooses not to, rather than that by His very nature 
He cannot.
(4) Finally those who argue for a passible God do not seem sufficient- 
ly to retain in their thinking the tension orthodox to Christianity between
transcendence and immanence in God, faith in God who is 'both universal and
1 
individual, both absolute and personal 1 . The immanentism integral to the notion
of passibility in God tends to lose personality in God and man (as among the 
neo^egelians) or to build up the concept of personality in God wholly from the
notion of personality in man (and thus including suffering in the nature of God,
2 
since it plays so large a part in 'making 1 personality in man).
Immanentism, then, tends on the one hand to make God impersonal or 
finite (a 'struggling God' subject to the libertas minor), or on the other to 
tone down the badness of evil. The chief problem for those who argue against 
Fairbairn's view of Divine passibility, as I see it, is that they tend to 
establish a metaphysical dualism between the two natures of Christ, a concept 
which is more than difficult in view of the present understanding of the nature 
of the self. Yet this is a problem which has faced Christianity from the start, 
and it seems doubtful if the immanentist attempt at solution does not raise 
more problems than it solves.
Fairbairn himself, while stressing the idea of a suffering God, 
clung to the idea of transcendence: God for him was infinite, absolute, and 
personal. Yet he made no particular effort to reconcile his notion of Divine 
passibility with that of God transcendent, did not take account of the problems 
consequent upon the idea of a suffering God.
Earlier we noticed that the idea of Divine passibility for Fairbairn
1. John Baillie, Interpretation of Religion^ p. 398.
2. In the development of these four points, I have closely followed von Httgel's 
discussion in the essay quoted.
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(and others who hold this view) was a necessary corollary of the doctrine of 
the Atonement: that is to say, Christ on the Cross revealed to man the awful- 
ness of sin through showing forth the suffering that sin caused God. In this 
way, according to his central idea of the Atonement, he held that men are won 
back to fellowship with God through catching a vision as they see Christ on 
His Cross a vision of the depth of the richness of the love in God»s fatherly 
nature. If there were no suffering in God, according to his view, the work of 
Christ in His death could not be efficacious.
Fairbairn held a modified Abelardian view of the redeeming work of 
Christ. In 'looking backwards' at his doctrine of the Atonement, it may be 
considered in contrast and comparison with several representative views held 
by contemporaries. Principal Franks with inexorable logic and pellucid clarity 
develops the Abelardian conception of the Atonement with thorough-going consist- 
ency.
'It is the doctrine,' he writes, 'that Christ reconciles men to 
God by revealing the love of God in His life and still more in His death, 
so bringing them to trust and love Him in return.' (1)
He rejects the Greek and Latin theories of the Atonement, and allows that such 
terms as 'satisfaction', 'ransom', and 'propitiation' are meaningful only as 
1 illustrations'.
In addition to this experiential theory of the Atonement, three 
other theories (following Franks' useful classification) have recently been 
expounded:
'They are the Greek or Patristic theory of recapitulation, or 
alternatively of ransom; the Latin theory of satisfaction and merit; and 
the theory of arbitrary sovereignty.' (2)
The extreme voluntaristic theory based on the Divine Sovereignty has no 
connection with Fairbairn's theology, since as we have seen he wholly repudiated 
this Ockhamist tendency in theological thinking. This theory is followed by
1. The Atonement, p. 2.
2. Ibid, p. 175.
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Professor Brunner in The Mediator. The Greek theory has been re-interpreted 
by Bishop Aulen, but this theory too Fairbairn would have repudiated, although 
at times the notion of recapitulation crept into his thinking.
With the Latin theory it is somewhat different, since Fairbairn not 
infrequently used substitutionary and forensic terminology. It is possible,
as Rashdall suggested in 1903, that Fairbairn 'would doubtless be the first to
1 
repudiate' such theories 'if stated in black and white 1 . To take his writing
 
at face value as it stands, however, it is certainly true that he carried some 
ideas of penal substitution in his thinking which kept him from being wholly 
consistent in setting forth the Abelardian view. For this reason we may consi- 
der briefly the theory of the Atonement as propounded by Canon Hodgson, who 
tells us that
f we may accept the positive teaching of the Abelardian view and then go 
on to ask whether its negative teaching, its denial that there is anything 
further to be said about the Atonement, is justified.' (2)
Canon Hodgson explains five difficulties to accepting the Abelardian view as 
complete; and if these difficulties are admitted, it might be argued that Fair- 
bairn was not merely inconsistent or 'walking in two directions at the same 
time 1 in presenting his own view of the Atonement, although he did not 
elaborate his theory sufficiently to make it possible to tell whether he 
actually tried to modify the Abelardian view or whether he merely carried over 
from his early Calvinism certain notions which he never fitted into his system
of theology.
Canon Hodgson states (1) a practical difficulty to maintaining that
the Abelardian theory is adequate: if the preacher fails to awaken a response 
to the proclamation of God' s love, he has failed completely; whereas if he can 
point to something objective achieved by Christ on His Cross, the listener may 
at least carry away the idea that something was done 'once for all 1 for him,
1. Hibbert Jl., o£. c±t., p. 181.
2. And Was Made Man, p. 88.
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and a response on his part may be evoked by reflection on this fact. (2) If 
the significance of Christ's work on the Cross is restricted to its subjective 
effect on the part of the individual Christian, Canon Hodgson points out that 
all people not believers are excluded, so to say, from the benefits of that 
work. Thus would be excluded people who because of intellectual doubts have 
been unable to join the Church, or persons to whom the Gospel has never been 
preached. Yet this would exclude people like Dr. Jacks' shoemaker, who 'spent
his breath in proving that God doesn't exist, and his life in proving that He 
2
does 1 . Moreover, if the many who have not heard the Gospel preached are to be 
condemned, Canon Hodgson suggests we are reverting to an immoral notion of 
predestination; or, if they are not to be condemned, are giving the Incarnation 
a very insignificant place in the Divine plan for the world.
(3) People who believe and are truly penitent but have difficulty 
in believing they are really forgiven would be helped if the 'objective accom- 
plishment' on the Cross could be pointed out to them. (4) According to the 
Abelardian theory of the Atonement, God suffers because man sins. But it fails 
to answer the question, 'Why does sin make God suffer?' (5) Finally Canon 
Hodgson challenges the basic premise of the whole Abelardian theory: 'Is it 
true that the state of the sinner's soul is all that has to be put right?' 
Even after the sinner has repented, he still needs to be convinced that 'God 
has neither connived at his sin, nor been worsened by it 1 . Canon Hodgson 
maintains that our Lord accomplished this two-fold work on the Cross.
'In the pain and suffering which He endured we see the divine 
repudiation of sin; in the manner in y/hich He endured it ("Father, 
forgive them") we see His absorption of its power for evil. Because
1. Franks, it should be noted, objects to labelling the Abelardian theory 
'subjective'. 'It is in truth fundamentally objective, inasmuch as God, 
Christ, His Cross, and the Divine love are all the objects of human trust 
and responsive love.' Hence he calls it the experiential theory, 'since 
the term experience implies both object and subject and the relation 
between them', (op. cit., p. 4.)
2. Mad Shepherds and other Human Studies, p. 25.
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in Him we see God we can believe that in spite of our sins God remains 
good and victorious over the power of evil.' (1)
Fairbairn wished to retain in his doctrine of the Atonement both 
the notion of the 'objective something 1 accomplished once for all on the 
Cross: he also tried to hold to the idea of penal substitution. Principal 
Franks maintains that such notions represent pre-Christian elements: to think 
of a 'cosmic act' without specific reference to the sinner's response is but 
to think in terms of magic, he holds. The idea of penal substitution he 
criticises when he argues against the conceptions of vicarious suffering and 
vicarious penitence on the part of Christ (as held respectively by Campbell and 
Moberly).
'These modern doctrines are still based on the notion of making 
sin forgivable, which abstracts from the personality of the sinner, and 
so misses the true problem which is to make the sinner forgivable.' (2)
Of these two contemporary points of view, then, I take it that Principal 
Franks would criticise Fairbairn for inconsistency, for not excluding more 
rigidly from the exposition elements which he would consider non-Christian; 
and that Canon Hodgson would allow that possibly Fairbairn, consciously or not, 
was modifying his Abelardian view in order to meet difficulties and problems 
in the theological interpretation of the Divine-human relationship which a 
thoroughly consistent Abelardian theory of the Atonement overlooks.
iv. The Church.
It would generally be conceded that Fairbairn was 'angularly 
Protestant'. He was completely out of sympathy with Catholicism, its polity, 
its idea of 'orders', its mode of worship. He had, moreover, as Principal
Dickie has suggested, 'perhaps greater faith in Congregationalism as the ideal
3 
form of Church polity than is usual nowadays'.
1. The quotations in this paragraph are taken from And Was Made Man, pp. 
95, 97. The five points are stated in Ch. V, section iii.
2. 0£. cit>, p. 184.
3. 0£., cit.s ?  61.
198
When viewing Fairbairn's ecclesiology in connection with the rather 
considerable amount of thought which has been directed upon the whole question 
of the Church and its function (as, for instance, in the preparatory work for 
the Oxford Conference, 1937, and the discussion there), it becomes apparent 
that he really had no doctrine of the Church. Even in 1898, in reviewing 
Fairbairn's Catholicism. Rashdall made this criticism of Fairbairn, a shrewd 
comment for a time when there was 'an almost general agreement in laying the 
emphasis on the conception of the Church as a religious association', when
 the whole conception of the Church was individualistic, democratic and atomis-
1 
tic'.
Rashdall criticised Fairbairn for belittling the visible Church 
and using all terms such as 'institutional', 'ecclesiastical' and 'organized' 
in a disparaging way, pointing out that though the Church is an ideal which 
has never been fully embodied in any single human society, yet it was meant to 
be so embodied, which at once means there must be organization. Rashdall 
himself was a non-sacerdotalist, but he maintained that Fairbairn's criticism 
missed its mark in tending to identify the Church with the clergy and in 
failing to realize that the chief purpose of the Tractarian movement (in all 
its phases) was to establish a more meaningful conception of the Church. This 
emphasis on an 'inspired authoritative Church', in Rashdall's opinion, was an 
advance on the historical Protestant conception of an inspiration based solely 
on an infallible Bible, Fairbairn, to be sure, did not follow this orthodox 
Protestant point of view. But Rashdall held that he also did not offer sugges- 
tions toward clarifying and elevating the conception of the Church, but rather
threw aside the concept as useless (so to say) and argued for a sheer religious
2 
individualism.
1. T 1 Hooft and Oldham, The Church and its Function in Society, p. 23.
2. In this connection Principal Garvie suggests that Fairbairn 'does not give 
due consideration to the conception of the Church in its unity and continuity 
as an historical reality, imperfectly manifesting the invisible Church, and 
yet functioning diversely in the visible churches.'(Lond.Quat.,op. cit.. p.35)
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Rashdall further pointed out that in arguing against the Anglican 
Church as it was in actuality but for the Congregational polity in ideal, he 
quite over-looked or at least failed to acknowledge the Church reforms which 
at that time were being advocated by high churchmen, and did not recognize the 
influence on Anglicanism of Reformation ideas which had gradually seeped into 
the Church of England. (One specific reform which was being suggested in High 
Church circles was the participation of the laity in Church government.) As 
a matter of fact, Rashdall argued that a high view of the visible Church need 
not necessarily be linked 'with such notions as a mechanical apostolic succes- 
sion or with the belief in sacramental magic ... They are no more necessary 
to a high view of the importance of the religious society yes, if you like, 
of an "organized" society and an "institutional" Christianity than a high view
of the State is dependent on mythical theories of divine right or social
1 
contract. f
Because of Rashdall's general sympathy with Fairbairn*s point of 
view, his criticism in this regard is of especial significance. Professor 
Webb also criticised Fairbairn (in 1903) for his lack of understanding of 
Catholicism as 'a certain turn or habit of mind in religious matters . . . 
which is passionately sensible to the solemn atmosphere of a sacramental system 
charged with the sacred associations of an ancient ritual, wherein the sorrows
and the aspirations, the penitence and the triumph, of a fellowship to which we
2 
ourselves also belong, are as it were enshrined. 1 Professor Webb is careful
to point out that this temper is not particularly Christian, may indeed be a 
hindrance to developing the Christian temper: but the same holds true for 
Fairbairn 1 s characteristic attitude of marked antipathy to all sacramentalism.
No doubt Fairbairn 1 s tendency to set ideas in sharp antithesis, 
_£O De noted in his style of writing as in all his thinking, led him often
1. Review of Catholicism, Grit. Rev., Vol. IX, 1899, p. 217. 
2! Jl. of Theo. Studies, o£. cit., p. 298.
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into extremist positions, and nowhere more markedly than in developing his 
ecclesiology. He set in antithesis, for instance, 'knowledge and thought' 
against 'institutions and offices',-a distinction which surely has little 
meaning when viewed even in the pragmatic light of the consistent contributions 
to religious thought made through the nineteenth century by the Broad Church 
leaders, who certainly did not repudiate 'institutions and offices' in the 
Church, as wen as by the High Church theologians towards the end of the 
Victorian era, even if granting the very dubious admission that the early 
Tractarians made no such contributions but only stimulated, as Fairbairn did 
not fail to point out time and again, the religious life of England.
Principal Garvie recently has asserted that Fairbairn 'again and 
again . . . opposes, and overstates the opposition of prophet and priest,
person and institution, spiritual and sensuous, in asserting his Protestantism,
2 
and assailing every type of Catholicism'. Fairbairn himself, even while
declaring that a minister can in no wise be considered as having priestly 
functions, inadvertently spoke of the minister when leading his people in 
public prayer as standing 'in their place' and pleading 'in their name before 
God'. In this connection Principal Garvie, speaking as an Independent Protestant
, 
suggests that priestly as well as prophetic functions can be delegated to a 
minister by a local congregation, which in this respect, according to Congrega- 
tional polity, acts as the Church universal. Although he further states that 
'no priest nor prophet can claim an exclusive mediation of the truth or grace
of Christ 1 , yet he also stresses that he 'cannot see how a delegated mediation
3 
is contrary to the Christian Gospel.' Nor will he grant that Fairbairn 1 s
1. It may be observed that Fairbairn inveighed against Tractarian scholarship 
because it was based, he maintained, on 'presuppositions'. Professor 
Brunner recently has argued against the notion of 'voraussetzungslose 
Erkenntnis' in Per Mensch in Widerspruch, pp. 45 ff. From this point of view 
Fairbairn himself approached all historical questions with the presuppositions 
of a Free Churchman.
2. Lond. Quat., op. cit., p. 34. 3. Ibid, p. 35.
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antithesis between spiritual and sensuous is sound, since all worship in being 
symbolical must to a degree express itself through the senses.
f ln preaching the Gospels, physical organs are employed no less 
than in the administration of the sacraments. . . If the prophetic 
function of declaring the Word of God can be committed to the Christian 
minister, may not the priestly function of conducting the worship be 
entrusted to him also? 1 (1)
In respect to his attitude toward the Eucharist Professor Webb 
pointed out that in denying that it was an institution for worship Fairbairn 
was not being true to his own principles. For on the basis of his interpreta- 
tion of our Lord, where he insisted that not only the historical events of the 
life of Jesus but especially those events as interpreted by His followers 
should provide the content of Christianity, a thing must be judged not only in 
view of its beginnings but of what it has become, and this was a fundamental 
principle in all of Fairbairn1 s work. Thus the question in this connection, 
according to Professor Webb,
'as of Christianity in general, so of the rite in which Christian worship 
is concentrated, is not what, if we ignore its subsequent development, we 
can descry it to have been in its beginnings, so much as what in the life 
and thought of the community it has become. 1 As with our interpretation 
of Christ, so 'in a secondary way we may say of the Eucharist, too, that 
in fairness this too should be contemplated, not as an isolated rite, 
but in the light of the meaning which it has gathered around it, of the 
ideas which it has come to symbolize: and what is true of the Eucharist 
in particular is true of the system of which it is the centre.' (2)
In addition to these criticisms, Fairbairn's conception of 
Christian worship should be considered in relation to a symposium which has 
recently appeared and which sets forth a representative Free Church view of 
worship for the present day. The symposium, as its editor points out, seeks 
to present a 'systematic study of Public Worship', partly historical, partly
interpretative, and as interpretation to serve 'as a vindication of the
3 
common tradition of our Reformed Churches'.
1. Lond. Quat., op. cit., pp. 34, 35.
2. Jl. of Theo. Studies, op. cit., p. 299.
5. N. Micklem, ed., Christian Worship, p. vii.
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Professor Dodd in his interpretation of the Sacrament of the Lord's 
Supper as »the sacrament of a transformed eschatology' stresses its two primary 
aspects, remembrance and communion: remembrance in the sense of recalling in 
the Sacrament that the Christian faith is rooted in specific historical acts 
and facts, communion in the sense of being a rite symbolizing to communicants 
the sacramental nature of the universe. 'The very act of taking food is a 
symbol of the fact that we live by that which we receive from the great 
universe beyond us.' Hence we acknowledge the dependence of the Self on the 
Not-self, which is the beginning of religion. Moreover, 'the partaking of 
good together is a symbol of the fact that we share with one another the life 
that we derive from the universe, or the power behind it.' Professor Dodd 
further points out that the death of Christ, which sealed the sacrificial self- 
dedication of His life ('that it may be communicated to men') is related to 
the Sacrament, in which 'we accept that which God gives, become that which He 
makes of us (by grace, not by merit), and render it up to Him. Worship is
here that which ideally it must be the return to God of that which came from
1 
God.' In contrast with Fairbairn's assertion that the Lord's Supper is not
worship of God at all, this re-interpretation of the meaning of the Sacrament 
strikingly reveals the change which has taken place among Free Church thinkers. 
For Fairbairn the chief act of Christian worship was the preaching 
of the Word. Stress is still placed on preaching, but it is not set in 
opposition to but made ancillary to the duties of the minister as priest. Mr.
Edward Shillito, in fact, speaks of preaching as the administration of a
2 
Sacrament, 'wherein God deals with man as a reasonable being'.
Principal Micklem in his essay on "The Sacraments" points out that 
only in historic Protestantism have the Sacraments always been conjoined with
1. Christian Worship, pp. 79, 80, 82.
2. Ibid, p. 218.
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the Word and hence only there have they not been 'degraded either to a mere 
symbolism or to an impersonal operation'. Fairbairn's inveighing against 
sacerdotalism, it will be remembered, was especially directed against the 
notion that man can take the initiative in the Divine-human relationship; and 
Principal Micklem makes this same emphasis, asserting, however, that God's 
action can take place in or through the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's 
Supper.
'But it belongs to our tradition and to the truth of the Gospel 
to lay all the stress upon the action of the living God. It is God who 
calls and regenerates, He who comes and gives Himself to us. His action 
is first and last; our worship is but Antwort to His Wort, an answer to His Word.'          
In this view the Sacraments are considered as being rather a corporate than 
an individual act, and chiefly a 'bequest'.
'They are the acts of God in His Church, whereby the opus operatum 
of Christ, never to be repeated, is, as it were, extended and brought 
home to believers.' At the Sacraments of the Word 'time is, as it were, 
rolled up, and that which in ordinary human experience we know as 
successive is seen in the eternal simultaneity of heaven. . . . the whole 
drama of Redemption is, as it were, present together before our eyes 
as visibly occurrent, and the promise of our own inheritance is sealed by 
the Lord Himself upon our wondering hearts.' (1)
Judging by this whole point of view, we may say that the Free 
Churches in Britain have been moving away from the extreme Protestant position 
represented by Fairbairn, or rather have re-interpreted historical Protestantism 
in a different dimension, as it were, from that understood by Fairbairn. This 
trend of thought shows, as Dr. Visser t' Hooft says, that 'the influence of 
the Catholic conceptions of the relations of nature and grace, and of the
sacramental character of all life, has permeated many sections of British
2 
Christianity, whether they be nominally Catholic or nominally Protestant.'
This movement, and that described in an Outline of a Reunion Scheme for the 
Church of England and the Evangelical Free Churches of England (first published 
in February, 1938), I take it, Fairbairn would not have encouraged, except
1. Christian Worship, pp. 243, 244, 256.
2. OB- cit.. p. 72.
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in so far as he repudiated the position he consistently defended in his 
writings.
In viewing Fairbairn's ecclesiology as a whole, it would probably 
be admitted that its chief value lay in making sharply definitive the extreme 
Independent Protestant position. In this extreme position, the Independent 
Church must be considered, as Dr. Visser t 1 Hooft has indicated, rather as
  sects' than as Churches, since 'the voluntary element in their structure is 
stronger than the institutional one 1 . These Churches, moreover, 'have given 
the most cordial reception to that particular theology which is characterized 
by an active concern for the transformation of social institutions in accordance
with what is believed to be God's Will, and by an evolutionary view of human
1 
history.' With the shift in emphasis in Christian worship described above,
however, has developed a marked stress on the conception of the Church visible
 and its importance as such as the embodiment of the invisible Church. At 
the same time the Independent Church has not lost its social emphasis.
Possibly the most significant factor about these changes and their 
relation to Fairbaim is that contemporary theologians (like Fairbairn) strongly 
affirm and base their re-interpretations of doctrine upon historic Protestantism,
v. The Kingdom of God.
It is not surprising that Fairbairn's optimistic interpretation 
of Christianity as a 'social gospel', the principles of which when more widely 
accepted would inevitably result in the establishment of the Kingdom of God 
as an earthly society, should fall somewhat flatly on modern ears. This 
somewhat blithe, evolutionary eschatology seems to have no point of contact 
whatever with (for example) Professor Niebuhr's 'reflections on the end of an 
era' or with M. Berdyaev's 'end of our time'. The latter writes, 'More keenly 
than ever I feel that night and shadow are descending on the world, just as 
1. 0£. cit., pp. 53-4.
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was the case at the beginning of the Middle Ages, before the m
edieval 
Renaissance.' This is indeed a far cry from the jaunty optim
ism of the 
nineteenth century.
That the Church has something to say in regard to the problems of 
social life, that the Christian ethic has at least some relevance 
for the 
problems of class and international conflicts, would still be gene
rally recog- 
nized, especially in the English-speaking world. Thus far at leas
t Fairbairn's 
emphasis on Christianity as essentially social in nature continues
 to have 
significance. 'Christianity is in its very essence the hope of an
 ideal 
society,' writes Professor Baillie. But the wide divergence from 
Fairbairn's 
Utopian conception of the Kingdom is seen when Professor Baillie c
ontinues:




It is not possible here to trace the profound changes which have 
come about in the conception of the Christian social ideal since F
airbairn's 
time, through Troelsch, the early period of the 'social gospel' 
(characterized 
in the United States by mentioning the names of Rauschenbusch and 
Gladden), and 
the time of disillusionment following the Great War. M. Maritain 
has pointed 
with deep insight to the three chief 'moments' in the dissolution 
of 'this 
proud anthropocentric personality' of post-Renaissance times (who 
still stood 
erect before the universe and his Creator in the late Victorian er
a): (1) the 
general acceptance of the Darwinian hypothesis of the simian origi
n of manj 
(2) the development of the Freudian psychology which revealed the 
true nature
of the inner life of man to himself; and (3) the 'revolutionary mo
ment' when
3 
all values have been 'reversed'. By giving some further attentio
n to two
aspects of this change, however, the true nature of the difference
 between
1. The Fate of Man in the Modern World, p. 7.
2. Address on "The Church", delivered at Swanwick, January, 1938.
3. 0£. cit, pp. 20 ff.
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Fairbairn's and the present Christian social ethic will be seen more clearly. 
In an essay on "Tolstoi and Jesus", significantly written in 1919, 
Dr. Heim pointed to the fallacy in the 'perfectionist' ethic of the nineteenth 
century by referring to Luther's discovery in the monastery he had entered to
escape the conflict between the Christian ethic and the world. Dr. Heizn writes
1 
of Luther:
'Er merkte, mit alien diesen Anstrengungen kOnnen wir unser 
eigenes Ich nicht besiegen, das immer sich selber sucht. Wir kttnnen 
nicht anders, als uns selber lieben. Auch wenn wir auf Ehe, Eigentum 
und Selbstbehauptung vbllig verzichten, Immer schleicht sich der Gedanke 
in unsere Seele: Wie heilig bin ich doch, wie hoch stehe ich flber alien 
anderenl'
It is this poignant realization that self-love cannot be overcome, that the 
tension between the Christian ideal on the one hand and on the other the persis- 
tent self-assertion of the I, that has wrought such a total eclipse of the 
Victorian world-view. It is the awareness of the reality of original sin again 
coming into the focus of attention. Man may know that a corollary of love to 
God must always be love to his fellows: but the knowledge does not lead, as 
Fairbairn was inclined to think it would, to ethical action on the part of man. 
Nor can man be persuaded, as Fairbairn thought he could, to give up of his own 
free will financial or political power he has garnered, when he is shown the 
social injustices involved in such centralization of power. Nor is the extreme 
individualism issuing from Fairbairn 1 s interpretation of Protestantism an 
adequate basis for a social ethic which shall in some way be made relevant to 
the corporate sin of man. Nor can man, by striving to imitate our Lord, become 
a 'little Christ'. All these propositions are consequent upon the Christian 
doctrine of man as held by pre-Renaissance Christian theologians and by the 
Reformers: the doctrine, that is, that man is creature and hence finite, that 
man is sinful by nature and inextricably involved in the corporate sin of the
1. Glaube und Leben, p. 507.
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race. The theology of transcendence, by its very extremism, has led Christian 
thought in this regard back to orthodoxy.
Certainly it would be generally held that Fairbairn's emphasis on 
the indissoluble connection between religion and morality steadily maintained 
in the face of nineteenth century attempts wholly to secularize morality was
sound. »It is true without qualification,' writes Professor Nygren, 'that
1 
Christian ethics are religious ethics.' And Professor Baillie asserts that 'the
attempt to divorce morality from religion and form it into an independent pro-
2 
vince was . . . the last absurdity of modern humanism.' But modern thought
for the most part, I take it, would not follow Fairbairn in his attempt to 
interpret the 'teachings' of Jesus (specifically the Sermon on the Mount) as 
an ethical code of action for everyday life which man through his efforts can 
more and more nearly approximate in his social relationships. Professor
Dibelius has referred to the Sermon on the Mount as 'not an ideal but an
3 
"eschatological stimulus"'. In this view the Christian ethic is not an ideal
which can be realized in this life. The f law of the Kingdom is not a positive 
code, but an Absolute which by its very nature must be transcendent. In this 
world man by striving cannot overcome his finiteness and be 'made perfect'. 
Yet man must continue to use the law of the Kingdom as a 'principle of judgment 1 
in judging among the relativities of this life. This is the constant 'relevance 
of an impossible ethical ideal 1 , to use Professor Niebuhr's telling phrase. 
The early Christians, while fully realizing the eschatological nature of the 
Kingdom, 'from the very beginning endeavoured to apply the laws of the Kingdom
of God to their own little earthly society, as far as they could be applied
4 
under existing earthly conditions' . But they did not resolve the tension be-
1. Agape and Eros, p. 68.
2. "The Church", p. 7.
3. Quoted in Ibid, p. 9. 
4- Ibid, p. 10.
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tween the Absolute ethical ideal and the relativities of the world and hence
did not seek to dissolve the human dilemma of being set in two worlds. As
1 
Professor Niebuhr writes,
'There is, in short, no problem of history and no point in society 
from which one may not observe that the same man who touches the fringes 
of the infinite in his moral life remains imbedded in finiteness, that he 
increases the evil in his life if he tries to overcome it without regard 
to his limitations. Therefore it is as important to know what is 
impossible as what is possible in the moral demands under which all human 
beings stand. 1
The difficulties in Fairbairn's approach to Christian ethics, when 
considered from this point of view, lie just here: that he failed to see this 
tension between the Absolute and relative, that he did not take into account 
the poignancy of the human dilemma, that he did not realize that man, since 
finite, cannot achieve perfection at least in this world. In seeking to make
the Kingdom of God a Kingdom of this world, he failed to comprehend that it is
2 
essentially 'an order for which we must wait'. He tried, indeed, to make the
Christian ethic relevant for every social relationship, but in seeking to make 
it directly applicable he lost the tension between its absoluteness and the 
relativities of human existence. 'And the" tension between this absolute point 
of reference and the limited possibilities and necessities of our earthly
situation is a tension that can never be relaxed so long as earthly life shall
2 
last.'
What is of permanent value in Fairbairn's thought has emerged 
through the course of this chapter, and it is not necessary to re-state it
here. If we are not apt to turn for guidance to his writings in our day,
f«
it is not so much because he has nothing to teachAas that he did not
1. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, p. 135.
2. John Baillie, op. cit., p. 12.
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elaborate his thought into a system definitive enough to lend a marked 
direction to theological thought. Furthermore, the general theological outlook 
has changed so radically that his speculative approach to religion seems to 
have little relevance for our day. At the same time we do well to recall the 
vigour of his theological thought, robust because undergirt by a vibrant 
faith which lived in the world of men where it had constantly to give a 
reasoned defence of itself. His apologetic for the Christian faith met that 
world with elemental power.
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